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Intergroup relations under a shared superordinate category: Ingroup bias as a function of prototypicality, power and respect.

Christine Dobbs

Submitted to the
University of Wales
in fulfilment of the requirements for the
Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Swansea University

2007

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Summary

The thesis examined subgroup-superordinate group relations, and in particular compared the Ingroup Projection Model (IPM: Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) with the Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM: Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). The subgroups were British and German or English and Welsh. The superordinate groups were The EU and NATO (Studies 1 and 2) or The EU and Great Britain (Study 3). Alongside relative prototypicality (IPM), power differentials and the degree of ingroup identification and superordinate category identification, as well as social reality constraints were considered. Study 1 (quasi-experimental, British-German, $N = 43$) revealed that the lower-power group (the British) demonstrated higher evaluative ingroup bias than the higher-power group (the Germans), and bias was fully mediated by the degree of ingroup identification, and, against the backdrop of The EU, by relative power. Relative prototypicality did not predict ingroup bias. In Study 2 (experimental, British-German, $N = 181$), the Germans were higher in allocation-based ingroup bias, the British in evaluative ingroup bias. Here, relative prototypicality and relative power mediated allocation-based ingroup bias in the EU condition. In the German sample, high dual identification saw the highest levels of evaluative ingroup bias. Study 3 (experimental, English-Welsh, $N = 184$) additionally measured the perceived legitimacy of sub-group relations. The higher-power English sample scored higher on allocation-based ingroup bias, and the lower-power Welsh on evaluative ingroup bias. Correlations supported IPM, that is, higher relative prototypicality was associated with higher ingroup bias. However in contrast to the predictions of IPM, lower relative prototypicality in the Welsh sample mediated higher evaluative ingroup bias in the EU condition, as did higher ingroup identification. Furthermore, no effects of legitimacy were found. Finally, simple slope analysis demonstrated that, consistent with CIIM, an esteemed superordinate category can promote intersubgroup harmony.

Declarations and Statements

DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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STATEMENT 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Where correction services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is clearly marked in a footnote(s).

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Abbreviations

CIIM.....Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman & Rust, 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000)

ICM.....Intergroup Contact Model (Brown & Hewstone, 2005); a revised version of MIDM

IMSR.....Integrative Model of Subgroup Relations (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a)

IPM .....Ingroup Projection Model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999)

MIDM .....Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model (Hewstone & Brown, 1986)

SCT .....Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner, 1981; Turner, Hogg, Oaks, Reicher, & Wetherall, 1987)

SIT .....Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986)

Chapter 1 Introduction

Social psychologists have long been interested in intergroup and intersubgroup relations. Under which conditions is inter(sub)group conflict likely and under which conditions might relations be more favourable? On the one hand, a wealth of studies have examined inter(sub)group conflict in a laboratory setting, where contextual factors can be manipulated and controlled. The groups are sometimes created by the experimenter (such as minimal group studies) and are sometimes natural social groups such as student samples. From these studies, significant lines of evidence regarding inter(sub)group relations have emerged, and thus furthered our understanding of inter(sub)group processes.

On the other hand, however, a naturally occurring social group comes with its own unique identity, history and content. Some members may be more committed to the group, and others less so. When making any comparisons between in- and outgroup, members may well draw on a shared superordinate group in the comparison process, and this superordinate group too may mean different things to different ingroup members. Finally, past relations between two subgroups could be of a nature that mutual liking or one-sided or mutual disliking reflects the general quality of relations between the two subgroups. These factors (and others, such as power differentials) are taken into consideration in the following studies.

It is, therefore, not surprising that findings from real-life group research often contradict the evidence found in the laboratory setting. For example in the minimal group setting, ingroup favouritism has been regularly identified irrespective of the

size of the group or its degree of power over the outgroup (e.g., Tajfel, 1972). In real-life studies, this is not necessarily the case. A powerful group may easily demonstrate its superiority against a less powerful group and, for example, claim more resources than the outgroup (e.g., Hornsey, Spears, Cremers, & Hogg, 2003; Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004). In contrast, the less powerful group may feel that laying claim to more resources than the outgroup is risky and with possible negative consequences; therefore it may seek other ways of claiming superiority, and show ingroup bias on the dimension of negative attitudes towards the more powerful outgroup.

The thesis examines intersubgroup relations between national groups, where groups share a common past and are both subsumed under a shared superordinate category. In other words, relationships are three-way lateral (ingroup-outgroup) and hierarchical (subgroup-superordinate group). The in- and outgroup are either Great Britain and Germany (Study 1 and Study 2) or England and Wales (Study 3). The superordinate categories are either The EU and NATO (Study 1 and Study 2) or The EU and Great Britain (Study 3).

The fundamental questions posed throughout the studies are: How favourable are intersubgroup relations? To what degree might the respective superordinate category affect the quality of subgroup relations, and does perceived relative ingroup prototypicality with the superordinate category improve or harm subgroup relations? To what degree might power differentials account for the quality of subgroup relations? What roles do the degrees of ingroup identification and/or the degree of superordinate category identification play in subgroup relations? When examining each of these questions, the social realities of the groups are given full consideration.

Chapter 2 comprises a review of the literature. Firstly, two 'parent' theories of intergroup relations are presented. These are Social Identity Theory (SIT: Tajfel, 1974, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT: Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherall, 1987). In broadest terms, SIT examines why and how people behave as ingroup members; SCT distinguishes between personal and social identity. Secondly, four models of subgroup-superordinate group relations are compared and contrasted. These are (a) the Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM: Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), (b) the Intergroup Contact Model (ICM: Brown & Hewstone, 2005), (c) the Integrative Model of Subgroup Relations (IMSR: Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a) and (d) the Ingroup Projection Model (IPM: Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). In some respects the predictions of some of these models overlap, in other respects there are contradictions. Thirdly, the roles of power and legitimacy in intersubgroup relations are discussed. Finally, due to unique qualities associated with national identity, the chapter concludes with a brief overview of contributions from other disciplines and from qualitative social psychological research on national identity.

Study 1 is reported in **Chapter 3**. In this quasi-experimental study, British and German participants were requested firstly to give their opinions on the two superordinate categories NATO and The EU. Thus qualitative data were gathered. Further data were empirical. Relative power under and relative prototypicality of the superordinate categories were measured, as well as the degree of ingroup identification and the degree of identification with the respective superordinate categories. Ingroup bias was measured on the dimension of attitudes. Findings

showed that relative prototypicality, relative power and the degree of ingroup identification mediated ingroup bias in some instances.

Study 2 is reported in **Chapter 4**. The experimental study examined the subgroup relations between Great Britain and Germany in three conditions; under NATO membership, under EU membership and, as a control condition, at the ingroup-outgroup level only. In contrast to Study 1, here ingroup bias was measured on two dimensions; evaluative and allocation-based. Findings showed that both relative prototypicality and relative power mediated allocation-based ingroup bias, but only in two instances. On the other hand, interactions between ingroup identification and European identification moderated evaluative ingroup bias.

Study 3 is reported in **Chapter 5**. This was to some degree a replication of Study 2. However, the national groups under investigation were England and Wales, the two superordinate categories Great Britain and The EU. Furthermore, as well as perceived relative prototypicality and relative power, the perceived legitimacy of relations was added to the model. One form of relative prototypicality and the degree of ingroup identification were found to mediate evaluative ingroup bias. Relative power played no role in ingroup bias, nor did the perceived (il)legitimacy of relationships. Examining ingroup bias as a function of ingroup and superordinate group identification, high superordinate category identification did 'limit the damage' that high ingroup identification caused on evaluative ingroup bias and on received respect.

The thesis concludes with **Chapter 6**, the General Discussion.

Chapter 2 Literature Review

The literature review begins with section 2.1, where the two 'parent' theories of intergroup relations are presented. Section 2.2 compares and contrasts four models that examine subgroup-superordinate group relations. Here terms such as recategorization, mutual intergroup differentiation, dual identification and relative prototypicality are introduced and discussed. Section 2.3 addresses two key factors that may affect inter(sub)group relations; perceived relative power and the perceived legitimacy of power differentials. Section 2.4 visits areas outside of social psychology that have contributed to our understanding of the uniqueness of national identity – areas such as social and political theory. The focus then turns to the qualitative work of some key researchers of national identity (e.g., Billig, 1995; Condor, 1996, 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

At the end of sections 2.1 – 2.3, the material will be brought into the context of the thesis. Some implications of and questions arising from the preceding material will be highlighted. The questions will draw on Great Britain and Germany and The EU and NATO (the two subgroups and superordinate categories in Study 1 and Study 2). The questions start simplistically, increase in complexity, and may be considered as an 'aperitif' to the actual research question.

2.1 Social Identity Theory & Self-Categorization Theory: The theoretical background

Social Identity Theory (SIT: Tajfel, 1974, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and/or Self-Categorization Theory (SCT: Turner et al., 1987) are the point of departure in this

thesis. SIT's theoretical underpinnings offer an explanation of why some groups (ingroups) might discriminate against other groups (outgroups). At the heart of SIT lies the assumption that ingroup members will strive to attain, maintain or enhance positive distinctiveness over the outgroup. Demonstrating ingroup bias, that is, entering into social competition, is one means to do this (others are described later below). Identifying oneself as a member of a particular ingroup requires the process of self-categorization (SCT). SIT, then, is motivational in its essence, and SCT, which builds on SIT, is generally regarded as a more cognitive-perceptual process.

2.1.1 Social Identity Theory (SIT)

Henri Tajfel, the father of Social Identity Theory, was a victim and survivor of National Socialism. His motivation was to find an explanation as to why such atrocities can occur. As a starting point he drew upon Realistic Conflict Theory (Sherif, 1966), where Sherif had demonstrated successfully that aggression is not necessarily an individual pre-disposition, but can be a form of collective behaviour. Tajfel sought to identify specific intergroup dynamics that might foster or suppress intergroup hostilities, and thus the first seeds of Social Identity Theory were sewn.

In his examination of intergroup behaviour, Tajfel (1978) places an individual's behaviour on a continuum ranging from interpersonal to intergroup. The more the individual identifies with his or her social group, the more likely they will act as a member of that group. Social situations may vary, and the degree of social identification in any given situation is a function of the degree of (a) group membership awareness, (b) the positive evaluation of that group and (c) the

emotional investment in that group. Purely interpersonal or purely intergroup behaviour is, according to Tajfel, the exception, not the rule, and the individual's placement on the interpersonal-intergroup continuum is also 'crucially affected by the individuals' perception (or rather interpretation) of the situation' (p. 43).

Tajfel (1974) suggests that individuals desire positive distinctiveness for their group. Should, for example, a lower-status group be dissatisfied with its relative position, SIT proposes a series of strategies that ingroup members might employ to change the status quo (e.g., social mobility at an individual level, social creativity or social competition at the group level). Social mobility is not always possible or desired. Social creativity might be a strategy choice of a low-status group, whereby, for example, it seeks a new comparison dimension where it does compare favourably to the high-status outgroup. Social competition is demonstrated when the group shows ingroup bias. Ingroup bias, then, is one identity management strategy and it can take several forms, ranging from ingroup favouritism to outgroup derogation.

Some have criticised SIT in that studies have failed to produce consistent evidence of ingroup bias (see Brown, 2000 for a review). However, from the outset Tajfel (1978) postulated that there are a series of factors that may induce or suppress ingroup bias. Firstly, irrespective of group status, the degree to which an individual will demonstrate ingroup bias (or not) depends upon the emotional significance attached to that group (Tajfel, 1978). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that ingroup bias occurs as a response to perceived threat (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Although threat is *not* measured in this thesis, qualitative findings

from Study 1 did suggest that threat played a role in subgroup-superordinate group relations. This line of evidence will be drawn upon later in brief.

Secondly and alongside status, perceived (il)legitimacy and (in)stability of relations and interactions between these are likely to influence the forms of ingroup behaviour (Tajfel, 1978). An ingroup can perceive itself to be relatively high or low in any combination on all three of these dimensions (e.g., high in status and stability, low in legitimacy). In an experimental study involving natural groups, Turner and Brown (1978) showed how these dimensions might affect ingroup bias levels (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Interactions between status, legitimacy, stability and their effects on ingroup bias (Turner & Brown, 1978)



High-status groups demonstrate higher ingroup bias than low-status groups. Perceived illegitimacy increases ingroup bias in both high- and low-status groups. Additionally, perceived stability renders higher ingroup bias in legitimate/high-status groups, perceived instability renders higher ingroup bias in illegitimate/low-status groups. This demonstrates that, given the opportunity, a group will show ingroup bias; a higher-status group in illegitimate conditions to defend its position or in a stable condition when it may fear no reprisals from the lower-status group.

Conversely a lower-status group will demonstrate higher ingroup bias in illegitimate conditions to rectify the status quo, and in instable relationships when chances of changing that status quo are more likely.

Thirdly and finally, ingroup bias comes in several forms, and a whole array of contextual contingencies may affect strategy choice. Jetten, Spears, and Postmes (2004) make two broad distinctions; judgmental strategies (e.g. trait ratings) and behavioural strategies (e.g. reward allocation). Furthermore, evaluative or allocation-based ingroup bias are behavioural responses (Reactive Distinctiveness Hypothesis: Spears, Jetten, & Scheepers, 2002), and are more likely to occur when ingroup distinctiveness is low, or when the ingroup feels threatened (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996, 1998). The two forms of ingroup bias measured in this thesis are allocation-based and evaluative.

Finally and crucially, the social reality of the group will affect its strategy choice. One need search no further than the original SIT literature or a military dictatorship to find support for this. As Turner (1999) points out, when striving to attain or maintain positive social identity, groups will be aware of their perceived social realities. The strategies that groups adopt is 'a function of an interaction between their status position (high or low), their beliefs about the nature of the group boundaries, the intensity of ingroup identification and their collective ideologies and shared beliefs about the nature of the social system and intergroup differences of status, power and wealth' (p. 9). In other words, collective psychological variables interact with social reality variables. Note that perceived social reality is not

'necessarily valid or accurate' (Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001, p. 341), and some social(ly imposed) realities are 'difficult to deny' or 'difficult to escape' (p. 342).

In summary, it is widely recognised within the realm of social psychology that SIT has provided a major contribution to understanding intergroup processes. However, it should be remembered that Tajfel's *leitmotif* was to understand why extreme intergroup hostilities (e.g. the Holocaust) occur, and he emphasised that SIT might be a *starting point* in understanding intergroup dynamics. Indeed, Tajfel (1981) cautions that the range of vision *must* accommodate 'the nature of the relations between the groups involved', in order to gain an understanding of specific intergroup relations (p. 166).

2.1.2 Self-Categorization Theory (SCT)

Turner's Self-Categorization Theory (1981; Turner et al., 1987) grew out of and is related to SIT, but the two theories are not interchangeable. As Turner and Reynolds (2001) discuss, SIT places the shift from personal to social relations on a continuum (Tajfel, 1974, 1978); SCT distinguishes between personal and social identity (Turner, 1978). SIT investigates status differences and offers explanations as to how ingroup members might act and react in response to these differences; SCT is concerned with the processes underlying becoming and being a group member. Once a self-categorized group member, the individual becomes 'depersonalized' and collective processes are enhanced. SCT, then, offers cogent evidence for social stereotyping, the self-concept, social influence and so forth. To use Turner and Reynolds' words,

'just as SIT provides a new way of approaching intergroup relations, so SCT provides a new way of thinking about social groups' (2001, p. 136).

Seeking to explain how individuals may behave in terms of a shared identity, SCT maintains that the process of categorising oneself as a member of a particular group is the crux of all group processes (Turner, 1991). Self-categorization is context- and situation-specific, and, once the individual has self-categorized – even under conditions where some members are actually unknown other group members – then the behaviour and attitudes proposed by SIT may come into operation. Cognitive-perceptual factors fuel categorization processes to a large extent.

There are a series of assumptions and hypotheses (Turner et al., 1987, pp. 44-66) upon which SCT is based, and these will not be discussed here at any length. Summarizing relevant assumptions, the representations of the self can be made at different levels (i.e. human, social and personal) and these take the form of self-categorization. At the social level, *we* can be distinct only if there is an *other* to compare ourselves against; comparisons with *them* are necessary if *we* are to exist. These comparison processes often draw upon the next higher level of abstraction, the next higher relevant category of shared membership. This brings us to the essence of this thesis; subgroup-superordinate group relations. The superordinate category serves as a frame of reference to distinguish between *us* and *them*, between in- and outgroup. When individuals draw on the higher level category, they may rate their group as more relatively prototypical of the superordinate category than they rate the outgroup. From this, Turner et al. hypothesise that the more highly the superordinate category is evaluated and the more relatively prototypical ingroup members perceive

themselves to be, the more likely it is that ethnocentrism might come into operation at subgroup level.

2.1.3 Implications and Questions

Bringing this sub-section into the framework of this thesis, the first question arises. Because the form of ingroup bias should reflect the realistic choices that an ingroup has in its identity maintenance, can we match specific forms of ingroup bias to specific national groups? If so, can we account for these choices based on their social realities?

Secondly, it seems apparent that social identification is multi-faceted. Prior to the development of SCT, Tajfel (1978) already hypothesised that as well as emotional investment in and evaluation of the ingroup, group membership awareness – *that is in SCT terms the degree of self-categorization* – serves to predict the degree of ingroup identification. Therefore, how reliably can the degree of ingroup identification be measured? Over the years, researchers have attempted to measure these dimensions (e.g., Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, & Williams, 1986; Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, & Cook, 1989; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), and most recent studies support Tajfel's hypothesis (Cameron, 2004; Cameron, Duck, Terry, & Lalonde, 2005; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Jackson, 2002). The degree of ingroup identification (measured across the studies with Cameron's three-factor model of social identity) reflects how willing an individual is to self-categorize into the relevant social group, and it can therefore reliably be used to predict an array of outcomes (Turner, 1999).

Finally, SCT brings subgroup-superordinate group relations into play. Are there differences in intersubgroup relations when different superordinate categories are primed? Might the British sample be more favourable towards Germans under NATO than under The EU? Similarly, might the German sample be more favourable towards the British under The EU than under NATO?

2.2 Models of subgroup-superordinate group relations

Having discussed the two parent theories, this section examines the four models that draw on these theories to develop their explanations of subgroup-superordinate group relations. Relations between in- and outgroups are context-specific. If we turn to any large social group, this will almost by default comprise subgroups; for example a national group can be divided into subgroups based on gender, occupation, ethnic background etc. (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). In this context, relationships are three-way lateral (ingroup-outgroup) and hierarchical (ingroup and outgroup under a shared superordinate category) (see Figure 2). The superordinate category provides a common ingroup, from which ingroup members construct group norms (Hogg & Turner, 1987). Therefore, we may legitimately draw conclusions about intergroup relations only when the groups are examined under the umbrella of a shared higher order group. The thesis seeks to do this.

The reader is reminded that the degree of identification at the ingroup level may vary from individual to individual, and therefore the degree of identification at the higher level may also vary from individual to individual. These two identification levels may interact, and the effects of these interactions may help determine the forms that

ingroup enhancement (e.g. ingroup bias) might take. Finally, perceived power and legitimacy (discussed later) may play pivotal roles in both high- and low-status groups' social realities (discussed previously).

Figure 2: Three-way lateral and hierarchical relationships



Four models of subgroup-superordinate group relations are examined throughout. Firstly, Gaertner and Dovidio's (Gaertner, et al., 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) draws on SCT and proposes that if ingroup members recategorize at the superordinate category level, this can improve intersubgroup relations. Secondly, Hewstone and Brown's (1986) Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model (MIDM) originally contested CIIM, and argued that SIT's propositions form the cornerstone in intersubgroup relations. If ingroup members maintain ingroup distinctiveness and appreciate outgroup differences, intersubgroup relations can be favourable. MIDM has since been revised, and the new model – the Intergroup Contact Model (ICM: Brown & Hewstone, 2005) – is integrated into the discussion below.

Thirdly, in their comparison of CIIM and MIDM, Hornsey and Hogg (2000a) offer in conclusion an Integrative Model of Subgroup Relations (IMSR). In doing so they

suggest that, by and large, MIDM is the stronger model in improving intersubgroup relations, but CIIM and its predictions may hold under some circumstances. Finally, as with CIIM, the Ingroup Projection Model (IPM: Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) draws on SCT. Its predictions, however, are contrary to CIIM. IPM posits that the positive evaluation of the higher order group can lead to derogation of the outgroup(s).

2.2.1 The Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM)

CIIM, originally presented in 1993 (Gaertner et al., 1993), has been tested in an expansive variety of real-life and experimental settings (e.g., inter- and intranational relations: Costarelli, 2006; Eller & Abrams, 2003; students: González & Brown, 2003; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b; organisations: Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996; Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Lipponen, Helkama, & Juslin, 2003; Lipponen & Leskinen, 2006; racial attitudes: Dovidio et al., 2004; Houlette, Gaertner, Johnson, Banker, Riek, & Dovidio, 2004; Nier, Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, Ward, & Rust, 2001). In 2000, Gaertner and Dovidio re-presented an extended model, illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: The Common Ingroup Identity Model



Note: Modified from Gaertner et al., (2000). The Common Ingroup Identity Model. In D. Capozza & R. Brown (Eds.), *Social Identity Processes* (p. 135). London: Sage.

In its original form, CIIM maintained that merging subgroups into one 'big family' would improve intersubgroup relations (see Figure 3, centre column, *1. One Group*). This requires the process of *recategorization* and *assimilation.* Consistent with SCT, categorizing oneself into a group brings that group closer to the self. In this sense, intergroup boundaries become blurred or disappear during the recategorization process. Therefore according to CIIM, if group boundaries are extended to a higher level of inclusiveness, former outgroups are thus included in the higher shared category and benefit from ingroup favouritism.

Furthermore, a perceiver will gauge and categorize the *other* based on, for example, shared goals and/or common fate (Oakes, 1987; Oakes & Turner, 1990). If a common goal can be identified, then the perceiver is more likely to identify the *other* as a co-member of the superordinate category which shares that goal. This line of argumentation has its roots in Sherif's (1969, 1979) Summer Camp Studies.

The idea that shared goals can result in a reduction of intergroup conflict has met with criticism (e.g., Billig, 1976; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Tajfel, 1978): unwelcome shared goals can exacerbate relations between subgroups. Nonetheless, Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) have pursued this concept further. Drawing also on Realistic Conflict Theory (Campbell, 1965; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; see also Sherif & Sherif, 1979), they argue that if resources are scarce and groups compete for these, intergroup conflict will arise; a win-lose situation. However, if a spirit of intergroup cooperation can be nurtured, the resulting win-win situation potential will see a reduction in competition, that is, in intergroup conflict.

In its original form, CIIM was cognition-based. The revised model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) acknowledges additionally affect and behavioural components, where individual needs and beliefs are primary when personal identity is salient, and collective needs and goals when social identity is salient. Figure 3, left column – *Causes* – shows possible predictive factors that may affect intersubgroup relations (e.g., intergroup interdependence, group differentiation). These factors may function independently or interdependently and may colour a person's perception of the superordinate category and its subgroups. The right column – *Consequences* – shows possible outcomes (cognitive, behavioural and affective). The direction of causality

may be left to right as depicted in Figure 3, but also bidirectional. For example, the impact of the consequences may lead to increased cooperation or competition. Representational mediators that may intervene between the two are depicted in the centre column. Of the four representational mediators, the first two are relevant to this thesis[1].

As well as now acknowledging behaviour and affect, Gaertner and Dovidio (2000, pp. 48-49) now maintain that the CIIM strategy 'does not necessarily' exact of group members that they relinquish their lower level ingroup identity, because 'it would be undesirable or impossible for people to relinquish these'. This new slant integrates MIDM/ICM (see Figure 3, centre column, *2. Two Subgroups in one Group*), which is discussed in the next section. There is no one-size-fits-all strategy to reduce intergroup conflict, but they propose that the representational mediators reflect 'complimentary approaches and ... that it is more productive to consider *when* each strategy is most effective' rather than which is the better contender (p. 33, emphasis in original). Furthermore, they add, the CIIM strategy can reduce bias over time.

2.2.2 The Intergroup Contact Model (ICM: formerly MIDM)

Many agree today that CIIM may be one of several approaches to reduce intergroup antagonism. However, in its original form (Gaertner et al., 1993) it did not accommodate affect and suggested somewhat that the 'one big family' approach is *the* most effective strategy in promoting intergroup harmony. Also, many argued that

[1] The other two are: *3 – Two Groups*): When perceptions of the aggregate are two distinct groups the current author suggests that attitudes to the outgroup may range from positive through indifferent to negative. *4 – Separate Individuals:* De-categorisation, on the other hand, reflects Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Miller, 1984) and may serve to satisfy an individual's need for both inclusiveness and distinctiveness

the SCT-driven CIIM did not profit from the motivational insights into intergroup behaviour offered by SIT, nor take the social realities of the groups involved into account. Hewstone and Brown's (1986) MIDM offered an alternative model of subgroup-superordinate group relations. To begin, MIDM is presented here in its original form as an untested model. Based on their own research (Hewstone, 1996; Vivian, Hewstone, & Brown, 1997) and the research of others, the model was later renamed the Intergroup Contact Model (Brown & Hewstone, 2005), and the refinements are presented later in this section. For the sake of clarity, the model is referred to as MIDM or as ICM where appropriate.

If we are to gain a fuller understanding of naturally occurring intergroup processes, we must turn to the social sciences and integrate their contributions (Hewstone & Brown, 1986). MIDM accommodates Tajfel's (1978) notion of the desire to attain positive ingroup identity and Turner's (1981; Turner et al., 1987) distinction between interpersonal and intergroup processes. Its rationale is as follows. Groups *will* differ on some dimensions, though not necessarily on others. Different groups will place varying degrees of importance on these perceived differences. The degree of importance placed by a specific group on these differences is an unknown quantity. Thus, what might be an acceptable degree of intergroup differences for one group, might for the other be not enough. In other words, if the outgroup is perceived to be too similar to the ingroup, the ingroup might feel that its unique identity is under threat, and ingroup bias or outgroup derogation is a likely response. Therefore, it might be more circumspect to focus on 'establishing mutual intergroup differentiation' (Hewstone & Brown, 1986, p. 35). If, they argue, groups could mutually appreciate both similarities and differences and recognise weaknesses and

strengths in each other, each group would be able to maintain positive ingroup evaluation *and* nurture positive outgroup evaluation.

Whereas CIIM advocates a policy of *recategorization* and *assimilation*, the original MIDM advocates a policy of *pluralism* as a means to improving intersubgroup relations. In the former, minority group members adopt the values of the mainstream group; in the latter, minority groups maintain their own distinct identity. Drawing on Berry (1984) and Triandis (1976), Hewstone and Brown (1986) are quite explicit in advocating pluralism. They caution that it would be 'both naïve and wrong to teach people that others are similar in all respects and to gloss over fundamental differences' (p. 10). Based on its own ingroup history and values, a real-life group simply may not want to amalgamate with a specific outgroup or outgroups, and this stance might be legitimate.

MIDM does not conflict with the CIIM proposition that working together towards a common goal can reduce intergroup conflict. However, Hewstone and Brown (1986) argue that improved relations cannot be attributed exclusively to recategorization. Rather, subgroups working together share an environment where they can acknowledge each other's strengths and weaknesses. In line with Gaertner and Dovidio, they too raise concerns regarding shared goals. Firstly, short-term cooperation (as in Sherif's (1969, 1979) Summer Camp Studies) will not necessary extend to long-term intergroup harmony. Secondly, if the ingroup does not feel that its contribution is adequately honoured, and/or if the ingroup does not perceive its role to be unique, identity threat might result. Finally, although a vast body of research (e.g. Aronson, Blaney, Stephan, Sikes, & Snapp, 1978; Johnson, Johnson, &

Maruyama, 1984; Worchel, 1979) supports the notion that working in co-operation can improve intergroup relations, failed co-operation can increase intergroup conflict.

Similarly, caution is called for when implementing a mutual intergroup differentiation approach (Hewstone & Brown, 1986). Policies promoting ingroup esteem might also promote ethnocentrism (Berry, 1984, 1997). Blatant outgroup discrimination might be replaced with a more subtle form (Mummendey & Schreiber, 1983, 1984; van Knippenberg & van Oers, 1984). Thirdly, in line with Stephan and Stephan's (1984) concerns, highlighting intergroup differences might bring with it perceived outgroup inferiority to the forefront.

What insights led to the revised ICM? The two main arguments underlining the original MIDM are (a) mutual intergroup differentiation must be maintained and (b) ingroup-outgroup encounters must be perceived to be at the intergroup level and not at an interpersonal level. In the revised model, the importance of mutual intergroup differentiation remains. The importance of intergroup level contact has been revised. As Brown and Hewstone (2005) acknowledge, the initial MIDM failed to recognise the power that outgroup friendships – that is, interpersonal contact – and intergroup emotions might have on reducing ingroup bias[2].

There are, then, essential differences between CIIM and MIDM/ICM, although the two seem to be converging. The revised CIIM acknowledges and integrates MIDM

[2] Additionally they have identified that group salience *moderates* the effects of contact on reducing ingroup bias, that is, group salience explains *when* bias reduction might occur. Intergroup anxiety (as well as other affective components) can *mediate* strongly between intergroup contact and attitudes towards the outgroup, that is, intergroup anxiety might explain *how* or *why* attitudes improve.

(see Figure 3, *2. Two Subgroups in one Group*). Similarly, ICM now lends support to some aspects of CIIM. Furthermore, both Dovidio et al. (2000) and Brown and Hewstone (2005) agree that the four acculturation strategies suggested by Berry (1984, 1997) can be linked to their strategies. Berry's *integration* strategy reflects dual identification (and IMSR, presented next), *assimilation* reflects CIIM, *separation* (i.e. pluralism) reflects ICM[3]. Additionally, further findings from acculturation research suggest that minority group members may favour a policy of integration (Berry, 1997; Zagefka & Brown, 2002), majority group members may favour a policy of assimilation (Pfafferott & Brown, 2004; Zagefka, Brown, Broquard, & Leventoglu, 2002). These two policies may therefore represent conflicting goals of minority and majority groups. What may be the better policy for one group and its interests may not necessarily be the better policy for the other group and its interests.

2.2.3 The Integrative Model of Subgroup Relations (IMSR)

It would seem, then, that neither CIIM with its strong recategorization emphasis nor ICT/MIDM with its strong ingroup distinctiveness emphasis can account wholly for ingroup bias causation or reduction. This leads to the third model of subgroup-superordinate group relations – Hornsey and Hogg's (2000a) IMSR. The model integrates CIIM and MIDM (not the later published ICM) in three-way lateral and hierarchical relationships (see Figure 2), with particular emphasis on the impact of the role of the superordinate category. The model considers both social psychological and political approaches, and, most importantly, brings CIIM and ICT/MIDM into

[3] The forth, *marginalization,* reflects Brewer's (1984) Optimal Distinctiveness Theory.

the non-contact situation, which, as Hornsey and Hogg point out, is how relations often are in natural group settings.

Whereas there is a wealth of experimental and correlational evidence to support CIIM, MIDM appears to have received relatively little attention (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). Against this backdrop, CIIM and MIDM were compared directly in a two-study series involving a student sample in a decision-making task (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b). In short, support was found for MIDM. Ingroup identification and ingroup bias were higher when the superordinate category alone was made salient (Figure 4, left, CIIM). Ingroup bias was lower when both levels of identity were salient (Figure 4, right, MIDM), however not significantly so. It also emerged that members nested within the superordinate category (CIIM) were more aware of being equally represented or not, and perceived inequality led to intersubgroup competition. A similar study with intergroup similarity-dissimilarity as independent variable brought forth a similar pattern of scores (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000c).

Figure 4: Structural relations between superordinate category and subgroups



Note: Modified from Hornsey, M.J. & Hogg, M.A. (2000a). Assimilation and diversity: An integrative model of subgroup relations. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4/2*, 143-156.

From the above evidence, Hornsey and Hogg (2000a) offer an integrative model of subgroup relations, where both subgroup and superordinate group identities are acknowledged and fostered simultaneously; a process of *dual categorisation* leading to *dual identification*. Interestingly, Hornsey and Hogg place policies of assimilation and pluralism on a continuum, where extreme assimilation involves the primacy of superordinate category identification and the absence of subgroup identity, and extreme pluralism the preservation of subgroup identification enhanced with superordinate category identification. In the integrative model, positive evaluation of the ingroup can extend to all groups belonging to the aggregate (CIIM), and ingroup distinctiveness can remain intact (ICM).

Supporting IMSR, Haslam (2001) argues that the original CIIM 'was partly dictated by the fact that it involved upgrading the erstwhile outgroup rather than downgrading the erstwhile ingroup' (p. 188), which might explain some cases where assimilation (and not dual identification) improved intersubgroup relations. Haslam maintains that subgroup-level differentiation is required for a superordinate category to emerge, and, indeed, to be maintained. That is, subgroup relations are more likely to be successful when subgroups are given a voice during the emergence of the superordinate category; thus dual identification has been made possible and the superordinate category mediates subgroup relations (Eggins, Haslam, & Reynolds, 2002: Exp. 2). Further experimental evidence to support the IMSR proposition has already emerged (e.g., Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1996; González & Brown, 2003; Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996).

Concurring with Brown and Hewstone (2005), however, Hornsey and Hogg (2000a) do note that groups place themselves in the three-way lateral and hierarchical relationship model based more on their perceptions of relationships and less on structural reality. In some situations, full assimilation might be goal-worthy, in others the pluralistic approach. Each approach, of course, comes with potential hazards. If the subgroup is subsumed within the superordinate category, it is 'land-locked' should relationships become strained (as shown in Figure 4, left). If the subgroup is not subsumed within the superordinate category (as shown in Figure 4, right) and perceives that, for example, the other subgroup is seeking to exert too much influence, again relationships can become strained.

In summary and consistent with MIDM/ICM, IMSR proposes that distinctiveness threat plays the key role in intersubgroup relations. As well as social reality considerations, other key factors such as power differentials may affect intersubgroup relations in natural groups. Consistent with CIIM, the superordinate category *can* provide subgroup members with a positive higher order identity, *can* under some circumstances subsume the subgroup but generally not, and a subgroup *can* be 'nested in a coherent superordinate category' (p. 143). The superordinate category should not, however, conflict with subgroup norms, values and beliefs nor threaten its distinctiveness (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). Recent findings support this. When comparing the subgroups *contract workers* and *permanent workers*, the degree of common ingroup identity mediated between perceived support given by the superordinate category (here the employer) and ingroup bias (Lipponen & Leskinen, 2006). Recategorization processes appears to function more successfully when the

superordinate category undertakes measures to promote good intersubgroup relations.

2.2.4 The Ingroup Projection Model (IPM)

The evidence thus far suggests that recategorization and assimilation can improve intersubgroup relations, though mutual intergroup differentiation and pluralism is more likely to do so. However, one model of intersubgroup relations that draws upon SCT predicts that recategorization can harm intersubgroup relations – the Ingroup Projection Model (IPM: Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). According to IPM, if the ingroup evaluates the superordinate category positively, it will project its own attributes onto the superordinate category, and may claim higher relative ingroup prototypicality[4]. This, in turn, may lead to ingroup bias or outgroup derogation. If the superordinate category is evaluated negatively, this might lead to the rejection of the superordinate category and a positive evaluation of the outgroup(s).

Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) illustrate ingroup projection with the following example: Pre-reunification in Germany, it was not likely that West Germans would rate East Germans on typical West German attributes such as efficiency and diligence, because two different political systems were in place and a common identity less salient. In a later study (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004), it emerged that both East and West Germans believe the dominant, higher-

[4] They liken IPM to the false consensus effect (Ross, Greene & House, 1977), whereby individuals overestimate the degree to which others share their views and beliefs. More recent evidence suggests that the overestimation of consensus on shared opinions operates within the ingroup, but does not extend to the outgroup (Spears & Manstead, 1990). In other words, the false consensus effect may shed light on projection processes from the individual onto the ingroup, whereas IPM offers an explanation for projection emanating from the ingroup onto the superordinate category.

status group *West Germans* to be more prototypical of the superordinate category *Germans* than the lower-status group *East Germans*. The same paper measured intergroup evaluation and perceived relative prototypicality in an informal group (motorcyclists) and a structured group (teachers). All three studies yielded evidence of ingroup projection, and from this Waldzus et al. (2004) conclude that IPM is a robust construct.

SCT provides the main theoretical thrust of IPM. Specifically, Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber and Waldzus (2003) turn to Turner's claims that 'ethnocentrism ... depends upon the perceived prototypicality of the ingroup in comparison with relevant outgroups (relative prototypicality) in terms of the valued superordinate self-category that provides the basis for the intergroup comparison' (Turner et al., 1987, p. 61). The ingroup's perception of the superordinate category mediates the relationship to the outgroup(s), whereby the superordinate category provides the norms against which the outgroup is judged (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). When the ingroup claims greater relative prototypicality, it does so with 'validity' and 'superiority' (p. 165). Due to its mediating role, we must turn to the superordinate category and its representation – and *not* to the initial subgroups – if we are to understand and counteract intergroup conflict.

In three respects, IPM supports MIDM/ICM. Firstly, it accommodates the mechanisms of natural groups, each with its own history and reality constraints. Indeed, a viable model must accommodate 'social facts and socially shared truths' which IPM does, because '[i]n-group projection can bend, but it cannot diverge from social truths' (Waldzus et al., 2004, p. 387). Secondly, IPM acknowledges that the

groups' past may not be enough to overcome current intergroup rivalry (e.g., Worchel, Coutant-Sassic, & Grossman, 1992; Worchel, 1996). Finally, IPM suggests that the continuum of perceived intergroup similarities-differences may be causal in negative intergroup relationships for one of two reasons; (a) perceived intergroup differences or (b) *lack of* perceived intergroup differences (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).

IPM does, however, bring into question the CIIM paradigm that a shared common identity at the superordinate level will increase outgroup evaluation due to generalization effects (Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), because the success of generalization effects is not predictable. Rather, any improvements in intergroup relations may be accounted for by depersonalized liking (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003).

Furthermore and contrary to the predictions of IMSR, IPM maintains that high dual identifiers (i.e. high identification with ingroup and with the superordinate category) show highest ingroup bias. Because this is a central question in this thesis, supporting evidence is examined here in some detail (Wenzel et al., 2003). Relationships were examined between students from different disciplines (Exp. 1) and between Germans and Poles (Exp. 2 and 3). From Exp. 1 and 2, it became apparent that those who identified highest with both the ingroup and the superordinate category (dual identity) perceived the higher relative ingroup prototypicality, and there was an association between relative prototypicality and negative attitudes towards the outgroup. Exp. 3 revealed that a positively primed superordinate category generated

more negative attitudes towards the outgroup, and a negatively primed superordinate category more positive attitudes towards the outgroup[5].

This notion has, in turn, received criticism from others (see Gonzáles & Brown, 2003). As a rejoinder, Waldzus et al. (2003) maintain that dual identity will not *in every case* lead to intergroup conflict. Mere superordinate category presence is not enough; rather, it is the *representation* of the superordinate category that mediates possible effects. The superordinate category is, in this sense, the prototype. Although the quality of the superordinate categories' representations were not of primary interest in this thesis, they are relevant in Study 1 and Study 2.

Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) suggest there are at least four representational qualities of the prototype. A prototype might (a) be clear or unclear, (b) have a large or small scope, (c) be narrow or broad, and (d) be simple or complex. These qualities were tested in a later study (Waldzus et al., 2003), and, in line with their predictions, undefinable and complex representations of the superordinate category decreased perceived relative prototypicality. Relative prototypicality was highest for dual identifiers when the representation was simple. Finally, if the representation was complex, there was no prototypicality effect even with high dual identifiers. It was concluded that the representation of the superordinate category must be both clearly definable and unitary, if the phenomenon of ingroup projection is to occur.

It appears, therefore, that the conditions necessary for ingroup projection are still somewhat blurred. For example, what of those groups who mutually agree on the

[5] These findings were 'of modest size' and effects 'small', but these nonetheless offered support for the 'basic theoretical predictions' (p. 470).

levels of perceived relative ingroup prototypicality? Here, Waldzus et al. (2004) argue that although there may be no contestation and thus no 'prototypicality rivalry', this does not rule out intergroup conflict. Secondly, what of those groups who reject superordinate category membership? Here, prototypicality is meaningless (Weber, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2002). Where shared norms do not exist, between-group differences cannot constitute norm violation. In cases such as these, IPM predicts 'plurality or tolerance[,] ... low comparability, disconnection, or exclusion' (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999, p. 169).

Summarised, an esteemed superordinate category can be likened to the container of positive values and attributes projected upon it by the ingroup. Members will regard both ingroup and the superordinate category positively (SCT). The higher the regard for the superordinate category, the more relatively prototypical ingroup members will feel. This perception may lead to ingroup favouritism and/or outgroup derogation.

Although IPM has examined perceived legitimacy and status differences (Weber et al., 2002), and Hornsey and Hogg (2000a) suspect that those groups who 'project their identities on to the shared superordinate category ... may be particularly strong [in] very high status, power, or both' (p. 152), the role of perceived relative power and its relations to relative prototypicality has not yet been examined. The thesis seeks to investigate any relationships between the two, and to establish which is the more reliable predictor of ingroup bias.

2.2.5 Implications and questions

It is apparent that the superordinate category plays a substantial role in intersubgroup relations. Of the four models, three converge to some degree; CIIM, MIDM/ICM and IMSR. CIIM explains the positive effect on intersubgroup relations that recategorization can have. MIDM/ICM emphasises the need for ingroup differentiation. Both models acknowledge their mutual strengths. IMSR proposes that both approaches can help improve intersubgroup relations depending on circumstances, whereby dual identification is the key. Perhaps a major contribution of IMSR is its definition of dual identification. By placing assimilation and pluralism on a continuum, one policy does not necessarily exclude the other. Not inconsistent with MIDM/ICM, but contrary to CIIM and IMSR is IPM. If a subgroup perceives itself to be prototypical of a shared superordinate category, it may demonstrate ingroup bias and/or outgroup derogation.

These models can lead to a multitude of questions in the examination of British-German relations under a shared superordinate category. For example, in Study 1 and Study 2 in this thesis, the superordinate categories NATO and/or The EU provide common ties between the subgroups Great Britain and Germany. Will differences in intersubgroup relations emerge depending on the saliency of the respective superordinate categories? Will the representation of the prototype affect intersubgroup relations? Will the group claiming higher relative prototypicality also demonstrate higher ingroup bias (IPM)? Will the group higher in superordinate category identification demonstrate lower ingroup bias (CIIM)? Finally, will high dual identifiers show higher ingroup bias (IPM) or lower ingroup bias (IMSR)?

2.3 The Roles of Power and Legitimacy

As well as the perceived social realities of the groups, the legitimacy and status (and thus power) of intersubgroup relations may affect ingroup bias (Bettencourt, Door, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Jetten et al., 2004; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Mullen, Migdal, & Hewstone, 2001). Additionally, although social identity theorists acknowledge that, generally, the ingroup will favour itself over the outgroup, there can be exceptions. Namely, *outgroup* favouritism has also been identified (e.g., Guimond, Dif, Aupy, 2002; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004, Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Finally, perceived relative prototypicality could serve to predict ingroup bias (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). However, there is little evidence to date to suggest that the interaction between relative prototypicality and relative power has been examined (although, as presented later, Weber et al., (2002), have investigated status differences and relative prototypicality). In this thesis, both relative prototypicality and relative power are measured throughout, and additionally, Study 3 explores the impact of *perceived legitimacy* on ingroup bias.

2.3.1 Power

It is circumspect at this point to differentiate between power and status. These are similar but distinct constructs. In an intergroup setting, power is typically defined as 'the degree of control one group has over its own fate and that of outgroups' (Jones, 1972, p. 416). Based on Sherif's (1966) Summer Camp Studies, it is generally acknowledged that demonstrations of power may likely become apparent in intergroup conflict. Status, on the other hand, reflects the standing a group has within

an intergroup setting, and it may be exhibited in terms of prestige, power, privileges and so forth (Hornsey et al., 2003). Status differences can promote or decrease ingroup bias, depending on the opportunities a group sees to change or maintain the social order (Turner & Brown, 1978). Power can result from status, although both can function independently of each other (Hornsey et al, 2003). Both power and status are relative and often reflect perceptions rather than actual reality, whereby power is also a reflection of 'a material fact of social relations' (p. 216). However and as indicated above, the degree of the legitimacy of the relative status and power brings with it perceptions of relations spanning from being right and fair to wrong and unfair.

It is interesting at this point to reflect upon a recent proposal regarding the nature of power. Turner (2005) questions the standard theory of power and its suggested direction of causality between ingroup identification, power and ingroup bias (control over resources). The view to date is that control over resources leads to perceptions of power, which in turn leads to influence (a reflection of social identity) and finally to group formation. As one point in question, this theory suggests that influence flows unidirectionally, from the '"haves" to the "have-nots"' (p. 4), and this does not align well with the reality of historical and social change, and associated strength of minority influence. Indeed, the approach suggests that the 'psychological group *is a precondition of influence*, not simply an outcome' (p. 4, emphasis in original). In response, Turner differentiates between, for example, persuasion, authority and coercion, and proposes in his three-process theory that control over resources is a result of power, and not vice versa. Furthermore, the degree of power evolves from the antecedents of group formation and the emergent

degree of ingroup identification. This proposal will not be examined in depth, but will be addressed briefly in the Results and Discussion sections of Study 2.

Returning to the standard paradigm of power, it appears that a more powerful group may abuse its power – one need look no further than a daily newspaper to see where this is the case in natural group settings. Indeed, it has been argued that a more powerful group has not only the *ability* but also the *means* to do so. The more powerful group will not necessarily fear penalties for its behaviour (Ng, 1980; 1982). Power differentials may also depend upon 'whatever other party may be significantly involved' (1982, p. 180) – within the framework of this thesis the superordinate category. Ng successfully demonstrated that the superordinate category (here a Select Committee in a university setting) can mediate between in- and outgroup. In his study, the in- and outgroup were represented ostensibly on the Committee, where the ingroup enjoyed majority power, equal power to the outgroup, or minority power. Discrimination was highest in the majority condition, there were no differences in discrimination levels in the equal and minority conditions.

In a later study (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985), participants allocated resources to in- *and* outgroup. Here, the ingroup held one of five levels of power (e.g., no power, high power, absolute power). Generally, the lower the power, the lower the ingroup bias. However, the high-power ingroup demonstrated higher discriminatory behaviour that the ingroup with absolute power. From this they suggest that an absolute power group can demonstrate benevolent paternalism or 'noblesse oblige' – possibly because it can afford to. In contrast, a high-power group does not have absolute control, its position is insecure, its response is ingroup bias. Furthermore, it

has been proposed that the noblesse oblige effect might occur when a high-status group is able to show generosity to a low-status group on a dimension that does not challenge its status position (Spears et al., 2001; see also Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002: Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002).

However, Vanbeslaere, Boen, van Avermaet, and Buelens (2006) argue that the higher power position may bring with it a degree of social responsibility (see also Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Overbeck & Park, 2001; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996). In their study ingroup bias was lowest when control over the ingroup or control over the outgroup was 0%. Ingroup bias increased significantly when control over either group was 50%. Ingroup bias decreased with absolute control over the ingroup, but not with absolute control over the outgroup. This leads to the interesting conclusion that it is not power over the outgroup that may lead to the noblesse oblige effect, but power over the ingroup. This effect may be due to 'individuals' feeling of security about the in-group's outcomes – rather than due to an advantageous position in an intergroup power structure' (Vanbeslaere et al., 2006, p. 696).

2.3.2 The Interaction between Power and Legitimacy

The legitimacy of intergroup relations and status differentials interact to produce differing levels of ingroup bias (Turner & Brown, 1978). Three primary theoretical approaches have been applied or developed to account for the role of legitimacy in power relations. All three differ in their essence, yet all three concur that ideas and

beliefs fuel notions of perceived (il)legitimacy. Two are addressed here, the third is outside of the remit of this thesis[6].

Firstly, System Justification Theory (Jost et al., 2004; Jost & Major, 2001) distinguishes between ego-, group- and system justification and the role of legitimacy in intergroup relations. In broad terms, group justification comprises those arguments laid down by SIT. At the system justification level – a level that Jost and colleagues claim has been neglected by SIT – both the dominant group *and* the subordinate group will seek to maintain the status quo if the system is justified. Here, then, members of the subordinate group internalise their inferior status, and this, according to System Justification Theory, explains outgroup favouritism.

This brings us to the second approach; SIT, which offers a different account for ingroup favouritism. A less powerful group will employ identity management strategies to attain positive distinctiveness, but research suggests that these are not necessarily at the cost of the more powerful group (Hornsey et al., 2003). Indeed, a low-power group may not be in a position to challenge realistically the high-power group or the status quo, thus direct social competition is not always a viable option in a natural setting. It is possible that a low-power group will therefore use more 'benign forms' to enhance the group's status, and these will 'reflect[...] the ideological content of group norms' (Spears et al., 2001, p. 337), for example by showing social creativity. At face value, this lack of social competition can be

[6] The third, Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) speaks of 'hierarchy-legitimizing myths' (1999, p. 77), and these myths empower dominant group members to deem ingroup superiority as right. The means by which the group expresses this is by 'the threat or actual exercise of naked force and the contents of "legitimate" social discourse' (p. 103). This theory argues that an individual will score along the social dominance orientation scale, and group membership will promote high scorers' beliefs in the rightness of the status quo.

interpreted as outgroup favouritism. However, a lack of social competition does not equate to the internalization of the low-status group's inferiority. Rather, the group may employ other ways that bend to reality constraints when managing its identity. This explanation accounts well for the lack of social competition – that is, this accounts well for 'outgroup favouritism' – and thus brings the explanation offered by System Justification Theory into question.

In their examination of the role of legitimacy of power differentials in intergroup relations, Hornsey et al. (2003) see power as a 'material fact' (p. 216), and this can have real outcomes such as the distribution of wealth and resources. They suggest, however, that perceived legitimacy is perhaps the psychological *interpretation* of power, and this perception may be of more import in intergroup relations than the 'factual' power itself. Perceived legitimacy may modify behaviour and relations, and past findings in minimal group settings (see also Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995; Jetten, Spears, Hogg, & Manstead, 2000; Ng, 1982) indicate that high-power groups show higher ingroup bias, and low-power groups more fairness or outgroup bias. Furthermore, illegitimate power might be more commonplace than one would assume. For example, those affected by tokenism (Kanter 1977; Moreland, 1965; Wright & Taylor, 1999) or ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001) may find it difficult to produce hard evidence of being the target of discriminatory behaviour. The power relationship is, in these instances, illegitimate.

Hornsey et al. (2003) tested the interactions between legitimacy and power. When relations were perceived as legitimate, power relations were seen to be fair. When relationships were perceived as illegitimate, power relations were seen to be more

unfair. Additionally, the levels of ingroup bias demonstrated were higher in illegitimate conditions irrespective of high or low-power, which supports fully the findings of Turner and Brown (1979).

Finally, relationships have been found between relative prototypicality, status and legitimacy (Weber et al., 2002). There was a positive relationship between relative prototypicality and perceived legitimacy, whereby the sample was drawn from a high-status group (i.e. university students compared with polytechnic students as the outgroup). There was, in turn, a negative relationship between legitimacy and ingroup bias (measured on the dimension of attitudes), but no relationship between relative prototypicality and ingroup bias (Study 1)[7]. Later studies revealed that the relationship between relative prototypicality and legitimacy was dependent on two moderators: the valence of the superordinate category and perceived status.

2.3.3 Implications and Questions

It is commonly acknowledged that power differentials are very likely to affect ingroup bias. And there the generalisation ends. A more powerful group may show higher or lower ingroup bias than a less powerful group, and vice versa. The perceived (il)legitimacy of the intergroup situation may well be the key to explain ingroup bias levels, and it seems that perceived illegitimacy brings forth higher ingroup bias in both high- and low-power groups (Hornsey et al., 2003; Turner & Brown, 1979).

[7] Interestingly, this negative relationship between legitimacy and attitudes to the outgroup is not consistent with the findings of others. (e.g. Turner & Brown, 1978). However, using pathway analysis, Weber et al. (2002) found that legitimacy was a significant predictor of attitudes, guilt and threat. They argue that this negative relationship is consistent with past research (e.g., Montada & Schneider, 1989; Schmitt, 1998).

Bringing these factors into the framework of this thesis, what impact does relative power have on ingroup bias levels? For example, if the German sample claim higher relative power against the backdrop of The EU, will it show higher or lower ingroup bias that the British sample? Will there be discernable patterns between relative power and the form of ingroup bias a group might demonstrate? What are the associations between relative prototypicality and relative power, and which of the two is the more reliable predictor of ingroup bias? Finally, Study 3 also looks at the perceived legitimacy of relations – here between England and Wales. Do relative power, relative prototypicality and perceived legitimacy interact?

2.4 National Identity

For the vast majority of individuals, nationality is bestowed at birth and is acknowledged as a truism. It provides us with the reference points to enact the rituals associated with that nationality, it specifies social norms and rules of conduct, and enriches its members, who perceive their group as unique, with a sense of belonging. Against this imposing backdrop, it is not surprising that national identity can, under some circumstances, become highly salient for some group members.

Social identity theorists have examined a whole array of group categories including national groups, and it seems that it can account well for inter-national group processes. However, given the unique attributes associated with national identity (e.g., group size, high group impermeability, permanency and so forth), it is circumspect at this point to reflect on the mechanisms of nationhood. Section 2.4.1 examines nationhood beyond the realm of social psychology, and draws on

contributions from sociology and social and political theory in doing so. Section 2.4.2 highlights in brief some qualitative social psychology research. The aim are firstly to illustrate how members make sense of their national identity, and secondly to demonstrate how well qualitative and quantitative research may together enhance our understanding of national identity.

2.4.1 National Identity and Contributions from other Disciplines

National identity, nationalistic sentiment and feelings of nation-ness are based on a customised past (Doob, 1964; Giddens, 1985; Smith, 1971, 1995) of an imagined (Anderson, 1983) or invented (Gellner, 1983) community. Group membership can be so strong that members are 'willing to die[8] for such limited imaginings' (Anderson, 1983, p.16). Why?

Consistent with Tajfel (1978), Anderson (1983) identifies a strong emotive element in national group membership. However, it is a series of 'cultural artefacts of a particular kind ... [that] command a profound emotional legitimacy' (pp.13-14), and furthermore, these artefacts are subsumed in an 'imagined political community' (p.15). In other words, we are placing the entity *nation* into the world and thus bestowing it with a more tangible form[9]. Nations are *imagined*, in the sense that the individual will possess an image of being a group member and will envisage other members, and this reflects the anonymity in self-categorization identified by, for

[8] (although, as Anderson (1983) points out, it is not necessarily the willingness to die, but the willingness to kill.)

[9] This leads us to Moscovici's Social Representation Theory (Farr & Moscovici, 1984; Moscovici, 1984, 1988) – which unfortunately also takes us outside of the remit of this thesis. In brief, this proposes that the category *nation* is an invention, whereby abstract concepts are made concrete, anchored to become familiar and then naturalized to become true. The resulting *we*-identity organises the present and creates a collective – and selective – past.

example, Turner (1981). Furthermore, the national group is imagined as a *community* despite any inequalities within the group, because membership is 'always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship' (Anderson, 1983, p.16).

However, any large-scale social group can more often than not be divided into subgroups (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a), so what needs to happen to unite subgroups and bring forth those feelings of Anderson's 'deep, horizontal comradeship'? In the face of common threat (to ingroup values, resources, identity) the nation is capable of acting as an aggregate (e.g., CIIM: Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Exceptional circumstances call for exceptional group cohesion.

Giddens (1985) offers two possible factors that could account for such strong and defensive ingroup emotions. Firstly, high ingroup identification brings forth nationalism. It provides the foundation for group identity, because it offers members the security of being able to draw upon a common past. Secondly this may be coupled with a need for a certain degree of homogeneity. This, he argues, is essential within a nation-state to ensure its healthy economy – and homogeneity can be maintained in the present, for example by maintaining a common past.

However, since nationalist sentiment is neither a constant in a given society nor representative of all group members (Gellner, 1994), Giddens (1985) attempts to pinpoint nationalism in the European nation-state more precisely. Nationalism does not form an intrinsic part of everyday social life, but becomes salient when the 'communality [provided by nationalism] ... supplies one means of support for ontological security, particularly where there is a perceived threat from outside the

state' (p. 218). This tallies with Anderson's (1983) willingness-to-die proposition, with Gellner's (1983) suggestion that territory is perceived as a non-shareable commodity, and with an array of social identity research linking threat with outgroup derogation (e.g. Branscombe et al., 1999; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997).

Threat can, of course, come from within or outside of the state; from within the ingroup or from outgroups. What mechanisms have nations developed to deal with threat? Gellner (1964, 1983, 1994) describes these. Firstly, he differentiates between state and nation. *The State* is 'that agency in society which possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence' (1983, pp. 3-4). Its bodies, such as the police and the military, are 'separated out from the rest of social life' and these bodies only may legitimately demonstrate violence. *The nation* is more difficult to define:

> Having a nation is not an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to appear as such. ... What then is this contingent, but in our age seemingly universal and normative, idea of the nation? (pp. 6-7).

Gellner (1983) acknowledges that nationality serves a normative function and that viewing one's own nation extremely more positively than the other nation(s) can bring forth nationalism. The State provides the legal framework for the nation, and it may be likened to a 'container of power' that may legitimately perform harmful acts to protect the group. In simple terms, the nation is our home; the state protects us.

In turn, the ingroup creates subgroups such as the military (to deal with external threat) and the police (to deal with internal threat), and these have the ability and the means to perform damaging acts upon outgroups (and deviant subgroups). If the threat is external, where 'standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high

cultures, [which pervade] entire populations and not just elite minorities' may be found, 'men [*sic*] will be politically united with all those, and only those, who share their culture' (p. 55). The nation stands as one. If the threat is internal, other countermeasures may be undertaken. Coupled with the desire to maintain a high ratio of ingroup members (i.e. fellow nationals) and a low ratio of outgroup members (i.e. non-nationals and deviant fellow nationals) within a given state,

> a territorial political unit can only become ethnically homogeneous ... if it either kills, or expels, or assimilates all non-nationals. Their unwillingness to suffer such fates may make the peaceful implementation of the nationalist principle difficult (Giddens, 1985, p. 2).

This dramatic statement does sadly reflect ingroup bias in its most extreme form – outgroup hatred.

2.4.2 National Identity and qualitative Research

Turning to the qualitative domain of social psychology, it is fair to state that, in the eyes of some, experimental social psychology and social identity research have come under some criticism for their treatment of national identity. The major criticism is that the national group is often treated as any other large-scale social group, and its uniqueness is somehow ignored (Billig, 1995; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Indeed, Cinnirella (1996) takes this one step further and suggests that group beliefs can be so varied in large-scale groups *per se*, that this makes the definition of ingroup norms extremely difficult. As well as variability within groups (Condor, 1996), another area that SIT and SCT do not adequately address is variability across time (Billig, 1976, 1995). Additionally, SIT and SCT, which examine the dynamics of intergroup processes, do not explain individuals' social constructions or social actions. These

latter criticisms are justified – if the aim is to look at social change over time or to turn from intergroup processes to individuals' belief systems.

However, one should never dismiss any evidence that may deepen understanding of the research area. To draw on two comments from Reicher and Hopkins (2001), if we are to understand what national identity means, firstly '[w]e need to elaborate psychological constructs that act as a pivot between structure, culture and ideology on the one hand and understanding and action on the other' (p. 6), and secondly we need to understand 'how distant past can shape present actions' (p. 6). Although the thesis examines the dynamic *intergroup* processes between subgroups and superordinate categories and not how *individuals* construct meaning and content to their (national) social worlds, some interesting and relevant qualitative findings are detailed below.

Should the research aim be to deconstruct identity, then tapping into social representations and/or analysing discourse are eminently sensible ways of doing so. These findings can, in turn, feed back into the parent theories SIT/SCT and the subgroup-superordinate group models that draw upon these. As a case in point, Lui and Hilton (2005) argue that social representations are central to our understanding of intergroup relations in the inter-national environment. For example, based on a study by Dresler-Hawke (2000) and social representational data, they examine what happens when an ingroup member is placed into an unwelcome social category (here Germans visiting Holocaust memorials accompanied either by fellow Germans or by Jewish individuals). Two identity management strategies became apparent when an unwelcome social category was imposed upon individuals; self-(re)categorization at

the European or regional level, or by 'denying culpability' and distancing oneself temporally from the atrocities (p. 545). Here, then, recategorization at the European level can serve the individual as an identity management strategy for individuals in a situation-specific low-status group. Indeed, it has been found in experimental research that this is sometimes the case (Hornsey & Hogg, 2002).

As well as drawing on social representations, it is generally accepted that discourse analysis or analysis of interview data can bring out those finer points that written responses would fail to capture. Indeed, Potter and Wetherell (1995; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) argue that this method is essential to further our understanding of belief systems. Additionally, if it is combined with an eye to linking to social representations, very rich findings can result (Potter & Wetherell, 1998).

In particular, discourse analysis can reveal individuals' degree of identification with a particular social group in a very subtle way, for example the differences between referring to 'we British' as opposed to 'the British'. A major contributor in the field of English-ness is Condor (1996, 2000, 2006). Some key findings (1996) are that English people display a reluctance to vocalise national pride, and tend to draw on the category 'English' at home and to be uncomfortable with the category 'British', but will draw on the category 'British' when abroad. This could be interpreted as the respondents' need to maintain ingroup distinctiveness when in the UK (i.e. self-labelling as being English), and to present as a member of a common ingroup when abroad (i.e. self-labelling as British).

To add to the complexity of her findings, the consensus of respondents when asked to define a 'typical English' person brought forth two very different prototypes; either the gentleman/gentlewoman or the lager lout. This observation could have implications for studies on social stereotypes in national settings. For example, it is commonplace in this line of research to have participants to rate a 'typical target-group member' on a list of specific traits. However, taking Condor's (1996) findings into consideration, common sense dictates that the two prototypes possess contradictory characteristics, which in turn could affect the target group's overall favourableness rating. Might it not therefore be circumspect for the researcher(s) to adopt a more differential approach, for example by employing additionally open ended responses where participants may describe themselves the typical target-group member?

In the more recent study and in contrast to the earlier studies, respondents were not directed to think in terms of being British or being English (Condor, 2006). In the interviews, some English respondents used 'English', 'England' etc., others used 'British', 'Britain' etc. The reason for using the latter set of terms was, as Condor interpreted, often a question of moral judgement. She likens this to:

> a lay version of the common in-group model (Gaertner [et al.,] 1993) ... [where the respondent] casts the use of the category English as promoting particularistic group self-interest ... and a potential threat to public order ... In contrast, the use of the category British allows for the establishment of '*common ground*' ... promoting future social harmony (p. 672, respondent data italicised in original).

It is findings such as these that can provide a most interesting starting point for further, empirical study.

Two issues relevant to this thesis remain; the implications of social change in general and the emergence of The EU. Apart from the impact of EU membership discussed later, the groups under investigation in this thesis have experienced dramatic social change (Germany's reunification in 1990) or are in the process of changing (the devolution processes in the UK). As well as the implications for the social groups, Hopkins and Reicher (1998) stress that such changes have implications for the individual. '[P]eople's representations of who they are and their relationship with others, categories and identities that were once routinely used in self-definition' (p. 69) are challenged. This in turn presents a challenge for research. One solution is to integrate SIT and Social Representation Theory, the former shedding light on needs and motivations, the latter showing how individuals may construct their current social (changing) world (Breakwell, 1992; De Rosa; 1998). This combined approach is at first viewing promising, though it is questionable to what extent the intergroup focus of SIT would sit with the individualist focus of Social Representation Theory. Nonetheless, De Rosa has constructed an impressive design for a long-term and multinational study, and her findings are awaited with interest.

The emergence and the growth of The EU has, for some, brought with it the perceived threat of being 'overtaken' by a higher order. For most, it likely poses the question of where to place one's national group in this growing setting, and whether embracing the new 'parent' will be in the group's interest or not. For example, Chryssochoou (2000) found that group self-interest is an essential component in evaluating The EU. Here, participants from France (a stronger member of The EU) and Greece (a weaker member of The EU) provided social representations of The EU (Study 1), and the evaluation (on economic, political and cultural dimensions) of

their respective status within The EU was measured (Study 2). Qualitative findings showed that both groups identified areas of self-interest. For the French, EU membership made them stronger in the world. Furthermore, The EU supports French values, and thus categorization at the EU level was not rejected (although not actively sought either). In contrast, although Greek respondents felt economically inadequate, feared that other members would share this perception, and felt dependent on The EU, EU membership was nonetheless deemed positive in that it strengthened national security and economic stability, that is, promoted the group's interest. Empirical evidence supported qualitative findings.

Summarising this brief overview, attention has been drawn to the following. Firstly, many argue that there are limitations to empirical research on large-scale (national) groups and their social identities. By examining qualitative evidence either additionally or simultaneously, a more complete picture can emerge. Paying adequate tribute to both approaches within this thesis would exceed its scope – and indeed its aims. There are, then, 'planned limitations' here, both theoretically and methodologically.

Secondly, Social Representation Theory (Farr & Moscovici, 1984; Moscovici, 1984, 1988) is not considered in the following studies, despite substantial evidence that it links past to present very neatly, and that is can compliment SIT well. Deconstructing national identity and ideology was not our aim. Nonetheless and relevant to this thesis, the potential impact of social change against the backdrop of the emergence of The EU and German Reunification has been addressed peripherally (De Rosa, 1998; Hopkins & Reicher, 1998). Additionally, a study was presented that

illustrated both the effectiveness of merging qualitative with quantitative data and comparing two national groups and their perceptions of EU membership (Chryssochoou, 2000). Based on social representations, it was found that for both groups self-interest was an essential component when evaluating The EU, but for different reasons. The follow-up study (empirical) brought forth similar findings.

Finally, and specifically because it is relevant to this thesis, we have examined some of the works of Condor (discourse analysis; 1996, 2000, 2006) on Englishness and Britishness, and of Lui and Hilton (social representations; 2005) on German identity management strategies. Both (see Condor, 2006) provide evidence of recategorization at a higher level of abstraction (CIIM), albeit for two different purposes. This strategy in those who identify as British rather than English was interpreted as a means of distancing the self from the self-interest associated with being English *in the present*, and in the German context as a means of distancing the self from the atrocities committed *in the past* by national socialists.

It is true to say that the subsection presented here only skims the surface of the enrichment that a qualitative approach can provide. However, it is also true to say that many of these contributions (both those cited above and others) served to inform the author in the design of the empirical studies and to enrich *her* understanding of what national identity might, in fact, be.

Chapter 3 Study 1

A vast body of research suggests that the awareness of a shared superordinate category is, under certain conditions, likely to influence intersubgroup relations. Two major models underpinning this notion are Gaertner and Dovidio's (Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM), and Brown and Hewstone's (2005; Hewstone & Brown, 1986) Intergroup Contact Model (ICM).

CIIM, which draws on Turner's Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987) and also Realistic Group Conflict Theory (Sherif, 1967), advocates a process of recategorization and assimilation. Here subgroup members focus simultaneously on intersubgroup commonalities such as shared goals and common fate under the superordinate category, and this is not necessarily at the price of ingroup identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). ICM proposes that groups *will* differ, and therefore the key to promoting intergroup relations is pluralism. Thus tribute is paid to distinctive subgroup identity within a shared superordinate category identity, and the weaknesses and strengths of subgroups are acknowledged and respected.

Comparing CIIM with the earlier version of ICM, the Mutual Intergroup Differentiation Model (MIDM; Hewstone & Brown, 1986), Hornsey and Hogg (2000a) conclude that subgroup identity should be maintained rather than weakened. Their Integrative Model of Subgroup Relations (IMSR) does however identify areas where recategorization might help reduce intergroup bias. Furthermore in the extended CIIM, pluralism and assimilation are viewed as complimentary approaches

to intersubgroup relations, and recategorization may reduce bias over time (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

In opposition to CIIM and its predictions, though not contrary to the notions of ICM, lies the Ingroup Projection Model (IPM; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). IPM proposes that, under certain conditions, the awareness of a shared superordinate category may have a negative impact on intersubgroup relations. The ingroup will turn to the superordinate category when comparing *us* to *them*. If the ingroup perceives itself to be more relatively prototypical of the superordinate category than it perceives the outgroup to be and the outgroup is deemed as deviant, this can lead to higher ingroup bias.

Despite essential differences between these models, there are commonalities between them. For example, the superordinate category should be positively evaluated by the subgroup if their respective theoretical projections are to hold true. Similarly, all agree that the subgroup(s) involved may be of such a nature as to override either sets of predictions. For example, a subgroup may be high in ingroup bias *per se*, or the relationship between two subgroups may be fraught with past conflict.

Additionally, all concede that their respective prognoses on intersubgroup relations are dependent upon certain factors, such as power, status, similarity, the degree of ingroup identification and the legitimacy of relations (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Guimond et al., 2002; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a; Hornsey et al., 2003; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996; Jetten, et al., 2001; Spears et al., 1997; Turner & Brown, 1978; Verkuyten & Hagendoorn, 1998; Weber et al., 2002).

The focus of this study was on intersubgroup relations under a shared superordinate group. Alongside relative prototypicality, the two other key factors examined were relative power and the degree of ingroup identification. Ingroup bias as the possible outcome of these factors was measured on the dimension of attitudes. The groups under investigation were the two subgroups Great Britain and Germany, and the two superordinate categories The EU and NATO.

Relative prototypicality

The main thrust of this study was to test IPM and compare it with competing models of intergroup relations. Does higher relative prototypicality in relation to an esteemed superordinate category increase (IPM) or decrease (CIIM) ingroup bias? Furthermore, although Mummendey and colleagues have regularly found supporting evidence for ingroup projection (e.g., Waldzus et al., 2004; Wenzel et al., 2003), it is not yet entirely clear under which conditions this might occur. For example, the representation of the superordinate category may need to be well-defined (Waldzus et al., 2003), and qualitative analysis from this study may show that this is the case. There were strong reasons to believe that Germans would claim higher relative prototypicality against the backdrop of The EU, because European identification is higher than German identification (Wenzel et al., 2003). Conversely, it was thought possible that both national groups would deem Great Britain to be the more relatively prototypical of NATO, because Great Britain enjoys close ties to the USA, a dominating NATO member. This, however, remained to be tested.

Laboratory studies of power using the minimal group paradigm show that high power groups tend to show more ingroup bias than low power groups because they have 'usable power' to justify ingroup bias (Ng, 1982; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991). However in more naturalistic settings such as in this study, low power (and status) will be threatening to identity. Therefore more subtle forms of ingroup bias and identity protection strategies that acknowledge social reality constraints may emerge (Spears et al., 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Brown, 1978), and these forms are not necessarily detrimental to the more relatively powerful outgroup (Hornsey et al., 2003). Furthermore, ingroup bias demonstrated by both high and low power groups may very well be influenced by the perceived stability and legitimacy of the groups' positions (Turner & Brown, 1978; Hornsey et al., 2000; Weber et al., 2002).

In this study, it was assumed that relations between national groups are relatively stable, the effects of perceived legitimacy were also *not* examined here. Rather, perceived relative power was measured, and it was expected that the British sample would claim higher power in the context of NATO, and the German sample in the context of The EU. It was of interest to observe whether high or low power groups show higher ingroup bias, and whether the patterns of relative power scores mirror relative prototypicality scores. Indeed, Hornsey and Hogg (2000a) suspect that ingroup projection is more likely to occur when the ingroup is high in status and/or power, and Weber et al. (2002) see links between relative prototypicality and ingroup bias in high-status groups.

Many argue that the degree of ingroup identification – in particular the affective component of social identity and/or perceived identity threat – is the strongest predictor of ingroup bias, where high scorers show highest ingroup bias (Cameron, 2004; Ellemers et al., 1999; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b, 2000c; Jackson, 2002; Lipponen et al., 2003). However, aspects of the British-German intergroup context may reveal a different picture, not least when we take into account the relation to The EU in particular. From studies examining national and European identity with The EU as salient superordinate group, the following findings have emerged. German citizens have a higher sense of European than of German identity (Wenzel et al., 2003). The EU is associated with identity threat for British citizens (Cinnirella, 1997) and introducing Germans as a fellow sub-group member of The EU decreases European identification significantly (Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000).

In summary, it is generally acknowledged that investigations of subordinate-superordinate group relations need to make clear the superordinate category (and whether it is contextually salient) as well as the relation to that category (whether it also valued). It is also generally acknowledged that a shared past history between in- and outgroup may be of such a nature as to override theoretical models of intersubgroup relations. For these reasons it was considered circumspect to begin the study series with a quasi-experimental study, in order to gauge 'the general picture' regarding British-German relations under both specific superordinate categories. To this end, a series of research questions were formulated.

Firstly, what mental representations and beliefs do the two national groups hold regarding NATO and The EU? Given the qualitative data collection at this point, one could only speculate here. It was thought that, overall, the British sample would hold NATO in *higher esteem* and The EU in *lower esteem.* This would reflect the 'special relationship' Great Britain enjoys with the USA, a dominant NATO member, and British *Euroscepticism*. Overall, an opposite picture was expected from the German sample.

Secondly, it was expected that The EU would pose an *identity threat* to British participants, whereas NATO would not, and that neither The EU nor NATO would pose an identity threat to German participants. It was likely that The EU would be regarded as a *threat to economic prosperity* in the German sample only. In Germany the fall in purchasing power has become apparent since the introduction of the Euro. In contrast, Great Britain has declined to join the European Monetary Union, and thus it was thought that there would be no associations between The EU and economic prosperity in the British sample. It was also thought that NATO, given its militaristic nature and US American dominance, could be construed as a *threat to peace* in the German sample, and as a source of *ensuring peace* in the British sample.

Thirdly and finally, it was assumed that both groups would demonstrate *more knowledge* of the workings of The EU than of NATO, because the former has more impact on day-to-day life than the latter. If this were the case, then it could indicate that the mental representations of The EU are more clearly defined, and those of

NATO less so. In turn, these differences might lead to ingroup projection in The EU context, but not in the NATO context.

A priori *assumptions*

Further analysis was quantitative; a series of *a priori* assumptions were made.

Superordinate category evaluation: As a starting point and consistent with anticipated qualitative responses and other published research, it was expected that British evaluation of The EU would be significantly lower than evaluation of NATO, and that the opposite would hold true for the German sample.

Identification measures: In line with past research, it was assumed that ingroup identification would be higher in the British sample (Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000), and European identification higher in the German sample (Wenzel et al., 2003). It was also expected that the British sample would draw significantly on sub-groups in their self-definition (e.g., Welsh, Scottish, English), but not on European identity. Conversely, the German sample[10] would draw on European identity but not on its sub-groups (i.e., East or West German).

Relative power and relative prototypicality: A pattern of scores was anticipated whereby the British sample would be higher in relative prototypicality and relative power in the NATO context, and conversely the German sample in the EU context (i.e. within-subjects). It was also necessary to examine between-subjects differences in relative prototypicality. According to IPM, if the claim to higher relative

[10] Note that the German sample drew on West German participants in the main. This point is addressed further in the Results section.

prototypicality between groups is contested, ingroup projection might occur (although if it is not, this will not necessarily rule out intergroup conflict; Waldzus et al., 2004)). It was assumed that both groups would agree that Germany was more relatively prototypical of The EU, no assumptions were made regarding NATO.

What are the relationships between relative prototypicality, relative power, the degree of ingroup identification and the degree of European identification (possible predictor variables)? How do these relate to ingroup bias (outcome variable)? Are there differences between the national groups and/or between contexts in these relationships?

Are these variables interrelated in any way? For example, do relative prototypicality and/or relative power correlate? More specifically, do intercorrelations differ between national groups, and/or between the contexts of The EU and NATO?

Do relative prototypicality, relative power, ingroup identification and/or European identification mediate the effect of national group on ingroup bias?

Finally, this study set out to establish some evidence for whether (a) ingroup and/or European identification or (b) relative power and/or relative prototypicality might mediate between national groups and ingroup bias.

3.1 Method

Design

The quasi-experimental study employed a 2 (National Group: British/German) X 4 (Target group: Ingroup/Outgroup/NATO/The EU) mixed ANOVA design, where national group was between-subjects, and target group within-subjects. Dependent variables were ingroup and European identification, superordinate category evaluation, ingroup bias, two measures of relative prototypicality and one measure of relative power. Furthermore, two open-ended questions encouraged participants to express their views on NATO and The EU.

Participants

Forty-six British and Germans participated in the study, all recruited via e-mail. Initial contacts were largely ex-colleagues (Commerce and Industry) of the investigator, several of whom forwarded the questionnaire to others[11]. Participants were older than the average student sample and were post-war generation, and every attempt was made to ensure that the initial contacts varied demographically (e.g., socioeconomic background, highest level of educational achievement etc.). After screening, three participants were excluded from the study (two dual-nationals, one questionnaire format destroyed). There remained 22 British participants (m:f = 8:14, age range = 20-57, $M = 43.14$, $SD = 10.18$), and 21 German participants (m:f = 6:15, age range = 21-57, $M = 43.86$, $SD = 8.69$). None had ever lived abroad.

[11] Clearly the sample size was extremely modest considering the complexity and sophistication of the central questions. This limitation is addressed in the Discussion section.

Materials

The study was questionnaire based (see App. I-3 and App. I-6). All documents were originally designed in English and subsequently translated by the investigator into German. Cooperating with two bilingual speakers (one German, one Irish), there followed a translation – back-translation phase adapted from the techniques suggested by Brislin (1970, 1976). This was a cyclic process, and was concluded only when all parties had reached agreement. Before running the study, two British and two German subjects filled in the questionnaire on-line, to ensure that the instructions and the questionnaire itself were comprehensible.

Open-ended items

Before responding to the quantitative items for each superordinate category, participants were given the opportunity to list anything they associated with each (e.g., 'When you think of NATO, what things spring to mind?'). The purpose of these questions was to assess the connotations each superordinate category elicited, and to use these to construct quantitative measures for subsequent studies.

Framing text describing the superordinate categories

Given the different natures of the superordinate categories, constructing two descriptive texts positive in valence proved difficult. Both were described on the dimension of security and member state protection, adapting texts from the respective superordinate category website (EU: http://europa.eu.int/index_en.htm; NATO: http://www.nato.int/#; both accessed 28.07.04, see Questionnaires in App. I-

3 and App. I-6). It was assumed that both texts would reflect how each superordinate category attempts to present itself in positive terms to its members. In other words, these texts were *not* neutral in nature. If a superordinate category is primed positively, this leads to more negative attitudes towards the outgroup (Waldzus et al., 2003). CIIM suggests that a positively evaluated superordinate category will lead to more positive attitudes towards the outgroup. Therefore, positive texts were chosen to facilitate an increase (IPM) or decrease (CIIM) in ingroup bias.

In each framing text, paragraph one described briefly the superordinate category's history. Paragraph two drew attention to sovereignty and actual ingroup power. (NATO members retain full sovereignty, whilst EU member states delegate some of their national sovereignty to The EU. Both national groups enjoy comparably high statuses within the superordinate category, demonstrated for example by the number of votes allocated to each national group in various commissions etc.) Paragraph three emphasised the respective superordinate category's role in maintaining peace and/or striving to find peaceful solutions to conflict situations.

Dependent variables

These are described below in the order in which they appeared in the questionnaire. Other measures were also included, but were not relevant to this study[12]. Unless stated otherwise, all items and sub-items employed a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*). Because the effects of different superordinate categories on subgroup relations was the starting-point in the study

[12] Right-Wing-Orientation, degree of interest in national and in European politics, categorization measures

series, superordinate category awareness was primed first; ingroup identification was measured towards the end of the questionnaire.

NATO evaluation: Participants were asked to evaluate NATO (*pre-framing text evaluation,* 1 item) and then read the framing text. Next, three comprehension questions underlined the priming process. Finally, three sub-items tapped into evaluation of NATO (*post-framing text evaluation*; e.g., 'Membership in NATO is a good thing for Great Britain'; one reverse-scored). The post-framing text evaluation sub-items were collapsed into one single measures (α = .89, 1 = *low* to 7 = *high*).

Direct relative prototypicality NATO: Our own measures were devised[13]. Three statements investigated the degree of perceived *ingroup prototypicality* (e.g., 'Great Britain has a lot in common with NATO'). In the next three statements, 'ingroup' was substituted for 'outgroup' (e.g., 'Germany has a lot in common with NATO), thus giving measures of perceived *outgroup prototypicality*. Internal reliability was acceptable on in- and outgroup measures (both αs $\geq$ .69), and $M_{ingroup\text{-}score} - M_{outgroup\text{-}score}$ delivered the single measure of *direct relative prototypicality NATO* (-6 = *low* to +6 = *high*).

Relative power NATO: Relative power statements were alternated with relative prototypicality statements and followed the same matrix (three ingroup and three outgroup sub-items; e.g. 'Great Britain is a strong member in NATO). Each set of sub-items was collapsed (both αs $\geq$ .59), and $M_{ingroup\text{-}score} - M_{outgroup\text{-}score}$ delivered the single measure of *relative power NATO* (-6 = *low* to +6 = *high*).

[13] The IPM-school traditionally employs stereotype-based measures that in the NATO context would have been implausible.

EU evaluation, direct relative prototypicality under and relative power in The EU: In these measures, NATO was replaced by The EU. The compound variables *EU evaluation* ($\alpha = .93$), *direct relative prototypicality EU* (both $\alpha s \geq .87$) and *relative power EU* (both $\alpha s \geq .60$) were computed as above.

Ingroup bias: Participants rated the ingroup, the outgroup and both superordinate categories on a Feelings Thermometer (0 = *extremely unfavourable* to 100 = *extremely favourable*). $M_{attitude\text{-}ingroup} - M_{attitude\text{-}outgroup}$ delivered the single measure of *ingroup bias* (-100 = *low* to +100 = *high*).

Similarity-based prototypicality: IPM posits that the group claiming higher relative prototypicality will project its beliefs, values etc. onto the superordinate category, and prototypicality is akin to similarity (Weber et al, 2002). Against this backdrop, a second measure of relative prototypicality was administered; similarity on the dimension of shared goals and values. Participants rated how similar they perceived the shared goals and values to be between (a) ingroup – NATO, (b) ingroup – The EU, (c) ingroup – outgroup, (d) outgroup – NATO and (e) outgroup – The EU (adapted from Cinnirella, 1993, 1997; 1 = *very dissimilar* to 7 = *very similar).* For each context, mean outgroup – superordinate category scores were subtracted from mean ingroup – superordinate category scores, thus providing two measures of *similarity-based prototypicality* (-6 = *low* to +6 = *high*).

Identification measures

Ingroup identification: Three-factors of social identity (Cameron, 2004) were measured. *Ingroup ties* measures individual-level perceptions of a common bond

with one's group (e.g., 'I feel strong ties to other British people'). *Centrality* reflects the dimension of cognitive self-categorization (e.g., 'The fact that I'm British rarely enters my mind'). *Ingroup affect* draws on Tajfel's (1978) 'emotional significance' attributed to ingroup membership (e.g., 'In general, I'm glad to be British') (Cameron, 2004). Each factor comprised three sub-items (randomly ordered, four sub-items reverse scored). All nine sub-items ($\alpha = .69$) were collapsed into one single measure; *ingroup identification.*

European identification: Participants were asked to place themselves on a bipolar scale from 1 (*entirely <ingroup>*) to 7 (*entirely European*) in response to 'how much do you feel <ingroup> and how much do you feel European?'

Hierarchical measure of identity: This multiple response item required participants to tick from a list of boxes those groups they felt described themselves. Boxes were provided for all subgroups (e.g., Welsh, West German), both national groups (i.e., British and German) and the superordinate group European. A further box ('other: please specify') served, for example, to identify and later exclude dual-nationals from the study.

Procedure

Ethics Approval was granted before running the study (see App. I-1). The mode of correspondence was via email. Participants were informed that the study was to investigate 'how citizens feel about ... involvement with other nations ... and your perceptions of living in Europe' Those who agreed to participate were requested to return a consent form and complete the language-specific questionnaire. All

participants were thanked by the investigator and fully de-briefed (see App. I-2 – I-7).

3.2 Results

Qualitative analysis – What is the nature of British and German relations to The EU and to NATO?

Results from the open-ended responses are reported below, the data supporting them in App. I-8. German responses were translated into English using the same translation – back-translation technique described above.

The response rate was excellent; 42 out of 43 participants responded, many going into considerable depth. In a preliminary step, participants were coded as giving positive, negative, or positive and negative responses; those participants whose responses were not explicitly evaluative were coded as neutral. Frequencies are reported in Table 1[14].

[14] The sample size was very small, and the main aim of content anlaysis was to design an empirical measure for further studies. Therefore in this section, no statistical tests of nominal data (e.g. χ^2) were performed.

Table 1: Frequencies of open-ended responses

	British	German	
NATO	$n = 21$	$n = 21$	Total
Positive only	8	6	14
Negative only	1	6	7
Positive and negative	1	4	5
Neutral only	11	5	16
EU	$n = 21$	$n = 21$	Total
Positive only	5	4	9
Negative only	10	3	13
Positive and negative	4	11	15
Neutral only	2	3	5

In the British sample, only two respondents made negative evaluative judgements regarding NATO, compared with 14 negative evaluative judgements regarding The EU. German evaluative judgements were more equally distributed with regards to NATO (6 = positive, 6 = negative, 4 = positive and negative) and more critical with regards to The EU (4 = positive, 3 = negative, 11 = positive and negative).

Next, every negative and positive connotation was coded into one of three pre-determined categories; *positive connotations*, *negative connotations* and *threat*. Within each category, common connotations that were later to serve as sub-items in quantitative analyses, were identified. An independent judge was consulted regarding the final coding and agreement was reached. Positive connotations are listed in Table 2, negative connotations in Table 3 and threat connotations in Table 4.

Table 2: Positive connotations by national group by superordinate category

	British $N = 21$	German $N = 21$	Total $N = 42$
NATO	$n = 6$	$n = 5$	11
shared goals and values	1 (4.77)	2 (9.52)	3
promotes diversity	0	0	0
together we are strong	5 (23.81)	3 (14.29)	8
supportive of weaker members	0	0	0
freedom of movement	0	0	0
EU	$n = 9$	$n = 20$	29
shared goals and values	0	3 (14.29)	3
promotes diversity	2 (9.52)	2 (9.52)	4
together we are strong	3 (14.29)	6 (28.57)	9
supportive of weaker members	1 (4.77)	1 (4.77)	2
freedom of movement	3 (14.29)	8 (38.10)	11

Note: Percentages of each national group N are reported in parentheses.

Positive connotations NATO: As shown in Table 2, from the British standpoint, NATO served primarily to strengthen its member states ($n = 5$, 23.81%; *together we are strong*). The only other positive connotation was on the dimension of *shared goals and values* ($n = 1$, 4.77%). From the German standpoint, both of the British connotations elicited agreement (*together we are strong*: $n = 3$, 14.29%; *shared goals and values*: $n = 2$, 9.52%).

Positive connotations EU: Here from the British standpoint, four of the five connotations delivered frequencies ranging from 1 (*supportive of weaker members,*

4.77%) to 3 (*together we are strong* and *freedom of movement,* 14.29%). From the German standpoint, all five connotations were addressed; the main focus was on *freedom of movement* ($n = 8$, 38.10%), followed by *together we are strong* ($n = 6$, 28.57%).

Table 3: Negative connotations by national group by superordinate category

	British $N = 21$	German $N = 21$	Total $N = 42$
NATO	$n = 1$	$n = 6$	7
too powerful	0	2 (9.52)	2
too bureaucratic, unwieldy	1 (4.77)	1 (4.77)	2
too expensive	0	0	0
too much intersubgroup rivalry	0	2 (9.52)	2
too little power	0	1 (4.77)	1
irrelevant goals	0	0	0
too large *or* enlargement bad	0	0	0
EU	$n = 13$	$n = 15$	28
too powerful	0	0	0
too bureaucratic, unwieldy	5 (23.81)	4 (19.05)	9
too expensive	1 (4.77)	1 (4.77)	2
too much intersubgroup rivalry	3 (14.29)	3 (14.29)	6
too little power	0	0	0
irrelevant goals	4 (19.05)	3 .(14.29)	7
too large *or* enlargement bad	0	4 (19.05)	4

Note: Percentages of each national group N are reported in parentheses.

Negative connotations NATO: Table 3 shows that, in the British sample, NATO elicited only one negative response (*too bureaucratic, unwieldy,* 4.77%). In contrast, NATO was viewed by German participants as *too powerful* ($n = 2$, 9.52%), *too bureaucratic, unwieldy* ($n = 1$, 4.77%), hosting too much intersubgroup rivalry ($n = 2$, 9.52%), or as having *too little power* ($n = 1$, 4.77%).

Negative connotations EU: In the British sample, The EU elicited 13 negative responses, where it was seen primarily as being *too bureaucratic* ($n = 5$, 23.81%), as pursuing *irrelevant goals* ($n = 4$, 19.05%) and as hosting *too much intersubgroup rivalry* ($n = 3$, 14.29%). In total, The EU elicited 15 negative German responses, and these were by and large in line with British responses. However, four (19.05) suggested that The EU was *too large or enlargement bad*, an association missing from the British sample.

Table 4: Threat connotations by national group by superordinate category

	British $N = 21$	German $N = 21$	Total $N = 42$
NATO	$n = 1$	$n = 2$	3
Threat to sovereignty	0	0	0
Threat to ingroup identity	0	0	0
Threat to peace	1 (4.77)	2 (9.52)	3
Threat to ingroup wealth & prosperity	0	0	0
EU	$n = 6$	$n = 8$	14
Threat to sovereignty	6 (28.57)	0	6
Threat to ingroup identity	0	3 (14.29)	3
Threat to peace	0	0	0
Threat to ingroup wealth & prosperity	0	5 (23.81)	5

Note: Percentages of each national group N are reported in parentheses.

Threat connotations NATO: From Table 4 it was apparent that NATO ($n = 3$, 7.14%) was far less threatening than The EU ($n = 14$, 33.33%) for both national groups. NATO was perceived to pose a threat on the dimension of *peace* only (which contradicts its own declared goal). However, NATO did not threaten ingroup identity (i.e. *sovereignty* and *ingroup identity*) or *ingroup wealth and prosperity.*

Threat connotations EU: In contrast, The EU was not a threat to *peace.* However, the largest perceived threat was to identity ($n = 9$; *threat to sovereignty* and *to ingroup identity,* 21.42% of total sample). It was made clear in the priming text that EU member states do, in fact, delegate some degree of sovereignty to The EU. It was therefore interesting to note that this was perceived as a threat by six British

participants, but by none of the German participants, although three Germans perceived it to be a *threat to ingroup identity.*

Finally, five German participants (23.81%; British; $n = 0$) saw The EU as a threat to *ingroup wealth and prosperity.* Many agree that the Eastern European Enlargement and the effects of globalisation have impacted upon the economy. From the standpoint of political and economic experts, the impact of enlargement is generally viewed positively (Barysch, 2006; Braun, 2007; House of Lords European Union Select Committee, 2006) and globalisation it is seen as more of a challenge than a 'catastrophe' (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, 2007; Die Bundesregierung, 2007; Shipman, 2007; TUC, 2007). However, evidence suggests that the peoples' view diverges, whereby the impact is viewed negatively in both Great Britain and in Germany (Jahnke, 2006; Wright, n.d.). It was therefore interesting to note that this popularistic view was documented in the German sample only.

In summary, the British sample overall was more favourable[15] to NATO (+4) than to The EU (-10) as anticipated. Overall, NATO represented security (*together we are strong*), posing in only one instance a *threat to peace.* In contrast, The EU was seen to represent a form of security (*together we are strong*), but it was also seen as a bureaucratic institution with irrelevant goals, as a body where intersubgroup rivalry could be found, and, clearly and as anticipated, as a *threat to sovereignty*, that is to ingroup identity.

[15] For each superordinate category, this was calculated as the frequency of positive connotations minus negative connotations minus threat connotations.

The German sample delivered a more differential picture regarding both NATO and The EU than anticipated. Its evaluation of NATO was both positive (+5) and negative (-8), although, contrary to expectations, only two participants associated NATO with a *threat to peace*. Responses to The EU showed that opinions were favourable (+20) but also critical (-23), and negative connotations were very much consistent with those of the British sample; too bureaucratic, too much intersubgroup rivalry and irrelevant goals. In the German cohort only, enlargement was seen in a negative light, the reason often cited as a *threat to economic prosperity.*

Interestingly, overall NATO elicited only 21 comments, compared with 71 comments concerning The EU. The EU, then, was more salient than NATO according to this indicator. Furthermore, the information supplied by participants was incorrect in ten instances in the NATO context (British = 7; German = 3) compared with none in The EU context[16]. This suggests that the mental representations of NATO are rather more fuzzy and less clearly defined, the mental representation of The EU less fuzzy and more clearly defined.

Quantitative analysis

The data were screened for outliers and all reverse-scored items recoded. Sub-items were recoded into new variables as described in the Materials section. In the analyses reported below, due to the gender bias across the sample (m:f ratio 14:29) analyses of covariance were performed in each instance in a first step, with Gender as covariate.

[16] For example, NATO was seen as a trading partner, as being solely a European organisation, or was sometimes confused with the UN.

No gender effects were found in any of the models. Hence the following analyses use analysis of variance. The *a priori* assumptions were examined first.

Superordinate category evaluation

It was anticipated that the British would rate NATO higher than The EU, and the Germans would rate The EU higher than NATO. It was also hoped that the priming texts would have affected all scores positively. Both assumptions were correct in the British sample, but not in the German sample.

As shown in Table 5, paired-sample *t*-tests revealed that British evaluations of the superordinate categories increased significantly from pre-framing to post-framing text (NATO: $t(21) = 5.14$, $p < .001$; EU: $t(21) = 2.96$, $p < .01$). In the German sample, an increase occurred in the NATO context only, $t(20) = 3.77$, $p < .01$. Since pre- and post-framing values correlated significantly for each superordinate category (both $rs \geq .80$), the post-framing measure was used in the next analysis.

Consistent with the *a priori* assumption, British evaluation of NATO ($M = 5.02$, $SD = 1.07$) was significantly higher than of The EU ($M = 4.15$, $SD = 1.51$), $F(1, 41) = 6.35$, partial $\eta^2 = .13$, $p < .05$ (simple effect). However contrary to the *a priori* assumption, German evaluation of NATO ($M = 4.71$, $SD = 1.17$) was only marginally lower than evaluation of The EU ($M = 4.94$, $SD = 1.46$). Nonetheless, since all scores were significantly above the mid-point (all $Fs \geq 3.75$, all $ps \leq .05$), it was concluded that both groups held both superordinate categories in positive esteem. Thus the prerequisite of the four models of subgroup-superordinate group

relations for their predictions to come into operation was met, and this variable was not utilized in any further analyses.

Table 5: Mean superordinate category evaluation scores

	British	German
Evaluation		
NATO		
Pre-framing text	4.18***	4.19***
	(1.10)	(1.17)
Post-framing text	5.02***	4.71***
	(1.07)	(1.17)
	$n = 22$	$n = 21$
EU		
Pre-framing text	3.75*	5.00***
	(1.67)	(1.48)
Post-framing text	4.15**	4.94***
	(1.51)	(1.46)
	$n = 22$	$n = 21$

Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above the midpoint (3) using one-sample *t*-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Ingroup and European identification, hierarchical identification levels

Three assumptions had been made. British ingroup identification would be higher than German ingroup identification. European identification would be higher in the German sample than in the British sample. The British sample would draw more upon subgroups in their identification (e.g., Welsh, English), the Germans would draw more on the European level of identification.

Ingroup identification: All scores were significantly above the midpoint (3), both *ps* < .001. An independent *t*-test showed that British ingroup identification ($M = 4.76$, $SD = .88$) was significantly higher than German ingroup identification ($M = 4.03$, $SD = .82$), $t(41) = 2.83$, $p < .01$.

European identification (-3 = *entirely ingroup* to +3 = *entirely European):* British scores ($M = -1.38$, $SD = 1.02$) were significantly below the midpoint and thus identification was at the ingroup and not the European level, $t(20) = 6.18$, $p < .001$. German scores ($M = .62$, $SD = .1.60$) were approaching significance above the midpoint, $t(20) = 1.77$, $p = .09$. Here, then, Germans identified more with being European than being German (n.s.).

Hierarchical levels of identity: To recap' briefly, participants had ticked boxes that they felt described themselves. Firstly, responses were coded to reflect whether they had drawn upon subgroup identity levels (e.g., Welsh, West German), group level (i.e. British or German) and/or European level. Next, specific values (categorical) were given to specific combinations of identity levels. The distribution of identity level combinations are reported in Table 6.

Table 6: 2 X 7 contingency table – national group by identity level combinations

	Count (% within nationality)						
Hierarchical ID level combinations	Sub	Sub + Group	Sub + Super	Group	Group + Super	Super	All 3 levels
British $n = 22$	7 (31.8)	5 (22.7)	0 (0)	10 (45.15)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
German $n = 19$	5 (26.3)	0 (0)	0 (0)	3 (15.8)	3 (15.8)	8 (42.1)	0 (0)

Note: Sub = subgroup, e.g. Welsh, East German. Group = British or German. Super = European.

National group membership was indicative of how individuals might draw on differing levels of groups in their self-description ($\chi^2 = 19.99$, $df = 4$, $p < .001$). Over half of the British sample (54.5%) identified at subgroup or at subgroup + group level (German sample: 26.3%). Identity level combinations excluding European identification accounted for all British responses (German sample; 26.3%). Identity level combinations at group and European levels accounted for 73.7% of German responses, 42.1% of which were at European level only.

It should however be noted that 12 British participants in total drew on their subgroups (here English and Welsh), and only five Germans drew on their subgroup West German. Had there been more East Germans participating in this study, it may be that some of these (as a lower-status group) would have also drawn upon their subgroup.

The British claimed significantly higher relative prototypicality in the NATO context than in the EU context. The Germans claimed significantly higher relative prototypicality in the EU context than in the NATO context. Both groups agreed upon their mutual relative prototypicality positions (all $ps \leq .08$), that is, there was no contestation in either context. Mean scores and standard deviations are reported in Table 7.

Each measure of relative prototypicality (direct and similarity-based) was analysed using a 2 (National Group: Great Britain/Germany) X 2 (Context: EU/NATO) ANOVA, with the latter as a repeated measure factor. In each, there was a signification interaction between national group and context, direct relative prototypicality: $F(1, 41) = 90.54$, partial $\eta^2 = .69$, $p < .001$; similarity-based relative prototypicality: $F(1, 40) = 43.75$, partial $\eta^2 = .52$, $p < .001$.

Within-subjects, simple effects: The British sample felt significantly more relatively prototypical of NATO (direct relative prototypicality: $M = .00$, $SD = .90$; similarity-based prototypicality: $M = .00$, $SD = 1.48$) than of The EU (direct relative prototypicality: $M = -1.84$, $SD = 1.25$; similarity-based prototypicality: $M = -1.64$, $SD = 1.65$) on both measures (simple effects; direct relative prototypicality: $F = 52.01$; similarity-based prototypicality: $F = 13.71$; both $ps = .001$). Conversely, the German sample felt significantly more relatively prototypical of The EU (direct relative prototypicality: $M = 1.19$, $SD = .89$; similarity-based prototypicality $M = 1.50$, $SD = 1.28$) than of NATO (direct relative prototypicality: NATO $M = -.44$,

$SD = .69$; similarity-based prototypicality $M = -1.10$, $SD = 1.62$) on both measures (simple effects; direct relative prototypicality: $F = 39.15$; similarity-based prototypicality; $F = 31.46$; both $ps \leq .001$).

Table 7: Mean relative prototypicality scores

	British	German
Direct relative prototypicality		
NATO	.00	-.44**
	(.90)	(.69)
EU	-1.84***	1.19***
	(1.25)	(.89)
	$n = 22$	$n = 21$
Similarity-based relative prototypicality		
NATO	.00	-1.10††
	(1.48)	(1.62)
	$n = 22$	$n = 20$
EU	-1.64†††	1.50***
	(1.65)	(1.28)
	$n = 22$	$n = 20$

Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above and daggers that measures are significantly below the midpoint (0) using one-sample t-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. ††/**$p < .01$. †††/***$p < .001$.

Between-subjects, simple effects: Between group differences were significant in The EU context (direct relative prototypicality: $F = 83.49$; similarity-based prototypicality; $F = 46.79$; all $ps = .001$), where, as predicted, German scores were higher than British scores. In the NATO context, British scores were consistently higher than German scores, and differences were significant or marginally significant (direct relative prototypicality: $F = 3.31$, $p = .08$; similarity-based prototypicality; $F = 5.29, p < .05$).

Relative power

Here, each national group felt more relatively powerful under that superordinate category where it was higher on relative prototypicality. Relative power was analysed using a 2 (National Group: Great Britain/Germany) X 2 (Context: EU/NATO) ANOVA, with the latter as a repeated measure factor. The two-way interaction National Group X Context was significant, $F(1, 41) = 24.73$, partial $\eta^2 = .38, p < .001$.

As shown in Table 8, the British felt significantly more relatively powerful in NATO ($M = .15$, $SD = .96$) than in The EU ($M = -1.14$, $SD = 1.36$), $F = 25.14$, $p < .001$ (simple effect). Conversely, the Germans felt significantly more relatively powerful in The EU ($M = .38$, $SD = .67$) than in NATO ($M = -.16$, $SD = .75$), $F = 4.21, p < .05$ (simple effect).

Table 8: Mean relative power scores

	British	German
Relative power		
NATO	.15	-.16
	(.96)	(.75)
	$n = 22$	$n = 21$
EU	$-1.14^{\dagger\dagger}$	$.38^{*}$
	(1.36)	(.67)
	$n = 22$	$n = 21$

Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above and daggers that measures are significantly below the midpoint (0) using one-sample *t*-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. $^{*}p < .05$. $^{\dagger\dagger}p < .01$.

Summarising the score patterns of the *a priori* assumptions, the British felt more relatively prototypical of and powerful under NATO than The EU. They also held NATO in higher esteem than they did The EU, but not significantly so. Germans, on the other hand, produced a mirror image of British perceptions of relative prototypicality and of relative power, where the ingroup scored higher in The EU context than in the NATO context. Only one *a priori* assumption was incorrect; Germans' evaluation of NATO was only marginally lower than evaluation of The EU. The next step was to examine whether these scores impact upon ingroup bias.

What are the relationships between relative prototypicality, relative power, the degree of ingroup identification and the degree of European identification (possible predictor variables)? How do these relate to ingroup bias (outcome variable)? Are there differences between the national groups and/or between contexts in these relationships?

As the point of departure, *relative prototypicality, relative power,* the *degree of ingroup identification*, and the *degree of European identification* were considered possible predictor variables of *ingroup bias*, the outcome variable. The exploratory goal was to identify difference between relationships based on national group membership and/or on the context of the superordinate category.

Ingroup bias was examined in a preliminary step. British ingroup bias scores ($M = 15.68$, $SD = 25.93$, $n = 22$) were significantly above the midpoint, German ingroup bias scores were not ($M = 4.05$, $SD = 14.97$, $n = 21$); although not

significantly so, the British cohort showed higher ingroup bias than the German cohort did, $t(41) = 1.80$, $p = .08$.

In order to decompose relationships between variables, four sets of intercorrelations were tested. EU scores are shown in Table 9, and NATO scores in Table 10. In each table, British scores are given in the non-shaded and German scores in the shaded areas. After reporting the figures, see Figure 5 and Figure 6 for an explanation of these findings. Firstly we turn to identity measures and ingroup bias, because these scores are irrespective of context.

Identity measures and ingroup bias (non-context specific): Consistent with past research, as ingroup identification increased, so did ingroup bias. Consistent with CIIM, ICM and IMSR and contrary to IPM, as European identification increased, ingroup bias decreased (see Table 9 or Table 10). In both samples, higher ingroup identification saw higher levels of ingroup bias (both $rs \geq .46$, both $ps \leq .05$). Higher European identification saw lower levels of ingroup bias, but significantly so only in the British sample, $r = -.76$, $N = 21$, $p < .01$, two-tailed.

Table 9: EU context: Intercorrelations between relative prototypicality, relative power, ingroup identification, European identification and ingroup bias by national group

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Direct relative prototypicality	–	.55** (*n*=22)	.82** (*n*=22)	-.49* (*n*=22)	.49* (*n*=21)	-.56** (*n*=22)
2. Similarity-based relative prototypicality	.87** (*n*=20)	–	.67** (*n*=22)	-.44* (*n*=22)	.36 (*n*=21)	-.51* (*n*=22)
3. Relative power	.59** (*n*=21)	.46* (*n*=20)	–	-.53* (*n*=22)	.67** (*n*=21)	-.70** (*n*=22)
4. Ingroup identification	.03 (*n*=21)	.08 (*n*=20)	-.01 (*n*=21)	–	-.58** (*n*=21)	.60** (*n*=22)
5. European identification	-.12 (*n*=21)	-.24 (*n*=20)	.19 (*n*=21)	-.58** (*n*=21)	–	-.76** (*n*=21)
6. Ingroup bias	.07 (*n*=21)	.04 (*n*=20)	.06 (*n*=21)	.46* (*n*=21)	-.24 (*n*=21)	–

Note: The shaded area shows intercorrelations in the German sample. The non-shaded area shows intercorrleations in the British sample. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Prototypicality, power and ingroup bias (EU-specific): As shown in Table 9, clear between group differences emerged. Both measures of relative prototypicality and the measure of relative power correlated negatively and significantly with ingroup bias in the British sample (all $rs \leq -.51$, all $ps \leq .05$); there were no correlations between the three measures and ingroup bias in the German sample (r-range: .04 – .07).

Identity measures, prototypicality and power (EU-specific): The next question was: how do the identity measures and the prototypicality/power measures interrelate? In both samples, there were significant positive relationships between the two relative prototypicality measures and relative power (all $rs \geq .46$, all $ps \leq .01$). These three

measures correlated negatively and significantly with British ingroup identification (all $rs \leq -.44$, all $ps \leq .01$). Direct relative prototypicality and relative power correlated significantly with European identification (both $rs \geq .49$, both $ps \leq .05$). In contrast, there were no correlations between these three measures and ingroup or European identification in the German sample (r-range: -.24 – .19).

Prototypicality, power and ingroup bias (NATO-specific): As shown in Table 10 and in contrast to the EU context, no between group difference emerged. Relative prototypicality and relative power were not correlated with ingroup bias in either sample (British: r-range: -.25 – -.10; German: r-range: -.09 – .14).

Table 10: NATO context: Intercorrelations between relative prototypicality, relative power, ingroup identification, European identification and ingroup bias by national group

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Direct relative prototypicality	–	.56** (*n*=22)	.75** (*n*=22)	.14 (*n*=22)	.17 (*n*=21)	-.23 (*n*=22)
2. Similarity-based relative prototypicality	.65** (*n*=21)	–	.56** (*n*=22)	-.15 (*n*=22)	.29 (*n*=21)	-.10 (*n*=22)
3. Relative power	.36 (*n*=21)	.38 (*n*=21)	–	.18 (*n*=22)	.23 (*n*=21)	-.25 (*n*=22)
4. Ingroup identification	.24 (*n*=21)	.16 (*n*=21)	.39 (*n*=21)	–	-.58** (*n*=21)	.60** (*n*=22)
5. European identification	-.13 (*n*=21)	-.09 (*n*=21)	-.15 (*n*=21)	-.58** (*n*=21)	–	-.76** (*n*=21)
6. Ingroup bias	.13 (*n*=21)	-.09 (*n*=21)	.14 (*n*=21)	.46* (*n*=21)	-.24 (*n*=21)	–

Note: The shaded area shows intercorrelations in the German sample. The non-shaded area shows intercorrleations in the British sample *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Identity measures, prototypicality and power (NATO-specific): In the British sample and in contrast to the EU context, relative prototypicality/power did not correlate with British ingroup or European identification (r-range: .14 – .29). In the German sample, none of these measures correlated (r-range: -.15 – .39).

These results are best summarized simplistically and schematically. Figure 5 shows significant correlations in the British sample. Figure 6 shows significant correlations in the German sample. In each, the EU context is depicted on the left, and the NATO context on the right. Comparing these two figures, it becomes apparent that the EU context hosts a range of interrelations between variables in the British sample, but not in the NATO context. In the German sample, only the degree of ingroup identification is linked to ingroup bias.

Figure 5: Significant intercorrelations in the British sample in both contexts



Examining Figure 5 first, in the British sample, as ingroup identification increased, so did ingroup bias, irrespective of context. Conversely, as European identification increased, ingroup bias decreased. In the EU context, the degree of ingroup identification correlated negatively with relative prototypicality/power; European identification correlated positively with relative prototypicality/power. In the NATO context, identification and ingroup bias were independent of relative prototypicality/power. Although we can make no causal inferences here, it would appear that the degree of identification at ingroup or at superordinate category level are central to ingroup bias (non-context specific).

Findings of the German sample produced a very different picture. Although the relationship between ingroup identification and ingroup bias was consistent with past research (see Figure 6), ingroup bias levels were unaffected by the degree of European identification across both contexts. Furthermore, the only correlation found was in the EU context, where relative prototypicality and relative power were positively linked.

Figure 6: Significant intercorrelations in the German sample in both contexts



There are several explanations that may account for these findings, and these are addressed in the Discussion. Here in brief, it may be that identification (ingroup high, European low) and (low) power [status] is the key to negative intersubgroup relations in the British sample, and given the lack of relationships in the NATO context, it could be that NATO does not challenge ingroup distinctiveness, whereas The EU does. With regards to the German sample's scores, European identification was far lower than anticipated (possibly due to the bi-polar scale employed), and it is questionable if this lack of association between European identification and ingroup bias found here is reliable.

Do relative prototypicality, relative power, ingroup identification and/or European identification mediate the effect of national group on ingroup bias?

Next a series of multiple regressions sought to distinguish between those variables that play a significant role in predicting ingroup bias levels and those that do not. To start, national group membership predicts ingroup bias; the British sample show more ingroup bias than the German sample does. The following analyses assessed mediators that might be responsible for this difference. Were there any specific mediator variables that may indirectly affect relationships between each national group and its ingroup bias levels? Because it was apparent that intergroup relations were unaffected by relative prototypicality/power in the NATO context, this context was not analysed further.

Regression analysis

Regression analysis was employed to determine the impact of the predictor variables on ingroup bias. However, two issues were of concern. Firstly, there were five possible predictor variables and a sample size of 43[17]. Although the sample size was clearly inadequate, given that the study's aim was to gain a general picture of British-German relations, it was felt that regression analysis interpreted with caution might nonetheless add to understanding this relationship. The second concern was that of multicollinearity. Despite these weaknesses, analysis showed that two variables

[17] Although some regard a case:IV ratio of 40:1 as an acceptable minimum (Brace, Kemp & Snelgar, 2003), others are more stringent. Green (1991), for example, recommends a ratio of $N \geq 50 + 8m$, where m = no. of IVs.

affected ingroup bias indirectly; (a) the degree of ingroup identification and (b) relative power.

In a preliminary analysis, all five predictor variables were entered in one step (see Table 11). The omnibus model was significant, $F(5, 35) = 6.36$, $p < .001$, adj. $R^2 = .40$. Relative power and ingroup identification were significant predictors (both $ps = .03$). Both relative prototypicality measures and the degree of European identification were non-significant.

Table 11: Multiple regression for all possible predictors of ingroup bias

Variable	Adj. R^2	R^2 increase	Step 1 β	Sig.
Direct relative prototypicality	.40	.48	.28	.33
Similarity-based relative prototypicality			-.07	.79
Relative power			-.54	.03
Ingroup identification			.37	.03
European identification			-.05	.80

Ingroup identification and relative power were analysed again. Ingroup identification was entered in block 1, and this model was significant, $F(1, 41) = 21.33$, $p < .001$, adj. $R^2 = .33$. Relative power was entered in block 2, and this model was likewise significant, $F(2, 40) = 16.26$, $p < .001$ adj. $R^2 = .42$ (see Table 12). Ingroup identification accounted for 33% of variance, and adding relative power to the model increased variance to 42%. It was noted that ingroup identification yielded a positive value ($\beta = .40$), thus higher ingroup identification sees an increase in ingroup bias.

Relative power yielded a negative value (β = -.38), thus higher relative power group sees a decrease in ingroup bias.

Table 12: Multiple regression for ingroup identification and relative power as predictors of ingroup bias

Step/Variable	Adj. R^2	R^2 increase	Step 1 β	Step 2 β	Sig.
1. Ingroup identification	.33	.34	.59		.00
2. Ingroup identification	.42	.11		.40	.01
Relative power				-.38	.01

Mediation analysis

Having reduced the number of possible indirect predictors of ingroup bias, analysis could now turn to examining ingroup bias as a function of national group (where the British sample was more biased than the German sample), but more specifically to identify whether a relationship between national group and ingroup bias can actually be explained by the indirect effects of a further variable or variables – here ingroup identification and relative power. To this end, mediation analysis followed, using the steps recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986; Kenny, 2003). Findings showed that both ingroup identification and relative power indirectly mediate ingroup bias, although not statistically significantly so. Again taking the modest sample size into consideration, the directional evidence of mediation is reported here.

Ingroup identification: As shown in Figure 7, the initial pathway between national group and ingroup bias (path *c*, p = .08, n.s.) was reduced considerably when the mediator *ingroup identification* was added to the model, path *c'*: B = -.04, p = .78,

Sobel's $t = -2.32$, $p = .05$. In this case, path *b* was positive, indicating an *increase* in ingroup bias as ingroup identification *increases*. The British were higher in ingroup identification ($p < .01$) and ingroup bias ($p = .08$, n.s.) than the Germans irrespective of context, and the relationship between national group and the degree of ingroup bias was strong ($p = .08$). However, the degree of ingroup identification exacerbated the degree of British ingroup bias considerably.

Figure 7: Mediation effects of ingroup identification on ingroup bias



Note: National group context coded, where 1 = British, 2 = German

Relative power: Figure 8 shows findings unique to the EU context. The British were lower in relative power ($p < .001$) and higher in ingroup bias ($p = .08$) than the Germans, and relative power mediated ingroup bias even more so than the degree of ingroup identification. The initial pathway (path *c*, $p = .08$; n.s.) between national group and ingroup bias was reduced to non-significance when the mediator *relative power* was added to the model, path *c'*: $B = -.10$, $p = .53$, Sobel's $t = -3.02$, $p < .001$. Path *b* was negative; thus *lower* perceived relative power induced *higher* ingroup bias in the British sample.

Figure 8: Mediation effects of relative power in the EU context on ingroup bias



Note: National group context coded, where 1 = British, 2 = German

It was interesting to note that, on the one hand, both higher ingroup identification (non-context specific) and lower relative power (EU context) see an increase in ingroup bias in the British sample. It is not possible to say with any clarity whether the mediators carry such weight in affecting ingroup bias scores, or whether the findings are a reflection of the nature of British-German relations. It is, however, possible to conclude that higher or lower relative prototypicality did not significantly affect higher or lower ingroup bias in either sample in either context.

3.3 Discussion

The aims of this study were threefold. The first was to investigate how British and Germans view NATO and The EU overall. The second aim was to investigate the nature of British-German relations, specifically to test IPM against other models of subgroup and superordinate group relations and to examine the role of perceived power in ingroup bias. The third aim was to determine whether specific variables might mediate ingroup bias in either of the national groups in either context. As

pointed out previously, the sample size was extremely modest, and these limitations are discussed throughout this section where relevant.

Qualitative findings

Based on open-ended responses, it was expected that the British would favour NATO over The EU, and that, in particular, The EU would pose an identity threat, whereas NATO would not. It was expected that the German sample would favour The EU over NATO, possibly because of the multicultural ethics behind The EU and the militaristic nature of NATO. Additionally, it was anticipated that both groups would show more knowledge of The EU than of NATO.

With regards to the British sample, all speculations were correct. The overall evaluation of NATO was relatively positive (+4), of The EU relatively negative (-10). NATO was seen primarily to provide security and posed no threat to sovereignty or ingroup identity. In comparison, The EU did provide security to some degree, but perceived identity threat in the form of threat to sovereignty was apparent.

In the German sample, NATO evaluation was not relatively lower than EU evaluation (-3 for each category), nor was NATO a threat to peace. However and as anticipated, The EU posed a threat to ingroup wealth and prosperity.

A tentative conclusion is that, relatively speaking, NATO poses no threat to either group to any degree on any dimension. In contrast, The EU threatens British sovereignty and identity, (but not ingroup wealth and prosperity) and German

ingroup wealth and prosperity (but not ingroup identity). It is sensible here to distinguish between these two forms of threat and to relate these back to social reality. Several Germans reported that The EU was a threat to ingroup wealth and prosperity, and criticisms were often well-informed. These ranged from the fall in purchasing power since the introduction of the Euro, to the influx of citizens from new member states since the EU enlargement and their willingness to offer low-cost labour. This threat can be measured by one's bank balance at the end of the month.

Several British reported that The EU is a threat to sovereignty – before reading in the priming text that member states do, in fact, delegate some of their sovereignty to The EU. So how 'real' is this threat? Firstly, respondents' language was sometimes evaluative and emotive on negative connotations[18], and emotion is a common response to threat (González & Brown, 2006). Secondly, a change in the social order (such as EU membership has brought about) can lead the individual to question his or her self-definition and the definition of their social group (Reicher & Hopkins, 1998). Therefore, adding the situation (social change) to the response (affect), this can explain why EU membership is perceived as so threatening.

Based on connotation frequencies, the total number of evaluative judgements was higher in the EU (71) than in the NATO (21) context; The EU was therefore higher in contextual saliency. Additionally, incorrect information was given in the NATO context only, suggesting that its prototype is unclear (vague evaluative standards), broad (member states are intercontinental), and has a small scope (affecting few

[18] For example: 'Great Britain has become subservient to Europe and has forsaken her allies in the commonwealth' (participant 006e); 'We really don't understand it [The EU]' (participant 014e); 'When I go on holiday the Euro is the currency, but it is always nice to come back to the £1 and pence.' (participant 023e).

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areas of day-to-day living). In contrast, The EU prototype is clear (e.g. The EU receives regular media coverage), narrow (member states are European only), and has a large scope (affecting more areas of day-to-day living). Drawing on Waldzus et al.'s (2003) proposal that the superordinate category needs to be well-defined for ingroup projection to occur, these differences in the prototypes might account for differences between the two contexts in the respective correlations between relative prototypicality and ingroup bias. The reader is reminded that, in the British sample only, these correlated negatively and significantly in the EU context only. This notion is discussed further later below.

Quantitative findings

Analyses sought to examine the direct or indirect impact of (a) ingroup and European identification, (b) relative power, and (c) relative prototypicality on ingroup bias. For all of these, it was of particular interest to uncover differences between the two national groups and their levels of ingroup bias, as well as to compare scores between the two contexts.

The primary findings are that (a) the British sample is higher on ingroup identification and ingroup bias than the German sample, and ingroup bias is a strong but not significant function of national group (i.e. the relationship is exacerbated by the degree of ingroup identification). Ingroup bias is *not* a function of national group mediated by the degree of European identification. (b) The lower power group (the British) show higher ingroup bias. Here, ingroup bias is a strong but non-significant function of national group, where the relationship is fully mediated by relative power

– but in the EU context only. (c) Higher relative prototypicality does not predict ingroup bias in either sample in either context. However in the EU context, lower relative prototypicality is associated with higher ingroup bias (in the British sample).

Ingroup identification and ingroup bias (non-context specific): The British sample scored higher than the German sample on both measures. Note, however, that relationships between all four target groups (ingroup, outgroup, The EU and NATO) were measured before ingroup identification. It is therefore possible that the comparison groups (as well as an awareness of power and prototypicality differentials) did influence participants' ingroup identification scores.

European identification and ingroup bias (non-context specific): Intercorrelations showed that, in the British sample, as European identification increased, ingroup bias decreased significantly. In the German sample, the decrease in ingroup bias was non-significant. However, regression analysis yielded no evidence that the degree of European identification affects ingroup bias. In hindsight, this lack of evidence may be due to the way in which the degree of European identification was measured. A bipolar scale was employed, thus placing participants in the position where any pro-European choice was at the cost of national identity. This is clearly a weakness in the design, and was rectified in the next studies.

Relative power and ingroup bias: Both groups felt more relatively powerful in one context than in the other (the British in NATO, the Germans in The EU). However, there was no correlation between relative power and ingroup bias in the NATO context, yet a correlation of -.70 in the EU context. Here the less powerful group (the

British) demonstrated higher, and the more powerful group (the Germans) lower ingroup bias. Mediation analysis showed that ingroup bias was mediated fully by perceived relative power. However, and as discussed later, ingroup bias here was limited to evaluative ratings. The more socially competitive form of allocation-based ingroup bias was not measured here.

Furthermore, the lack of association between ingroup bias and relative power in the context of NATO suggests that the two superordinate categories do have different meanings for members, and these differences can affect intersubgroup evaluation, as proposed by all four models of subgroup–superordinate group relations (CIIM, ICM, IMSR and IPM). It can only be speculated why this might be. A tentative explanation lies in the lack of perceived threat that NATO elicited in the qualitative responses, compared with threat to ingroup identity/sovereignty or wealth and prosperity that The EU elicited. Where there is no perceived threat, there is no need to employ identity management strategies such as social competition. If perceived threat is indeed the key, then the more powerful group is in a stronger position to combat it. The less powerful group is less able to do so, and as well seeing the superordinate category as the instigator of this threat, the less powerful group may also perceive the more powerful outgroup as being 'guilty by association', hence ingroup bias as a response.

What we cannot conclude, however, is that the high British ingroup bias scores and the low German ingroup bias scores can be accounted for solely by ingroup identification and/or relative power (nor by perceived threat to the British ingroup). It may be that the British sample holds unfavourable attitudes towards Germans based

on past intergroup rivalries. Qualitative research lends support to this conclusion. For example, as Reicher and Hopkins (2001, p. 207) note, when evaluating the implications of German reunification for Europe, one British government minister concluded in 1993 that, whereas Germany had failed in military terms in the past, it was now seeking to dominate Europe economically. Past German national socialist atrocities remain in the British consciousness.

Similarly, it may be that the more relatively powerful German group can *afford* to hold a favourable opinion of the British because of its stronger position. This noblesse oblige effect ties in with findings by Sachdev & Bourhis (1985). In demonstrating favourable attitudes to the outgroup, the German sample is not sharing any of its resources, and the power differential remains unchanged (Spears et al., 2001). Note also that only one form of ingroup bias was measured here (evaluative), and it may be that the German sample would have demonstrated higher ingroup bias on a more socially competitive level (e.g. allocation-based ingroup bias), had it been given the opportunity to do so.

Relative prototypicality and ingroup bias: The pattern of scores for direct and for similarity-based relative prototypicality measures mirrored relative power scores, that is higher British/NATO scores, higher German/EU scores. Also consistent with the relative power scores, there was no association between relative prototypicality and ingroup bias in the NATO context, but there were significant negative correlations in the EU context in the British sample only – and IPM offers no predictions regarding ingroup bias levels based on lower relative prototypicality. Drawing too on regression analysis, there was no significant evidence that higher

relative prototypicality sees an increase in ingroup bias, as proposed by IPM (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Simultaneously, no evidence was found in support of CIIM (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), IMSR (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000c) and, in some respects, ICM[19] (Brown. & Hewstone, 2005). Had this been the case, increasing European identification and/or relative prototypicality would have seen a significant decrease in ingroup bias.

It would be rash to criticize IPM at this point. As mentioned in the Method section, ingroup projection has been measured to date on the dimension of traits. In this study, however, different measures were employed and it could be that these did not tap into those processes in the same way that trait-rating would.

Finally, why was there no association between ingroup bias and relative prototypicality in the NATO context, but clear evidence in the EU context? Here the IPM literature may provide an insight. The prototype of the superordinate category may determine whether ingroup projection might occur or not. It is more likely to occur when the prototype is clear and narrow (as was the case with The EU), and less likely to occur when the prototype is unclear or broad (as was the case with NATO) (Waldzus et al., 2003). This could account for the lack of association between relative prototypicality and ingroup bias in the NATO context. However, it does not account for lower relative prototypicality seeing an increase in ingroup bias in the EU/British context.

[19] As noted earlier, all three models (CIIM, ICM and IMSR) converge on several points.

Another explanation (though wholly speculative due to the absence of empirical evidence) may lie in the differences between The EU and NATO, between Great Britain and Germany. It appears that NATO is less threatening to the British and the German sample, whereas The EU challenges British identity and German economic prosperity. If we add identity threat to a lack of power in the EU context, then The EU challenges the British in a way that NATO does not, and this could account for the higher British ingroup bias. Turning to the German sample, the threat to ingroup wealth and prosperity in The EU emanates from the Eastern European countries (as well as the effects of globalization and the introduction of the Euro). Therefore Great Britain herself is not the source of the threat and therefore not the target of ingroup bias.

As well as the weaknesses discussed above, there were other limitations in this study. Firstly, this first study in this series sought to gauge the general picture of British-German relations in the context of two superordinate categories. The correlational, quasi-experimental design was therefore a good choice, but there were no clear demarcations between contexts effects and there was no control sample (i.e. there were no separate conditions).

Secondly, the sample size (drawn on ex-colleagues) was inadequate given the sophistication of the research questions. Had the investigator extended the range of participants to include friends, this could have tipped the balance by introducing a like-minded sub-group to the sample. There was, then, a trade-off where diversity was prioritised over sample size. In a similar vein, a series of findings were non-significant ($p = .08$). One plausible explanation for the lack of significance could be

related to the small sample size. Therefore these findings have been reported, but should be interpreted with caution.

Thirdly, though again for sound reasons, the superordinate categories were primed at the start of the study, the two were not counterbalanced, and the degree of ingroup identification was measured at the end of the study. Not counterbalancing the two superordinate categories ensured that all participants focussed on NATO (thought to be the more neutral superordinate group) and then on The EU (thought to be possibly a threat inducing superordinate group). Whether this was the best decision is debatable. Additionally, measuring the degree of ingroup identification last ruled out any possibility of examining its role as a possible moderator of ingroup bias.

The next study rectified these weaknesses. The experimental design looked at separate conditions (EU, NATO, control); ingroup identification was measured before superordinate category priming; a more appropriate measure of European identification was implemented. It was also extended to include a second dimension of ingroup bias – allocation-based ingroup bias – in order to compare two forms of social competition.

In summary, findings showed that the degree of ingroup identification mediates British ingroup bias in that context where it feels under identity and status threat; The EU. The effect of relative prototypicality did not affect ingroup bias scores; however correlations suggested that, contrary to IPM, *lower* perceived relative prototypicality (in the British sample) increases ingroup bias, again in the EU context. No evidence

was found to suggest that the degree of European identification mediates ingroup bias in either national group.

This was an exploratory study. Turning to the next study, when examined by condition, will The EU still elicit British ingroup bias more than NATO will? Will the noblesse oblige effect remain in the German sample, or might ingroup bias express itself in the form of allocation-based ingroup bias? Finally two questions not answered satisfactorily in this study: Does higher relative prototypicality increase or decrease ingroup bias? Does dual identification improve or harm intersubgroup relations?

Chapter 4 Study 2

Study 1 had served to provide a general understanding of British-German relations under The EU and NATO, and to examine the roles of relative prototypicality, relative power and the degrees of ingroup and European identification in predicting (evaluative) ingroup bias. Five main conclusions emerged, and these were investigated further in this study. Firstly, there was no evidence that the superordinate category of NATO promoted or decreased ingroup bias. Secondly, the British sample demonstrated higher ingroup bias and identified more with the ingroup than the German sample did, and mediation analysis showed that the bias was enhanced by the degree of ingroup identification. Thirdly and against the backdrop of The EU but not against the backdrop of NATO, relative power also enhanced ingroup bias. Here the national group higher in relative power (the Germans) demonstrated lower ingroup bias. Fourthly, again in the EU context only, the less relatively prototypical group (the British) showed higher ingroup bias. There were no associations between relative prototypicality and ingroup bias in the German sample. Fifth and finally, there were no significant associations between the degree of European identity and ingroup bias.

Study 2 sought to rectify weaknesses identified in Study 1. As well as reducing the possibility of context effects by examining three separate conditions (The EU, NATO, control), the degree of national and of European identification were measured on two separate scales. The degree of ingroup identification was measured before the respective superordinate category was primed.

Study 2 was also extended beyond the scope of Study 1. A second dimension of ingroup bias was included, and a measure of the degree of identification with the superordinate category was designed.

Ingroup bias: Due to its exploratory nature, Study 1 measured ingroup bias on the dimension of attitudes only (evaluative ingroup bias). As Spears et al. (2001) point out, the ingroup will show bias in a form that is realistically possible. In Study 1, one could postulate that the British sample showed higher evaluative ingroup bias because it was *able* to. Similarly, the German sample showed lower (and arguably withheld) ingroup bias because it could *afford* to. Therefore in Study 2, ingroup bias was measured additionally on a resource allocation task (allocation-based ingroup bias). Here the groups would have the opportunity to enter more directly into social competition.

Superordinate category identification: Additionally in Study 2, the degree of superordinate category identification (i.e. identification with The EU or with NATO) was measured, based on the evaluative component of identity. Consequently, a further notion could be tested, where IPM predictions are contrary to CIIM, ICM and IMSR. Namely, high dual identification – that is, identification with the ingroup and with the superordinate category – may increase the likelihood of ingroup bias (Wenzel et al., 2003).

The *a priori* assumptions made in Study 1 were tested here in a first step. In brief, the British would be more relatively prototypical/powerful under NATO than under The EU, would hold NATO in higher esteem than the EU, would identify more at the

ingroup than at the European level and would draw more on sub-groups (e.g., Welsh, English) in their self-definition. The German sample would perceive itself to be more relatively prototypical/powerful under The EU than under NATO, would hold The EU in higher esteem than NATO[20], would identify more at the European than at the ingroup level and would not draw on sub-groups (i.e. East German, West German) in self-definition.

Do we see higher evaluative ingroup bias in the British sample? Does either group show higher allocation-based ingroup bias? To what degree does the superordinate group affect ingroup bias scores?

Study 1 saw higher evaluative ingroup bias in the British sample. It was likely that this would hold constant in this study for two reasons. Firstly, was expected that the degree of ingroup identification, a strong but non-significant ($p = .08$) predictor of evaluative ingroup bias in Study 1, would remain higher in the British sample than in the German sample. Secondly, British attitudes to Germans may well be generally unfavourable. Should this be the case, then British evaluative ingroup bias should be constant across all three conditions.

Additionally, both forms of ingroup bias show social competition and both are behavioural (Jetten et al., 2004), whereby allocation-based ingroup bias is perhaps the more competitive form. It was speculated that the German sample – at least in The EU condition – would show higher allocation-based ingroup bias, because as a

[20] This was not the case in Study 1, where NATO evaluation was only slightly lower than EU evaluation. This was possibly due to the age group of the sample. Given the student sample in Study 2 and the more left-wing stance generally associated with this group, it might be that NATO does equate with the USA (and indirectly with its foreign policy), and therefore the sample hold it in lower esteem that The EU.

powerful EU member, it feels entitled to more resources that the outgroup and/or because the outgroup is less deserving of EU resources. The second speculation was that the British sample could even demonstrate outgroup favouritism in the EU condition, not necessarily because it finds itself less entitled to resources, but as a means of distancing itself from The EU. No speculations were made regarding allocation-based ingroup bias in the NATO condition.

What are the relationships between the possible predictor variables of ingroup bias and the two forms of ingroup bias?

Of the five possible predictor variables, three were identification-based; ingroup, European, and superordinate category identification. The other two variables were relative prototypicality and relative power. How did these intercorrelate? Furthermore, how might these intercorrelate with evaluative and with allocation-based ingroup bias? Would any specific patterns emerge for specific national groups and/or specific conditions? It was expected that ingroup identification would remain a strong predictor of evaluative ingroup bias. If the premises of CIIM were to hold true, high European identification (but not NATO identification) should see a decrease in both forms of ingroup bias. Based on research on power differentials and social reality constraints, it was expected that the more powerful group (Germans) would show higher allocation-based ingroup bias, and the less powerful group (British) higher evaluative ingroup bias. Given the sparse evidence found to support IPM in Study 1 (which may or may not be due to the small sample size), no predictions were made here.

Is either form of ingroup bias a function of national group and (directly or indirectly) relative prototypicality or relative power? Are relative prototypicality and relative power distinct constructs? If so, are there any structural links we can identify?

Two research questions arise. Firstly, if either form of ingroup bias is a function of nationality (or not), is it mediated by relative prototypicality or relative power? In Study 1, there was evidence to suggest that lower relative prototypicality and lower relative power see higher evaluative ingroup bias (in the British/EU context). Secondly, there were interesting positive correlations between relative prototypicality and relative power in Study 1 (British/EU, British/NATO, German/EU). Therefore, are relative prototypicality and relative power two distinct psychological constructs? If yes, then is relative power the driving force behind relative prototypicality or vice versa, that is, which is the better predictor of relative prototypicality?

Do high dual identifiers demonstrate higher or lower ingroup bias?

The final research question brings us to the degree of ingroup and superordinate category identification. Do high dual identifiers demonstrate higher (IPM) or lower (CIIM, ICM and IMSR) ingroup bias in either form? To what degree does ingroup identification interact with superordinate category identification and moderate ingroup bias in either form?

4.1 Method

Design

The experimental study employed a 2 (National Group: British/German) X 3 (Condition: EU/NATO/no superordinate category) X 2 (Target Group: ingroup/outgroup measures) mixed ANOVA design. The two between-subjects factors were national group and condition, and target group data constituted within-subjects repeated measures. From the repeated measures, a relative ingroup rating was sometimes calculated that then served as a between-subjects measure. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions within each national group. Cell sizes were between 27 and 35.

Participants

One hundred and ninety-four students across a variety of Faculties and Schools from the University of Wales Swansea and the *Universität zu Köln* participated in the study. Of these, 13 were excluded entirely; eleven did not fulfil participant criteria (e.g. dual nationality), and a further two due to flippant comments written on the returned questionnaire. There remained a net sample size of 181 participants (British: $N = 95$, m:f = 39:56, age range = 18-50, $M = 21.15$, $SD = 5.37$; German: $N = 86$, m:f = 46:40, age range = 19-42, $M = 24.48$, $SD = 4.54$).

Materials

The study was questionnaire-based and was largely a replication of Study 1. All printed matter was originally designed in English and there followed the same translation-back-translation cycle. Before running the study, three British and three German subjects filled in the questionnaire to ensure its clarity.

Manipulation

The manipulation took the form of priming superordinate category membership using the framing texts employed in Study 1.

Dependent variables

Unless stated otherwise, all items and sub-items employed a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*). There were seven dependent variables, five of which served as possible predictor- and two as outcome variables. These are described below in the order in which they appeared in the questionnaire. Measures included in the control condition are asterisked. Other measures were also included[21], but were not relevant to this study.

**Ingroup identification (replicated from Study 1):* Sub-items ($\alpha \geq .62$) were collapsed into the single measure of *ingroup identification* (1 = *low* to 7 = *high*).

[21] These were; Right-Wing-Orientation (Altemeyer, 1981, 1998), nationalism and patriotism (Blank & Schmidt, 2003), interest in national and European politics, crossed categorisation, intergroup anxiety (Stephan & Stephan, 1985), and social stereotypes. The similarity-based prototypicality measure from Study 1 was also administered. However, given the strong correlations between direct and similarity-based prototypicality in Study 1, the latter measure was used to examine ingroup distinctiveness in a separate study. These findings, not relevant to the thesis, are therefore not reported here.

Superordinate category evaluation (replicated from Study 1): After the framing text, and three comprehension questions, the three evaluation sub-items followed. These ($\alpha \geq .76$) were collapsed into the single variable *superordinate category evaluation* (1 = *low* to 7 = *high*).

Relative prototypicality and *relative power (replicated from Study 1):* In contrast to Study 1, two of the prototypicality and two of the power statements were reverse scored. As in Study 1, two single measures of relative prototypicality (both $\alpha \geq .77$) and relative power (both $\alpha \geq .55$) were computed (-6 = *low* to +6 = *high*).

**Allocation-based ingroup bias (outcome variable)*

Since it was not realistic to introduce the somewhat complicated Tajfel matrices outside of the laboratory, our own measures were devised to tap into allocation-based ingroup bias. Participants allocated a grand total £10 million [€10 million] between the ingroup and outgroup for three ostensible projects that had been organised by the respective superordinate category[22]. One project, for example, was 'to fund six-monthly conferences [to be held locally] to discuss future policies'. $M_{ingroup\text{-}score} - M_{outgroup\text{-}score}$ delivered the measure of *allocation-based ingroup bias* (-10 = *low* to +10 = *high*). There was a risk that the results might reflect perceptions of equality and fairness that might override ingroup bias, and this remained to be seen.

[22] In the control condition, participants were told that the scheme was devised by The EU. Also, one project was later rejected (see Results section).

**Evaluative ingroup bias (outcome variable):* This was replicated from Study 1.

Superordinate category identification (based on the evaluative component of identity)

Ideally, superordinate category identification would have been measured on Cameron's (2004) scale. However, some sub-items would have been implausible in the NATO condition (e.g. 'In my everyday life, I often think about what it means to be a member of NATO'). Therefore, based on the rationale that the ingroup (here the superordinate category) will strive for positive global self-esteem, and that high identifiers will very likely evaluate the ingroup positively, measures were devised to tap into the evaluative component of identity.

Drawing on the connotations the superordinate categories had elicited in Study 1, four positive (e.g. 'peace' and 'helps protect Western values') and four negative statements (e.g. 'threat to our identity' and 'too much rivalry amongst member states') were randomly ordered. Participants rated how much each of these elicited their agreement (1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much so*). Negative and positive sets of sub-items were collapsed into two new variables (both $\alpha s \geq .54$) and $M_{positive} - M_{negative}$ delivered the measure of *superordinate category identification* (-6 = *low* to +6 = *high*).

Other identity measures

**National and European identification:* In contrast to Study 1, participants rated the degree to which they felt British [German] and the degree to which they felt

European[23] (1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much so*) on two separate scales. Thus *national identification* and *European identification* were measured. **Hierarchical levels of identity* were a replication of in Study 1.

Procedure

The study was run after Ethics Approval had been gained (see App. II-1). The data were collected based on convenience sampling. Participants were approached individually by the investigator at eating outlets in both universities between January and February, 2005. They were informed in the respective language that the study was to investigate 'European perceptions; how people feel about their country and their European neighbours'. None were aware that the study would run parallel in the other country. Those who agreed to participate signed the Form of Consent and completed one of the six questionnaires (language- and condition-specific). In nearly all instances, questionnaires were filled in and returned on the spot. All participants were thanked by the investigator and fully de-briefed, either immediately or later via e-mail (see App. II-2 – II-7). As an incentive, each participant received a raffle ticket with a prize of €20 and £15 for the respective national group winner.

4.2 Results

The data were screened for outliers and all reverse-scored items recoded. Sub-items were recoded into new variables as described in the Materials section. In the demographics section, participants had reported whether they had ever resided

[23] This item was placed at the very end of the questionnaire, ensuring that European priming had not occurred in the NATO or control conditions.

abroad or not for a period of at least six months. Significantly more German participants ($n = 28$, 32.6%) than British participants ($n = 12$, 12.6%) had, $t(179) = 3.31$, $p < .05$. Also the British sample was significantly younger than the German sample (GB: $M = 21.15$, $SD = 5.37$; Germany: $M = 24.48$, $SD = 4.54$), $t(179) = 4.48$, $p < .001$. Therefore in the analyses reported below, analyses of co-variance were performed in each instance in a first step, with Residency Abroad and Age as co-variates. No effects of these were found in any of the models. Hence the following analyses use analysis of variance. Unless stated otherwise, all analyses of variance employed a 2 X 2 [3] design, where the factors national group (British/German) and condition (EU/NATO/[Control]) served as independent variables. The *a priori* assumptions were examined first.

Relative prototypicality

A priori assumptions were correct and findings consistent with Study 1 (see Table 13). The British felt more relatively prototypical of NATO than The EU, and the Germans of The EU than NATO. The German claim was not contested by the outgroup, the British claim was contested by the outgroup. A 2 X 2 ANOVA with relative prototypicality as dependent variable yielded a significant 2-way interaction National Group X Condition, $F(1, 111) = 36.50$, partial $\eta^2 = .25$, $p < .001$ [24].

[24] The main effect of national group was also significant, $F(1, 111) = 15.52$, partial $\eta^2 = .12$, $p < .001$.

Table 13: Mean relative prototypicality and relative power scores

	British	German
Relative prototypicality		
EU	-.99††† (1.14) $n = 30$	.88** (1.32) $n = 27$
NATO	.33* (.74) $n = 30$	-.06 (.75) $n = 28$
Relative power		
EU	-.40 (1.40) $n = 30$	.41 (1.14) $n = 27$
NATO	.47** (.68) $n = 30$	-.61†† (.93) $n = 27$

Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above and daggers that measures are significantly below the midpoint (0) using one-sample *t*-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. $^{*}p < .05$. $\dagger\dagger/^{**}p < .01$. $\dagger\dagger\dagger p < .001$.

Within-subjects, simple effects: The British cohort felt significantly more prototypical of NATO ($M = .33$, $SD = .74$) than of The EU ($M = -.99$, $SD = 1.14$), $F = 26.16$, $p < .001$. Conversely, Germans felt significantly more prototypical of The EU ($M = .88$, $SD = 1.32$) than of NATO ($M = -.06$, $SD = .75$), $F = 12.02$, $p < .001$.

Between-subjects, simple effects: Whereas both groups concurred with Germany's significantly higher relative prototypicality in The EU ($F = 49.33$, $p < .001$), groups did not concur with Great Britain's significantly higher relative prototypicality in NATO ($p = .13$). As IPM posits, if the groups do not contest each other's claim to higher relative prototypicality, ingroup projection may not occur. If this is the case,

this increases the likelihood of ingroup bias in the NATO condition, and decreases its likelihood in the EU condition.

Relative power

Relative power scores were examined in the same fashion as relative prototypicality, and a similar pattern of scores emerged (see Table 13), confirming the *a priori* assumptions. British scores were higher than German scores in the NATO condition, German scores higher than British scores in the EU condition. The 2 X 2 ANOVA, where Relative Power served as dependent variable, showed that only the 2-way interaction National Group X Relative Power was significant, $F(1, 111) = 22.04$, partial $\eta^2 = .17$, $p < .001$. Simple effects showed that the British felt significantly more powerful under NATO ($M = .47$, $SD = .68$) than under The EU condition ($M = -.40$, $SD = 1.40$), $F = 9.79$, $p = .002$. Conversely, the German sample felt significantly more powerful under The EU ($M = .41$, $SD = 1.14$) than under NATO ($M = -.61$, $SD = .93$), $F = 12.29$, $p = .001$.

Superordinate category evaluation

Because CIIM, ICM, IMSR and IPM all maintain that the superordinate category must be held in high esteem for their respective predictions to hold true, this measure sought only to confirm whether this was the case across both national groups and both experimental conditions. This was, indeed, the case. Mean scores (see Table 14) showed that all scores were significantly above the midpoint (all $ps < .001$),

confirming *a priori* assumptions. This measure was therefore not utilized further in the study[25].

Table 14: Mean superordinate category evaluation scores

	British	German
Superordinate category evaluation		
EU	4.89***	5.70***
	(1.28)	(.76)
	$n = 30$	$n = 27$
NATO	5.09***	5.93***
	(.87)	(.64)
	$n = 30$	$n = 28$

Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above the midpoint (3) using one-sample *t*-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. ***$p < .001$.

Ingroup, national group, European, hierarchical and superordinate group identification

It was rightly assumed that the British sample would score higher on *ingroup identification* and *national identification* than the German sample, although differences were non-significant. It was further rightly assumed that the German sample would score higher on *European identification* than the British sample. It was also rightly assumed that the British sample would draw significantly more on sub-groups in their self-definition, and the German sample on the European level of identity (*hierarchical levels of identification*). Finally, it was incorrectly assumed that German sample would identify more with The EU than with NATO, and the British sample more with NATO than The EU (*superordinate category*

[25] A 2 (National Group: British/German) X 2 (Condition: EU/NATO) ANOVA showed that only national group produced a significant main effect, $F(1, 111) = 23.08$, partial $\eta^2 = .17$, $p < .001$. German scores overall (both $Ms \geq 5.70$) were higher than British scores overall (both $Ms \leq 5.09$).

identification). Here, the German sample identified more with both superordinate categories than the British sample did. Despite all between-group differences, all mean scores were significantly above the mid-point (see Table 15).

Table 15: Mean ingroup, national, European and superordinate category identification scores

	British	German
Ingroup identification	4.53*** (.83) $n = 95$	4.34*** (.78) $n = 86$
National and European identification		
British/German	5.03*** (1.52)	4.72*** (1.62)
European	3.32* (1.49) $n = 95$	5.26*** (1.12) $n = 86$
Superordinate category identification		
EU	1.09*** (1.48) $n = 30$	2.17*** (1.71) $n = 27$
NATO	1.53*** (1.52) $n = 30$	2.31*** (1.35) $n = 28$

Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above the midpoint (superordinate category identification = 0, all other measures 3) using one-sample *t*-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *$p < .05$. ***$p < .001$.

Ingroup identification: As shown in Table 15 and contrary to predictions, between group differences (M diff = .19) were marginal (British: $M = 4.53$, $SD = .83$; German: $M = 4.34$, $SD = .78$). *National identification:* British scores were higher than German scores (British: $M = 5.03$, $SD = 1.52$; German: $M = 4.72$, $SD = 1.62$), but not significantly so. *European identification:* European identification was significantly higher in the German sample ($M = 5.26$, $SD = 1.12$) than in the British

sample ($M = 3.32$, $SD = 1.49$), $t(176) = 9.71$, $p < .001$. Additionally, the German sample felt significantly more European than German (paired sample t-test: $t(84) = 3.23, p < .01$).

Superordinate category identification: Differences between groups and conditions were examined in a 2 X 2 ANOVA. Only the main effect of national group was significant, $F(1, 111) = 10.69$, partial $\eta^2 = .09$, $p = .001$. Simple effects revealed that the German sample identified more with each superordinate category than the British sample did (EU: $F(1, 111) = 7.16$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$, $p < .01$; NATO: $F(1, 111) = 3.78$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$, $p = .054$). This was contrary to *a priori* assumptions.

Hierarchical levels of identification: The data received the same treatment as in Study 1. As shown in Table 16, national group membership was indicative of how a person might draw on differing levels of group membership in self-description ($\chi^2 = 110.16$, $df = 6$, $p < .001$). Nearly half of the British sample (41.5%) identified at the subgroup level only (German sample: 2.5%). Identity profile combinations excluding the European level as a frame of reference account for 87.3% of British responses (German sample: 17.6%). Identity profile combinations at group and European levels accounted for 56.3% of German responses (British sample: 21.3%). These findings were consistent with those from Study 1.

Table 16: 2 X 7 contingency table – national group by identity level profile

	Count (% within nationality)						
ID level combinations	Sub	Sub + Group	Sub + Super	Group	Group + Super	Super	All 3 levels
British $n = 94$	39 (41.5)	27 (28.7)	0 (0)	17 (18.1)	2 (2.1)	1 (1.1)	8 (8.5)
German $n = 80$	2 (2.5)	0 (0)	5 (6.3)	7 (8.8)	22 (27.5)	16 (20.0)	28 (35.0)

Note: Sub = subgroup, e.g. Welsh, East German. Group = British or German. Super = European.

Summarising *a priori* assumptions, all were correct with the exception of superordinate category identification. Here Germans identified significantly more with both superordinate categories than the British did.

Do we see higher evaluative ingroup bias in the British sample? Does either group show higher allocation-based ingroup bias? To what degree does the superordinate group affect ingroup bias scores?

British evaluative ingroup bias scores were significantly higher than German scores, irrespective of condition. Similarly, German allocation-based ingroup bias scores were significantly higher than British scores, irrespective of condition. Interestingly in the EU condition, the British demonstrated outgroup favouritism on the allocation-based ingroup bias measure. Overall, then, there seemed to be tentative evidence pointing to each group demonstrating its own preferred (and realistic) form of ingroup bias. Mean scores are reported in Table 17.

Table 17: Mean evaluative and allocation-based ingroup bias scores

	British	German
Evaluative ingroup bias		
EU	18.77**	11.67**
	(28.22)	(16.23)
	$n = 30$	$n = 27$
NATO	18.67***	9.54***
	(21.01)	(11.90)
	$n = 30$	$n = 28$
Control	16.29***	8.10*
	(22.31)	(21.48)
	$n = 35$	$n = 31$
Overall	17.82***	9.96***
	(23.74)	(17.06)
	$n = 95$	$n = 86$
Allocation-based ingroup bias		
EU	-.17	.10
	(.50)	(.32)
	$n = 28$	$n = 27$
NATO	.10	.21*
	(.30)	(.38)
	$n = 29$	$n = 24$
Control	.01	.05
	(.47)	(.53)
	$n = 28$	$n = 28$
Overall	-.02	.12
	(.44)	(.42)
	$n = 85$	$n = 79$

Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above the midpoint (0) using one-sample *t*-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Evaluative ingroup bias: A 2 X 3 ANOVA with evaluative ingroup bias as dependent variable sought to identify any interactions between national group and condition. Findings showed that national group alone produced a significant main

effect, $F(1, 175) = 4.45$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$, $p < .05$. Scores were consistently higher in the British sample (overall score: $M = 17.82$, $SD = 23.74$) than in the German sample (overall score: $M = 9.69$, $SD = 17.06$), irrespective of condition.

Allocation-based ingroup bias: After data collection, one of the three 'projects' was deemed unsuitable and was excluded from the analysis[26]. Two steps were undertaken to refine responses for the two remaining projects[27]. As shown in Table 17, here German scores (EU: $M = .10$, $SD = .32$; NATO: $M = .21$, $SD = .38$) were higher than British score (EU: $M = -.17$, $SD = .50$; NATO: $M = .10$, $SD = .30$) across both experimental conditions. A 2 X 3 ANOVA, this time with allocation-based ingroup bias as dependent variable, again showed a main effect of national group, $F(1, 158) = 4.45$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$, $p < .05$[28]. Interestingly in the EU condition, we see the British sample demonstrating outgroup favouritism.

What are the relationships between the possible predictor variables of ingroup bias and the two forms of ingroup bias?

Four sets of intercorrelations are reported below. The EU condition is shown in Table 18, the NATO condition in Table 19. In each table, British scores are given in the non-shaded and German scores in the shaded areas. The variables examined were, in this order, 1. relative prototypicality, 2. relative power, 3. ingroup

[26] In this project promoting cultural diversity in schools, allocating a higher sum to the outgroup could indicate a belief that the outgroup lacks multicultural awareness more than the ingroup does. Thus allocating more to the outgroup might be a method of ingroup enhancement.

[27] Firstly, responses erroneously given in percentages were computed to reflect absolute values. Secondly, those responses which totalled >10 were re-proportioned to reflect the grand total value of 10. Re-proportioned responses between 9.9 and 10.1 were accepted as valid. The remaining 17 invalid responses were excluded from the analysis.

[28] The main effect of condition approached significance, $F(2, 138) = 2.73$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$, $p = .07$.

identification[29], 4. European identification, 5. superordinate category identification, 6. evaluative ingroup bias and 7. allocation-based ingroup bias. Variables 1-5 were considered possible predictor variables, variables 6-7 outcome variables.

In the British sample (EU condition, see Table 18), all three identity measures correlated with evaluative ingroup bias. Correlations were positive on the ingroup identity measure ($r = .60$, $p < .01$), and negative on the two superordinate category measures (both $rs \leq -.34$, both $ps \leq .08$). Relative prototypicality correlated with allocation-based ingroup bias ($r = .39$, $p < .05$). Neither relative prototypicality nor relative power correlated with evaluative ingroup bias

[29] The degree of national identification was not included in this analysis. It correlated positively with the ingroup identification measure across both groups and conditions (all $rs \geq .44$, all $ps \leq .05$). This measure (based on one item) was therefore excluded and ingroup identification (based on Cameron's (2004) three factor model of social identity) was included.

Table 18: EU condition: Intercorrelations between predictor and outcome variables by national group

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Rel. proto.	–	.34 (*n*=30)	-.12 (*n*=30)	-.03 (*n*=30)	.19 (*n*=30)	-.08 (n=30)	.39* (*n*=28)
2. Rel. power	.24 (*n*=27)	-	.08 (*n*=30)	-.10 (*n*=30)	.17 (*n*=30)	-.10 (*n*=30)	.27 (*n*=28)
3. Ingroup id.	.38* (*n*=27)	.24 (*n*=27)	-	.05 (*n*=30)	-.15 (*n*=30)	.60** (*n*=30)	.08 (*n*=28)
4. Euro. id.	.20 (*n*=27)	.03 (*n*=27)	.21 (*n*=27)	-	.17 (*n*=30)	-.38* (*n*=30)	-.19 (*n*=28)
5. Super. cat. id.	.38[a] (*n*=27)	.37[a] (*n*=27)	.37[a] (*n*=27)	.18 (*n*=27)	-	-.34[a] (*n*=30)	.01 (*n*=28)
6. Eval. bias	.07 (*n*=27)	.21 (*n*=27)	.32 (*n*=27)	-.02 (*n*=27)	-.32 (*n*=27)	-	.07 (*n*=28)
7. Alloc. bias	.27 (*n*=27)	.40* (*n*=27)	.21 (*n*=27)	.46* (*n*=27)	.02 (*n*=27)	.37[a] (*n*=27)	-

Note: The shaded area shows intercorrelations in the German sample. The non-shaded area shows intercorrelations in the British sample. [a] $p \leq .08$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

In the German sample (EU condition, see Table 18), none of the predictor variables correlated with evaluative ingroup bias. Superordinate category identification correlated with allocation-based ingroup bias ($r = .46$, $p < .05$) and with evaluative ingroup bias ($r = .38$, $p = .08$), suggesting that higher dual identification sees an increase in ingroup bias. Relative power correlated positively with allocation-based ingroup bias ($r = .40$, $p < .05$). Relative prototypicality did not correlate with either form of ingroup bias.

Table 19: NATO condition: Intercorrelations between predictor and outcome variables by national group

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Rel. proto.	–	.58** (*n*=30)	.03 (*n*=30)	.05 (*n*=28)	.16 (*n*=30)	.20 (n=30)	.19 (*n*=29)
2. Rel. power	.34[a] (*n*=28)	-	.27 (*n*=30)	.28 (*n*=28)	.03 (*n*=30)	.16 (*n*=30)	.23 (*n*=29)
3. Ingroup id.	-.05 (*n*=28)	.04 (*n*=28)	-	.24 (*n*=28)	-.04 (*n*=30)	.40* (*n*=30)	.19 (*n*=29)
5. Euro. id.	-.23 (*n*=28)	-.03 (*n*=28)	.52** (*n*=28)	-	.26 (*n*=28)	-.08 (*n*=28)	-.10 (*n*=27)
6. Super. cat. id.	.40* (*n*=28)	.23 (*n*=28)	.03 (*n*=28)	-.09 (*n*=28)	-	-.44* (*n*=30)	-.27 (*n*=29)
7. Eval. bias	.12 (*n*=28)	.21 (*n*=28)	.23 (*n*=28)	.42* (*n*=28)	-.02 (*n*=28)	-	.23 (*n*=29)
8. Alloc. bias	-.08 (*n*=24)	.05 (*n*=24)	.15 (*n*=24)	-.09 (*n*=24)	-.12 (*n*=24)	.07 (*n*=24)	-

Note: The shaded area shows intercorrelations in the German sample. The non-shaded area shows intercorrelations in the British sample. [a] $p \leq .08$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

In the British sample (NATO condition, see Table 19), relative prototypicality and relative power were associated ($r = .58$, $p < .01$), but neither was linked to either form of ingroup bias. Only two predictor variables were linked to evaluative ingroup bias; ingroup identification ($r = .40$, $p < .05$) and superordinate category identification ($r = -.44$, $p < .05$). As in the EU condition, higher ingroup identification sees higher evaluative ingroup bias, higher superordinate category identification lower ingroup bias. There were no relationships between predictor variables and allocation-based ingroup bias.

In the German sample (NATO condition, see Table 19), as the degree of European identification increased, so did evaluative ingroup bias ($r = .42$, $p < .05$). No

correlations with allocation-based ingroup bias emerged. Finally, relative prototypicality and relative power were not linked to either form of ingroup bias.

These results are summarized schematically and without correlational values below. Figure 9 shows significant or marginally significant correlations in the British sample. Figure 10 shows significant or marginally significant correlations in the German sample. In each figure, the EU condition is depicted on the left, and the NATO condition on the right.

Figure 9: Significant or marginally significant intercorrelations in the British sample by condition



As shown in Figure 9, in the British sample an increase in ingroup identification saw an increase in evaluative ingroup bias, irrespective of condition. Conversely, higher

European identification (both measures) saw a decrease in evaluative ingroup bias in the EU condition only. Allocation-based ingroup bias was linked positively to relative prototypicality in the EU condition, and negatively to superordinate category identification in the NATO condition. There was no link between relative power and either form of ingroup bias in either condition.

Figure 10: Significant and marginally significant intercorrelations in the German sample by condition



As shown in Figure 10, in the German sample ingroup identification was not related to either form of ingroup bias. However, higher superordinate category identification saw in increase in allocation-based ingroup bias (EU condition only), and higher European identification saw an increase in evaluative ingroup bias (NATO condition

only). Allocation-based ingroup bias was linked positively to relative power (EU condition only). There was no link between relative prototypicality and either form of ingroup bias in either condition. Interestingly, ingroup identification correlated positively with both levels of superordinate category identification in the EU condition.

Is either form of ingroup bias a function of national group and (directly or indirectly) relative prototypicality or relative power? Are relative prototypicality and relative power distinct constructs? If so, are there any structural links we can identify?

To answer the first question, a series of general linear models was employed (are there any interactions between relative prototypicality and relative power?), and mediation analysis followed where appropriate (do either mediate ingroup bias?). To answer the second question, principal component analysis was employed (are relative prototypicality and relative power separate constructs?), and mediation tests followed where appropriate (can we identify whether one indirectly affects the other?).

Is either form of ingroup bias a function of national group and (directly or indirectly) relative prototypicality or relative power?

Relative prototypicality was, then, positively related to allocation-based ingroup bias (British/EU) and relative power to allocation-based ingroup bias (German/EU). As a precursor to identifying possible indirect effects of relative prototypicality/power on either form of ingroup bias, a series of general linear models was employed. In each model, cases were selected by condition. One of the ingroup bias measures

(dependent variable) was examined as a function of nationality (independent variable, categorical measure) and relative prototypicality (independent variable, continuous measure). Tests were later repeated, where relative prototypicality was replaced with relative power.

Relative prototypicality and ingroup bias

Evaluative ingroup bias, where the British sample scored higher than the German sample, was not mediated by relative prototypicality in either condition. Allocation-based ingroup bias, where the German sample scored higher than the British sample, was mediated fully by relative prototypicality in the EU condition only.

On the dimension of *evaluative ingroup bias*, the main effects of national group, of relative prototypicality and the 2-way interaction between these were non-significant (EU: all Fs $\leq .54$, all ps $\geq .47$; NATO: all Fs ≤ 2.23, all ps $\geq .14$).

On the dimension of *allocation-based ingroup bias*, significant findings emerged in the EU condition only. Here, the main effect of relative prototypicality was significant ($F(3, 51) = 6.74$, partial $\eta^2 = .12$, $p < .05$), where German scores ($M = .10$) were significantly higher than British scores ($M = -.17$). The interaction National Group X Relative Prototypicality was non-significant. All findings in the NATO condition were non-significant.

The focus, then, was on allocation-based ingroup bias in the EU condition, whereby the NATO condition was examined for comparison purposes only. Following the steps recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986; Kenny, 2003), mediation analysis

examined the effects of relative prototypicality in more depth. National group served as independent variable, allocation-based ingroup bias as outcome variable, and relative prototypicality was tested as an indirect mediator.

As shown in Figure 11 left, relative prototypicality mediated allocation-based ingroup bias fully in the EU condition (but not in the NATO condition, Figure 11 right). In the EU condition, the initial significant path between national group and allocation-based ingroup bias (path *c:* B = .31, $p = .02$) became non-significant (path *c'*: B = .07, $p = .22$) after adding relative prototypicality as a mediator, Sobel's $t = 2.29, p = .02$.

Figure 11: Mediation effects of relative prototypicality on allocation-based ingroup bias



Note: National group context coded, where 1 = British, 2 = German

Evaluative ingroup bias, where the British sample scored higher than the German sample, was not mediated by relative power in either condition. Allocation-based ingroup bias, where the German sample scored higher than the British sample, was partially mediated by relative power in the EU condition only.

Following the same procedure as above, relative prototypicality was substituted with relative power. Again no evidence was found to suggest that evaluative ingroup bias was a function of relative power. All main effects and 2-way interactions were not significant (EU: all Fs ≤ 1.29, all ps $\geq .26$; NATO: all Fs ≤ 1.65, all ps $\geq .21$).

On the dimension of *allocation-based ingroup bias*, significant findings emerged in the EU condition only. Here, the main effect of relative power was significant, $F(3, 51) = 5.36$, partial $\eta^2 = .10$, $p < .05$. The interaction National Group X Relative Power was non-significant. All findings in the NATO condition were non-significant.

Mediation analysis showed that partial mediation had occurred in the EU condition (see Figure 12, right). German higher allocation-based ingroup bias scores were indirectly mediated by relative power. The effect of national group on allocation-based ingroup bias was reduced from significance (path c: B = .31, $p = .02$) to non-significance (path c': B = .22, $p = .10$) after adding relative power to the model. Sobel's t approached significance, $t = 1.66$, $p = .10$.

Figure 12: Mediation effects of relative power on allocation-based ingroup bias



Note: National group context coded, where 1 = British, 2 = German

Are relative prototypicality and relative power distinct constructs? If so, are there any structural links we can identify?

Given the similarity of the relative prototypicality and relative power findings, the question arose as to whether they are, in fact, two distinct, psychological constructs. It was found that relative prototypicality drives relative power in the EU condition. Relative power drives relative prototypicality in the NATO condition.

To examine whether they were distinct, principle axis factoring with direct oblique rotation was employed and set to two factors (see Table 20, 1. Ingroup sub-items). All six *ingroup* sub-items (i.e. prototypicality and power) were entered and loaded as expected – Component 1: prototypicality, Eigenvalue = 2.76, variance = 46.07%; Component 2: power, Eigenvalue = 1.03, variance = 17.19%.

Table 20: Components and the loadings of prototypicality and power variables

	Component 1	Component 2
1. Ingroup sub-items	Eigenvalue = 2.76 Variance = 46.07%	Eigenvalue = 1.03 Variance = 17.19%
	Prototypicality 2 Prototypicality 3 Prototypicality 1	Power 2 Power 3 Power 1
2. Outgroup sub-items	Eigenvalue = 2.09 Variance = 48.22%	Eigenvalue = 1.01 Variance = 16.90%
	Prototypicality 3 Prototypicality 1 Prototypicality 2 Power 2	Power 1 Power 3

Next, all six outgroup sub-items were entered (see Table 20, 2. Outgroup sub-items). All prototypicality items loaded similarly into Component 1, however with the addition of one power item, Eigenvalue = 2.09, variance = 48.22%. The remaining two power items loaded into Component 2, Eigenvalue = 1.01, variance = 16.90%. The factor correlational matrix showed an acceptable value of .44 between the two components, and it was therefore concluded that power and prototypicality were two separate entities.

Mediation analysis was employed to identify any structural links between relative power and relative prototypicality. Cases were examined by condition.

In the EU condition, where the German sample perceives itself to be higher on relative prototypicality ($p = .001$) and relative power ($p = .001$) than in the NATO condition, relative prototypicality drives relative power. As shown in Figure 13, left,

the significant pathway between national group and relative power (path *c*: B = .30, $p = .02$) became non-significant (path *c'*: B = .09, $p = .57$) when adding *relative prototypicality as mediator,* Sobel's $t = 1.61$, $p = .11$. In contrast, the pathway between national group and relative prototypicality (path *c*: B = .62, $p = .001$) remained equally significant (path *c'*: B = .55, $p = .001$) when adding *relative power as a mediator* (see Figure 13, right).

Figure 13: EU condition: Mediation effects of relative prototypicality on relative power



Note: National group context coded, where 1 = British, 2 = German

In the NATO condition, where the British sample perceives itself to be higher on relative prototypicality ($p = .001$) and relative power ($p = .001$) than in the EU condition, relative prototypicality drives relative power. As shown in Figure 13, left, when adding *relative prototypicality as mediator*, the significant pathway between national group and relative power (path *c*: B = -.56, $p = .001$) remained significant (path *c'*: B = -.46, $p = .001$). In contrast and as shown in Figure 14 left, with *relative*

power as mediator, the pathway between national group and relative prototypicality (path *c*: B = -.26, $p = .05$) became non-significant (path *c'*: B = .03, $p = .85$), Sobel's $t = 1.76$, $p = .08$.

Figure 14: NATO condition: Mediation effects of relative power on relative prototypicality



Note: National group context coded, where 1 = British, 2 = German

These findings are discussed later below in full. Here in brief, Germans may perceive their group to be upholding the values and beliefs underlying The EU. Therefore being a highly prototypical member enables the group to be a powerful key player. The British may associate NATO with the USA, a powerful key player – and the key player calls the shots on what are acceptable norms and values or not. Due to Great Britain's 'special relationship' with the USA, it may enjoy this power 'by proxy' and likewise call the shots on what is prototypical or not. What is also observable is evidence to support the standard theory of nature of power, where in the British/NATO context power leads to prototypicality – and by implication to ingroup

identification. Simultaneously we see evidence to support Turner's (2005) three-process theory of power, where in the German/EU context prototypicality – and by implication ingroup identification – leads to power.

Do high dual identifiers demonstrate higher or lower ingroup bias?

The final research question investigated the role that high ingroup and high superordinate category identification – high dual identification – may play in ingroup bias. More specifically, does the degree of ingroup identification interact with superordinate category identification and thus moderate ingroup bias, and do high dual identifiers demonstrate higher (as proposed by IPM) or lower (as proposed by other models) levels of ingroup bias? Findings showed that there were no effects of dual identification on allocation-based ingroup bias. Evaluative ingroup bias was moderated by the degree of ingroup identification interacting with the degree of superordinate category identification, but in the German sample only. This was consistent with IPM, the higher the dual identification, the higher the ingroup bias.

Ingroup identification: To recap' (see also Table 15), the mean difference between groups' scores was marginal (GB: $M = 4.53$, $SD = .83$; Germany: $M = 4.34$, $SD = .78$). *Superordinate category identification:* German (EU: $M = 2.17$, $SD = 1.17$; NATO: $M = 2.31$, $SD = 1.35$) scores were higher than British scores (EU: $M = 1.09$, $SD = 1.48$; NATO: $M = 1.53$, $SD = 1.52$) in both experimental conditions.

A preliminary analysis using median splits determined high and low ingroup, and high and low superordinate category identifiers. Findings are reported in App. II-8; suffice it to summarise at this point that 56 of the 116 participants were *not* double-

high or double-low identifiers. Also, there was a significant association between national groups and high ingroup identification (weighted towards the British: $\chi^2 = 7.25$, $df = 1$, $p < .01$) and with superordinate category identification (weighted towards the Germans), $\chi^2 = 8.57$, $df = 1, p < .01$.

Simple slope analysis was employed to identify whether ingroup identification interacted with superordinate category identification and, in doing so, moderated either form of ingroup bias. To facilitate this, two steps were necessary before slope analysis. Firstly, an omnibus MANOVA identified where interactions might be found (do the two identification measures interact with national group and/or condition?). Secondly, a series of ANOVAs were performed to break down any 3-way interactions into 2-way interactions (in which conditions and/or for which national groups specifically do the two identification measures interact with either national group or condition?).

Firstly, *ingroup identification* and *superordinate category identification* measures were centred based on the mean scores of the whole sample. Next, a 2 (National Group: Great Britain/Germany) X 2 (Condition: EU/NATO) X 2 (Identification: Ingroup/Superordinate Category) omnibus MANOVA identified where interactions might be found. The factors were national group and condition (categorical independent variables), and ingroup identification and superordinate category identification (continuous independent variables, centred values). Both measures of ingroup bias served as dependent variables.

On the dimension of *allocation-based ingroup* bias, all 2-, 3- and 4-way interactions that included ingroup identification and superordinate category identification were non-significant (all $Fs \leq 2.34$, all $ps \geq .13$). High ingroup identification, then, did not interact with superordinate category identification and moderate allocation-based ingroup bias.

Evaluative ingroup bias measures delivered significant interactions (see Table 21). The main effects of ingroup identification and of superordinate category identification were significant (ingroup identification: $F = 12.31$, $p = .001$; superordinate category identification: $F = 4.90$, $p < .05$). Two strong 3-way interactions emerged. Both identity measures interacted with national group significantly ($F = 5.10$, $p < .01$), and with condition at a level approaching significance ($F = 3.01$, $p = .09$). The level of evaluative ingroup bias, then, appeared to be co-determined by nationality (and by condition to a lesser degree) and by the degree of identification with the ingroup and with the superordinate category.

Table 21: 2 X 2 X 2 omnibus MANOVA: Evaluative ingroup bias as a function of National Group, Condition, Ingroup Identification and/or Superordinate Category Identification

Evaluative ingroup bias $df = 1$, error = 92	F	p	partial η^2
Main effects			
Ingroup ID	12.31	.001	.19
SC ID	4.90	.03	.05
3-way interactions			
National Group X Ingroup ID X SC ID	5.10	.03	.05
Condition X Ingroup ID X SC ID	3.01	.09	.03

Note: ID = Identification. SC = Superordinate Category.

The second step before slope analysis was to decompose the 3-way interactions into sets of 2-way interactions. To do this, cases were selected by national group or by condition (i.e. a total of four univariate analyses of variance). Each 2 (either National Group or Condition) X 2 (Identification: Ingroup/Superordinate Category) ANOVA then tested for evaluative ingroup bias as dependent variable. In particular, 2-way interactions Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification were of interest, within one or both conditions or within one or both national groups.

ANOVAs by national group: When the British sample was selected, there was a marginally significant 2-way interaction Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category, $F(1, 52) = 3.14$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$, $p = .08$. When the German sample was selected, there was a marginally significant 2-way interaction Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category, $F(1, 47) = 3.09$, partial $\eta^2 = .06, p = .09$.

ANOVAs by condition: All 2-way interactions Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification were not significant in either condition (both $Fs \leq 1.58$, both $ps \geq .22$).

Simple slope analysis followed, employing the steps recommended by Aiken and West (1991). First, the centred values were recalculated to reflect the actual ingroup and superordinate category identification scores for each national group. These are reported below.

As shown in Figure 15, top, in line with IPM, in the German sample high dual identification saw a significant increase in ingroup bias, z high: $\beta = 13.18$, $p < .001$. Low superordinate category identification led to slight decrease in ingroup bias as ingroup identification increased, z low: $\beta = -1.13$, n.s. Superordinate category identification at 0 also saw a significant increase in ingroup bias, z med: $\beta = 6.02$, $p < .01$. Thus high dual identification increased evaluative ingroup bias significantly.

Figure 15: Moderation effects of ingroup identification (X) on mean evaluative ingroup bias scores (Y) for high and low superordinate category identifiers (Z)



Figure 15, bottom, shows that there were no significant interactions between the two levels of identity in the British sample overall, and whether identification with the superordinate category was low, medium or high, ingroup bias increased as identification with the ingroup increased, *z* low: $\beta = 21.37$, $p < .001$; *z* med; $\beta = 14.27, p < .001$; *z* high: $\beta = 7.17$, n.s.

4.3 Discussion

In broadest terms, the purpose of the study was to examine subgroup-superordinate group relations; to (a) examine the relationship between relative prototypicality and

relative power, (b) test IPM against CIIM/ICM/IMSR in predicting ingroup bias, and (c) identify factors that mediate or moderate ingroup bias.

Evidence was found in the EU condition only that relative prototypicality and relative power mediate allocation-based ingroup bias, but not evaluative ingroup bias. An interesting relationship between power and prototypicality was identified, where relative power mediated relative prototypicality in the EU condition, and relative prototypicality mediated relative power in the NATO condition. The degrees of ingroup and superordinate category identification moderated evaluative ingroup bias in the German sample.

Ingroup bias score patterns

The British sample was higher in evaluative ingroup bias, the German sample in allocation-based ingroup bias – irrespective of condition. This choice of identity management strategy may be accounted for by the nature of the groups and/or by social reality. Allocation-based ingroup bias places Germany in the role of direct social competition, whereas Great Britain opts for a less direct or more constrained form, that is, unfavourable attitudes to the outgroup (and incidentally also less favourable attitudes to both superordinate categories). It seems that Germans feel it legitimate to claim resources, whereas a more insular way of thinking is in place in British individuals.

Firstly from the British standpoint, where the higher evaluative ingroup bias ratings were irrespective of relative prototypicality, relative power or superordinate category, it is possible that anything that is not 'us', is viewed less favourably.

Considering the past tensions between Great Britain and Germany, it is arguable that higher evaluative ingroup bias in the British sample was a foregone conclusion irrespective of condition. However, this would not account for the outgroup favouritism shown on the allocation-based ingroup bias measure in the EU condition. This, in turn, possibly reflects British Euroscepticism; receiving monies from an unwanted superordinate category brings with it a sense of obligation and ties, and this could furthermore account for the ethnocentric evaluative ingroup bias scores.

At the same time, this finding might add to System Justification Theory research, where it is claimed that a low-status group may demonstrate outgroup favouritism, because it feels its position is justified (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Firstly in this study it is apparent that British outgroup favouritism is dependent on the superordinate category, because the effect was unique to the EU condition. Secondly, the author suggests that, within The EU, the British do not perceive themselves to be a 'traditionally' low-status group (although low on prototypicality and on power), but rather as a distinct and separate entity. If this is the case, in this study outgroup favouritism it is permeated with system rejection, not with system justification.

Secondly from the German standpoint, allocation-based ingroup bias was more evident, and also more pronounced in the NATO condition, where participants claimed the position of lower relative prototypicality and lower relative power. The low evaluative ingroup bias may be accounted for by actual attitudes towards the British. The higher allocation-based ingroup bias in the EU condition may be accounted for by perceptions of the ingroup being more deserving of EU monies, because it is generally perceived that Great Britain does not support The EU as it

should[30]. It can only be speculated why the group claimed higher resources in the NATO condition than in the EU condition. Was it seen as a means of compensation for the lack of perceived power? Conversely when comparing scores between conditions, could it be that the German sample recognise that there are other EU-members more in need of financial EU backing, and therefore would claim less EU money than NATO money?

However, it must be noted that it was unfortunate that one of the three project measures had to be discounted, and the point allocation system was clearly somewhat complicated for some participants. It cannot be ruled out that a cleaner set of measures might have produced different scores.

Relative prototypicality and ingroup bias

As predicted, both groups agreed that Germany was more relatively prototypical of The EU. Contrary to prediction, the groups did not agree that Great Britain was more relatively prototypical of NATO. Ingroup projection may occur when groups contest their relative positions (Waldzus et al., 2004), so therefore there might have been evidence of ingroup bias in the NATO condition. This was not the case.

No evidence was found that relative prototypicality might predict evaluative ingroup bias in either condition. Allocation-based ingroup bias was not a function of relative prototypicality in the NATO condition. However, it did mediate fully allocation-based ingroup bias in the EU condition, where the German cohort claimed higher

[30] At an anecdotal level, this was addressed on their own initiative by several German participants during the de-briefing.

relative prototypicality. Evidence supporting IPM, then, was found in one instance only.

Focusing on the IPM premise that high evaluation of the superordinate category is a further possible prerequisite, findings showed that Germans value both The EU and NATO significantly more than the British do (although both groups' scores were significantly above the midpoint across both conditions). This too could account for ingroup projection being found in the German but not in the British sample. Also and in line with IPM, ingroup bias can occur when the outgroup is perceived to deviate from ingroup/superordinate category norms, and it is reasonable to assume that this is the case regarding Germans' perceptions of Great Britain within The EU.

There is acknowledged uncertainty in the IPM research regarding which co-factors might increase the likelihood of ingroup bias occurring. For example, it may be that the prototype of NATO is too unclear (see also Study 1), and this could account for the lack of evidence of ingroup projection in this condition. Also and as in Study 1, prototypicality measures did not include trait-based relative prototypicality, the 'traditional' IPM measure.

Relative power and ingroup bias

The British felt significantly more powerful in the NATO condition than in the EU condition; the Germans felt significantly more powerful in the EU condition than in the NATO condition. The findings examining relative power as a mediator of ingroup bias mirrored the relative prototypicality findings. That is, relative power did not predict evaluative ingroup bias in either condition, nor allocation-based ingroup

bias in the NATO condition. Relative power partially mediated allocation-based ingroup bias in the EU condition. Again the German sample (claiming higher relative prototypicality) claimed higher relative power and demonstrated higher allocation-based ingroup bias. This raised the question: is there a difference between relative power and relative prototypicality based on the measures employed in this study?

The structural relationship between relative prototypicality and relative power

Findings from principal axis factoring confirmed that the two measures tapped into to separate constructs. However, both brought about comparable outcomes, that is, higher relative prototypicality and higher relative power are positively related to higher allocation-based ingroup bias. This prototypicality-power relationship is in line with Weber et al.'s (2002) proposition that high-status groups (measured here on the dimension of relative power) show high relative prototypicality. Mediation analysis revealed that, in the EU condition, relative prototypicality mediated relative power to some degree (Sobel's test: $p = .11$n n.s.), and in the NATO condition, relative power mediated relative prototypicality to some degree (Sobel's test: $p = .08$, n.s.). Despite these non-significant findings, this observation is worthy of further investigation, and the nature of the national groups and superordinate categories involved may offer some explanations.

The EU: Germany (higher relative prototypicality/power than under NATO) is a founding member of The EU and its geographical location is land-locked within it. Given the recent enlargement to include Eastern European states, one could argue that Germans are *de facto* both relatively prototypical and relatively powerful, newer

members less prototypical and less powerful. Findings, then, appear simply to reflect 'factual' reality. However, mediation suggests that Germans' perceived relative power rests on perceived relative prototypicality. One can speculate why this might be. The post-war generation is extremely sensitive to issues concerning the use and abuse of power. The EU advocates democracy, equality and multiculturalism, values that find much support in Germany. From this, if Germany upholds EU values and beliefs, if it is therefore prototypical, then The EU offers the social, economical and political climate where Germans may 'rightfully' demonstrate power.

NATO: Great Britain (higher relative prototypicality/power than under The EU) is a founding member of NATO. It is a power-based organisation, and here relative prototypicality was mediated by relative power. It is generally acknowledged that the USA is the most powerful player in NATO, and Great Britain enjoys a 'special relationship' with the USA. The key players – USA and Great Britain by proxy – have the power to define the norms and values of the prototype, that is, what is prototypical and what is not. In other words, if the USA is a key player, and if 'we' (the British) have close ties to 'them', then the 'ownership' of the superordinate category extends to 'us'.

It is circumspect here to compare the relationship between prototypicality and power, and to bring in Turner's (2005) three-process approach in doing so. Turning specifically to the German scores in the EU condition, prototypicality drives power. This is in line with Turner's proposal, where he argues that the 'collective reality testing' (*viz.* the reflection of social identification) of the psychological group (here the EU) antecedes power. The influence that the group can use to manifest power can

take the form of persuasion, authority or coercion. In the case of Germany and The EU, the following explains the rationale clearly. '[L]egitimate authority is a product of influence and the formation of norms within the group. Authority is based on ingroup norms that a "group has the right to prescribe appropriate beliefs' (p. 11). Power, then, is the resultant expression of the group's influence on its members.

Dual identification and ingroup bias

There were only marginal differences in the degree of British and German ingroup identification, evidenced by both the Cameron's (2004) and the national identity measures (mean difference .19 and .31 resp.). The German sample identified with both superordinate categories significantly more so than the British sample did. The categorical measures of identity (e.g., Welsh, British, West German, European) showed a strong leaning in the British sample to identify at subgroup and group level, in the German sample at group and European level.

These differences in identification levels notwithstanding, one final IPM proposition was tested. Would high dual identification increase ingroup bias (Wenzel et al., 2003), or a decrease in ingroup bias, as proposed IMSR (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). Furthermore, would high superordinate category identification see a decrease in ingroup bias, as proposed by CIIM (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) and to some degree by ICM (Brown & Hewstone, 2005)?

Analyses revealed that allocation-based ingroup bias was independent of identification levels. However, in the German sample, high dual identifiers demonstrated higher levels of evaluative ingroup bias. As identification with both

ingroup and superordinate category increased, so did evaluative ingroup bias. This was the only example found in support of IPM (that is, it did not occur in the British sample or in either of the experimental conditions).

In contrast and consistent with IMSR, high dual identification saw a decrease in evaluative ingroup bias in the British sample. The positive impact of superordinate category identification supports CIIM and ICM[31]. An increase in ingroup identification saw an increase in evaluative ingroup bias irrespective of the degree of superordinate category identification. However, increasing superordinate category identification saw a reduction in evaluative ingroup bias as ingroup identification increased. Therefore in this sample, perhaps it is higher identification at the superordinate category level that sees the reduction in bias, but not necessarily dual identification.

It should be noted that the degree of superordinate category identification was measured on evaluative component of identification. This was unavoidable, due to differences in the two superordinate categories, where the Cameron (2004) measures would have been implausible. However, this did mean that the ingroup identification measure encompassed Cameron's three factors of social identity (ingroup ties, ingroup affect and centrality), whereas the measure devised for this study encapsulated a measure of ingroup affect only. The superordinate category measure was, therefore, not as rich as the ingroup measure. These differences may have affected scores.

[31] The same pattern of slopes was identified in the EU and in the NATO conditions. Because the 3-way interactions in these conditions did not suggest that further 2-way interactions might diverge from each other, these were not reported.

Ingroup projection, then, was found in the German sample only. The following proposition is highly speculative. Might ingroup projection be a nation-specific phenomenon? It is the author's understanding that IPM research has been conducted on German participants, both as members of their national group and as members of other social groups. Are there essential differences between British and German social groups and their respective constructions of the content and commitment of these, that in turn account can for ingroup projection in one group and a lack of ingroup projection in the other? For example, to draw on hierarchical levels of identity in this study, it may be that the German sample more readily thinks in terms of a shared, higher-order identity. The British, on the other hand, look within their group in self-definition. A way forward might be to test IPM on other non-German groups, or to remain within a British sample, where British identification is superordinate and European identification supraordinate.

In summary, support for all four models of intersubgroup relations was found. For the sake of clarity, these are summarised in brief in Table 22. Due to their converging nature, CIIM and ICM are summarised together.

As shown in Table 22, evidence supporting IPM was apparent but inconsistent; indeed, there were instances where there was an inverse relationship between relative prototypicality and ingroup bias. However, the study did not tap into the content or representation of the superordinate categories, that is, did not utilize the 'traditional' IPM trait-based measure, nor were factors such as legitimacy and intergroup differences addressed. Furthermore, a structural link was found between relative prototypicality and relative power, and interestingly one was the driving force in one

condition (relative prototypicality in the EU condition), and the other in the other condition (relative power in the NATO condition), although not significantly so in either case (Sobel's test: $p = .11$ and .08 resp.). Examining the relationship between relative prototypicality and relative power in future studies may well help in refining IPM and in testing Turner's (2005) three-process theory of power further.

Table 22: Summary of evidence supporting the four models of intersubgroup relations

	High EU ID	High SC ID	High dual ID	Proto-typicality[1]
CIIM/ICM				
Evaluative ingroup bias	GB/EU (corr)	GB/EU (corr) GB/NATO (corr)	GB[2] (mod)	-
Allocation-based ingroup bias	-	GB (mod)	-	-
IMSR				
Evaluative ingroup bias	-	-	GB[2] (mod)	-
Allocation-based ingroup bias	-	-	-	-
IPM				
Evaluative ingroup bias	-	-	G (mod)	-
Allocation-based ingroup bias	-	G/EU (corr)	-	GB/EU (corr) G/EU (med[3])

Note: EU ID = European identification. SC ID = superordinate category identification (based on evaluative component of identity). Dual ID = identification with ingroup and superordinate category. corr = correlational. med = mediation. mod = moderation. [1]: all measures of prototypicality are included here with no differentiation between these. [2]: high dual identification saw no significant increase in ingroup bias. [3]: $p = .08$.

It seems reasonable to propose that ICM with its notion of pluralism explains well the low evaluative ingroup bias in the German sample, where, as a group committed

to The EU and its values, the outgroup is viewed positively and distinctively (see Table 22). ICM could also account for the high evaluative ingroup bias in the British sample, where shared membership under an unwelcome superordinate category is seen as a threat to ingroup distinctiveness. The lack of evidence in the NATO condition could be accounted for by the lack of perceived identity threat that NATO elicits, if we were to extrapolate the qualitative findings from Study 1 to Study 2. If this is the case, this is in line with ICM. Future research would be required to test the roles of ingroup distinctiveness and identity threat.

Similarly, it is plausible that the CIIM notion of common fate and shared goals would explain the lack of evaluative ingroup bias in the German sample, but would not explain German high allocation-based ingroup bias (see Table 22). It appears that higher relative power could account for this latter finding, which is consistent with Spear et al.'s (2001) notion of useable power. Again, future studies could help explain these identity management strategy choices further.

Finally, the interactions between the two levels of identity and evaluative ingroup bias revealed interesting patterns, summarised in Table 22. Evidence generally supported CIIM and IMSR, although in one case the predictions of IPM held true. Before any definitive conclusions can be drawn here, more research is required on perceived legitimacy and status differentials between groups.

Chapter 5 Study 3

Studies 1 and 2 examined the impact of relative prototypicality, relative power and two different superordinate categories on intersubgroup relations. The influence that the degree of ingroup and/or superordinate category identification might have upon sub-group relations was also considered. Study 3 pursued these questions further, however with two new national groups; England and Wales.

From both previous studies, it was apparent that the EU as superordinate category evidenced different British-German subgroup relations than NATO did. Within The EU, the British enjoy a degree of 'notoriety' in their sometimes anti-EU stance, and although both groups enjoy comparable power within The EU, self-ratings showed a significant discrepancy in perceived power differentials between the two national groups. Additionally, evidence suggested that British attitudes towards the Germans are less favourable irrespective of superordinate category (documented too by high evaluative ingroup bias towards the Germans in the control condition). Finally, it was apparent that the British sample drew heavily on subgroup identities, that is, being Welsh, English and so forth.

But to what degree do the previous findings (such as the influence of the nature of the superordinate category, perceived power and prototypicality differentials and the impact of the degree of identification at ingroup and at superordinate group level) generalize to other subgroup-superordinate group relations? From Studies 1 and 2, it appeared that subgroup identification played an important role in British identity. Added to this, it is reasonable to assume that, within Great Britain, England is the

most dominant and therefore high-power group, and Wales a minority and therefore low-power group. Therefore the final study examined English-Welsh subgroup relations. The two superordinate categories were Great Britain and The EU. The study included a trait-based measure of *relative prototypicality* adapted from the IPM-school (e.g. Waldzus et al., 2003; Waldzus et al., 2004; Wenzel et al., 2003). The *relative power* items remained unchanged. A proxy measure of the perceived legitimacy of subgroup-superordinate group relations was added; *relative fairness*. A third measure of ingroup bias – *received respect* – measured perceptions of being a target of bias.

Before presenting these new measures in more detail, two issues are raised here. The first relates to the three levels of inclusiveness in this study, that is subgroup (English or Welsh), superordinate group (British) and supraordinate group (European). The second relates to two contextual factors concerning the two subgroups.

Firstly, it is reasonable to argue that, in this study, we have a tripartite hierarchy of social groups, from regional (subgroups belong to the regional groups England or Wales), through national (both belong to the nation-state of Great Britain) to supranational (Europe). Following the argumentation that the quality of intersubgroup relations can be affected by the nature of the superordinate category (Doosje, Haslam, Spears, Oakes, & Koomen, 1998; Turner et al., 1987), a far more complex picture can emerge when one hierarchical category (here the nation-state) sits between the subgroup (the region) and the supraordinate group (Europe).

Specifically relevant to this thesis, Mols, Jetten and Haslam (unpublished manuscript) have hypothesised that conflicts between regional (Wales) identities and nation-state (Great Britain) identities may affect European identification, and that identification will change in response to perceptions of both normative and comparative fit of the subgroup with the two higher social groups. As they argue, examination of a multi-layered, bottom-up approach is of particular relevance with regards to peripheral regions such as Wales, that is, regions who do not identify necessarily with the nation state (Mols & Haslam, in press).

Taking this rationale one step further, consider Wales. If the region perceives the relationship between the nation-state and The EU to be negative, its attitudes towards Europe may be enhanced, that is, the region may enhance its own identity by aligning with Europe (Mols & Haslam, in press)[32].. Thus as well as paying tribute to the basic tenets of SCT (Turner et al., 1987) and the need for ingroup distinctiveness (Spears, Jetten, & Scheepers, 2002), Mols and Haslam draw on Heider's (1946) balance theory and, from the standpoint of the Welsh, they found that "'my enemy's enemy is my friend"' (in press, ¶ 16).

In later sections, the research of Mols and colleagues will be discussed where relevant. For the sake of consistency, however, their terminology will be employed only where misunderstandings could otherwise arise. Thus *regional groups* (England and Wales) will be referred to as subgroups. They refer to Great Britain as *the nation*

[32] Conversely (though not relevant to the Welsh sample and their anticipated believes that England does not enjoy a positive relationship to The EU), if the region perceives the relationship between the nation-state and The EU to be positive, its attitudes towards the nation state may be negative, and towards The EU positive, that is, it may 'accuse' the nation state of over-conforming with The EU and claim for itself closer ties to Europe.

state and as the *superordinate group*, whereas below and generally Great Britain will be referred to as the superordinate group only. Similarly, the *supraordinate category* of The EU and Europe is referred to here as the second superordinate category. Finally, it is of course quite legitimate and correct that Mols and colleagues distinguish between the two levels of inclusiveness; the superordinate and the supraordinate groups. However, again for the sake of consistency across the study series in this thesis, Great Britain and Europe are treated as two separate superordinate groups.

Secondly we discuss the two contextual factors. These are group size and status differentials, and the two are interlinked. As discussed earlier, status reflects a group's standing in an intergroup setting and status may be exhibited in terms of power (Hornsey et al., 2003). In this study, power differentials are measured, status differences are assumed. A smaller group is, of course, not necessarily lower in status/power than a larger group. Indeed, a group's exclusivity can be indicative of its high status/power (e.g., 'Old Boys' networks', Free Masonry, MENSA). The smaller group is understood in this study as the lower-power minority group Wales, and the higher-power majority group England.

Group size, group status and group power can be manipulated successfully in laboratory studies, and thus their independent effects on intersubgroup relations are measurable. For example, a recent study showed that when group size only was manipulated (and there was intergroup contact), the minority group showed higher allocation-based ingroup bias. However, when status and size were manipulated, the higher status group *and* the minority group showed higher allocation-based ingroup

bias (González & Brown, 2006; cf Otten, Mummendey & Blanz, 2001). In an attempt to unravel why minority group members might exhibit higher ingroup bias, Leonardelli and Brewer (2001; laboratory study) suggest that the degree of ingroup identification is the key, but motivations to discriminate are dependent on how comfortable members are with the size of their group.

However, intergroup relations are far more complex in real-life groups who commonly share a past and present (and, as a rule, a future). Added to this, as group size and group status are not controlled, it is impossible to pinpoint where the effect of one ends and the effect of the other starts. For example in one such study examining group size and group status in Swedish and Finnish groups, a Group Size X Group Status interaction was identified (Liebkind, Nystrom, Honkanummi & Lange, 2004). Minority groups demonstrate less favourable attitudes to majority groups, and higher-status groups demonstrate more favourable attitudes to lower-status groups.

To add further to the complexity, drawing on acculturation research to examine minority-majority intergroup relations seems somewhat misplaced in an English-Welsh-British context. From the English standpoint, does the Welsh group pose any identity threat to Englishness or Britishness? Probably not. From the Welsh standpoint however, Great Britain may be perceived as a superordinate category dominated by the English. We cannot draw on IPM here, because it offers no predictions regarding ingroup bias in a less relatively prototypical group. Turning to acculturation research, if Welsh perceptions of Britishness equate to perceptions of Englishness, then attempts to integrate Wales further into Great Britain (IMSR: dual

identification) and particularly suggestions of Welsh people assimilating the British group (CIIM: assimilation and recategorization) are likely to be vehemently rejected by the group. Common sense dictates that the most likely strategy to enhance English-Welsh-British relations from the Welsh standpoint is mutual intergroup differentiation (ICM: separation) and strong ingroup identity maintenance. Does this 'common sense' strategy hold true in terms of EU membership?

The second experimental condition with The EU as superordinate category offers this Welsh sub-sample an opportunity to recategorize at a higher level of inclusiveness without 'paying homage' to Great Britain – and indirectly to England. This phenomenon is not new to research (e.g., Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke & Klink, 1998; Hornsey & Hogg, 2002), where a lower-status group seeks to enhance its status in this way. In other words, the CIIM strategy of re-categorization in this case can offer lower-status groups a viable identity management strategy.

Trait-based relative prototypicality

In studies 1 and 2, it was not possible to utilize the trait-based measure of relative prototypicality for reasons of implausibility in the NATO condition[33]. Given the sparse evidence found to support IPM, it is therefore arguable that the measures employed did not tap into same processes as trait-based relative prototypicality does. Study 3 provided the opportunity to employ this tried-and-tested measure of relative prototypicality.

[33] It was thought unlikely that participants would be able to rate what percentage of 'typical' NATO group members possess specific traits.

Relative fairness (legitimacy)

The perceived (il)legitimacy of relations can affect intersubgroup relations profoundly, and possible effects and interactions have been discussed in the Literature Review. However, and of particular relevance here, there is some preliminary evidence to suggest that the perceived (il)legitimacy of relations is dependent upon perceived relative prototypicality, and that the relationship is moderated by group status and superordinate category valence. Namely, Weber et al. (2002) found that relative prototypicality was used to justify a high-status position; however only where the superordinate category was positively primed. Negative superordinate category priming coupled with high relative prototypicality led to perceptions of illegitimate relations. Bringing this finding into the context of Study 3, we may find links between relative prototypicality and relative fairness if subgroup-superordinate group relations are perceived as illegitimate.

Received respect

This measure was introduced to obtain an approximation of how respected by the relevant superordinate category each group perceives itself to be. A measure of relative received respect was calculated by subtracting outgroup received respect scores from ingroup received respect scores. Lower received respect indicates that the ingroup is more a target of (negative) bias, and higher received respect less a target of bias. Simultaneously, the findings will serve as a starting point to develop more differential and sophisticated measures of respect in a future study.

Looking at some of the past evidence, it would seem that a subgroup receiving respect will demonstrate more favourable attitudes to the superordinate category and possibly to other subgroups (Huo & Molina, 2006); a top-down approach. Received respect between subgroups can enhance negotiation processes during the development of a superordinate category (Eggins et al., 2002); a bottom-up approach. Firstly, when examining US American ethnic subgroups and their perceptions of respect (feelings of being accepted, valued etc.), Huo and Molina found that the higher the perceived respect, the more favourable subgroups' attitudes were towards America (the superordinate category) and its ethnic sub-groups – however only amongst those participants who themselves were ethnic minorities[34]. Secondly in an ostensible strategy choice negotiation task employing a student sample, higher perceived respect (perceptions of fairness and of feeling valued) between subgroups brought forth more satisfying negotiations, and this effect was partially mediated by the emerging superordinate category (Eggins et al., 2002: Exp. 2).

Bringing these findings into the current study, it will not be possible to compare findings with those of Eggins et al. (2002), because received respect is measured top-down only. Nonetheless the mediation findings may shed light on interpreting these data. Conversely and drawing on Huo and Molin's (2006) reseach, if the (minority) Welsh overall feel relatively well respected by either or both superordinate categories, then this might account in part for lower evaluative ingroup bias towards

[34] As a point of interest, personal respect rather than subgroup respect predicted favourable attitudes in White Americans. This reflects somewhat the ideals and values associated with an individualistic culture.

the English. Conversely, if the Welsh feel relatively less well respected, this might account in part for higher evaluative ingroup bias.

A priori *assumptions*

To start, it was assumed that the English (majority group) is higher-status and the Welsh (minority group) lower-status, and, in contrast to power differentials, this was *not* measured. It was further assumed that both subgroups would hold both superordinate categories in high esteem, a general prerequisite postulated by CIIM, IMSR and IPM. In the case of The EU, the rationale was based on findings from Study 2, where British participants, that is, both English and Welsh participants, scored significantly above the midpoint on the evaluation of The EU. In the case of Great Britain, 57% of English and Welsh participants had identified as being British.

As a minority and low-power group, the Welsh should demonstrate higher *ingroup identification* than the English (Simon, Kulla, & Zobel, 1995; Wilder & Simon, 2004). The English as a dominant (IPM), high-power and majority group should demonstrate higher *British identification* and score higher on relative prototypicality than the Welsh. The Welsh sample could enhance its lower-power position by reporting higher *European identification* than the English (CIIM), and also feel more relatively prototypical of The EU than of Great Britain. This trend would support fully the 'my enemy's enemy is my friend' notion suggested by Mols and Haslam (in press). This remained to be tested. It was further assumed that the English would report higher *relative power* than the Welsh across both conditions. However, English scores would be higher in the GB condition than in the EU condition. Welsh

scores could be higher in the EU condition than in the GB condition, and this too remained to be tested.

Do we see higher evaluative ingroup bias in the lower-power Welsh sample, and higher allocation-based ingroup bias in the higher-power English sample? Can we identify any patterns of received respect? To what degree does the salient superordinate group affect ingroup bias scores?

Should the intersubgroup identity management strategies employed by British and Germans in Study 2 extrapolate to these two groups, then the English should demonstrate higher allocation-based ingroup bias (as did the German sample, which was higher in power and therefore able to claim more resources), the Welsh higher evaluative ingroup bias (as did the British sample, which was lower in power and therefore limited in its bias strategy choice). Based on its higher power position, it was assumed that the English would receive higher respect in the GB condition than in the EU condition. Based on its lower power position, it was also assumed that the Welsh sample would receive lower respect in the GB condition, but not necessarily in the EU condition.

What are the relationships between the possible predictor variables of ingroup bias (ingroup and superordinate category identification, relative prototypicality and relative power) and the three forms of ingroup bias? Is there any association between ingroup bias and relative fairness (legitimacy)?

Because this study was examining the two new groups, we sought to establish whether or to what degree English-Welsh relationships reflect British-German

relationships. SIT and SCT tell us that the nature of the groups involved will affect their relationships, and any differences in these two pairs would reveal that this is the case. Also new to Study 3 was (il)legitimacy, and whether or to what degree this might be linked to ingroup bias levels (Turner & Brown, 1978).

Is any form of ingroup bias a function of national group and (directly or indirectly) relative prototypicality, relative power or relative fairness, or of the degree of ingroup or superordinate category identification?

In Study 2, relative power and relative prototypicality mediated allocation-based ingroup bias to some degree, where German scores (higher-power group, lower ingroup identification) were higher than British (lower-power group, higher ingroup identification) scores. Should the assumption hold true that the English are higher in power and the Welsh lower, and should we see higher ingroup identification in the Welsh than in the English cohort, then a similar pattern of effects on ingroup bias should emerge.

Do high dual identifiers demonstrate higher (IPM) or lower (CIIM, IMSR) ingroup bias?

Study 2 provided no definitive answer was found to this question. On the one hand, high German dual identifiers demonstrated highest evaluative ingroup bias. In contrast, high British identifiers demonstrated lower (but not lowest) evaluative ingroup bias. Additionally, as identification with the superordinate category increased, evaluative ingroup bias decreased. Again drawing on the strong degree of

ingroup identification associated with the English and the Welsh, it was possible that the degree of ingroup identification alone would moderate ingroup bias.

5.1 Method

Design

The experimental study employed a 2 (National Group: English/Welsh) X 3 (Condition: EU/Great Britain/no superordinate category) X 2 (Target Group: ingroup-outgroup ratings) mixed ANOVA design, where target group data constituted repeated measures. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions within each national group. Cell sizes were between 26 and 38.

Participants

One hundred and ninety participants were from three HE establishments; Cardiff University (CU), Swansea University (SU) and Swansea Institute (SI). The School of Psychology at CU attracts a high percentage of English students, and here the study was run on English participants only ($n = 61$). English and Welsh participants were recruited at SU and SI. All SI students ($n = 45$) were studying Psychology and/or Counselling, SU students ($n = 78$) were from a variety of Faculties and Schools. Six participants were excluded from the study (two identified as English and Welsh, two had filled in the incorrect questionnaire, two reported nationalities other than English or Welsh). The net sample size was 184 (English: $N = 86$, age range = 18-57, $M = 20.29$, $SD = 5.18$, m:f = 17:69; Welsh: $N = 98$, age range = 18-54, $M = 23.71$, $SD = 9.12$, m:f = 20:76).

Materials

The study was questionnaire based and was largely a replication of Study 2. Here, British/Great Britain and German/Germany etc. were replaced with English/England and Welsh/Wales etc. The superordinate category EU remained, NATO was replaced with Great Britain. The item order of ingroup and outgroup measures was counterbalanced.

Manipulation

The manipulation took the form of a framing text in which superordinate category membership was primed. The initial text was adapted from the United Kingdom page of the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/uk.html, accessed 15.12.05; see Questionnaire in App III.), in which *the people*, *the economy* and *the political system* were described in a neutral manner. The same text was used as an ostensible description of The EU with one minor amendment[35]. This was followed by three comprehension questions to underline the priming process.

Dependent variables

Unless stated otherwise, all items and sub-items employed a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*). There were measures of identification, superordinate category evaluation, relative power, relative fairness, three measures of relative prototypicality and three measures of ingroup bias. These are described

[35] 'Elections are held as laid out in the statutes' (GB-version) was replaced with 'Elections are held as laid out in the Constitution' (EU-version).

below in the order in which they appeared in the questionnaire. Those measures administered across all three conditions are indicated by an asterisk. Those measures *not* replicated or adapted from Study 1 or Study 2 are indicated by a dagger. Other measures were also included[36], but were not relevant to this study.

**Ingroup identification* followed by *Superordinate category evaluation:* The nine ingroup identification sub-items (Cameron, 2004; all $\alpha s \geq .64$) and the three superordinate category sub-items ($\alpha = .84$) were collapsed into two single variables (1 = *low* to 7 = *high*).

† Trait-based relative prototypicality: Adapted from previous IPM studies (e.g., Waldzus et al., 2003; Weber et al., 2003), a list of 15 traits was presented to participants three times. Each time, participants were asked to rate how typical they felt these traits to be for the respective target group on a scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much so*). Ingroup and outgroup were counterbalanced, the superordinate category target group was rated last. Traits fell into three categories; warmth (5; e.g., 'genuine', 'community spirited'), competency (5; e.g., 'achieving', 'driven'), and non-nation specific (5; e.g., 'honest', 'intelligent'). The non-nation specific traits were taken from the Katz and Braly (1933) list.

The choice of warmth and competency traits was based on evidence that stereotypes can be encapsulated by two dimensions; warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002)[37]. For example, perceived status appears to predict perceived

[36] These were nationalism and patriotism (Blank & Schmidt, 2003), degree of interest in politics, political party affiliation and Right-Wing-Orientation (Altemeyer, 1981, 1998).

[37] Thanks to Dr. Ronni Greenwood for suggesting this approach.

competence, and socially competitive behaviour perceived lack of warmth. It was assumed that the English sample (higher-status) would be perceived higher in competence, and the Welsh sample (lower-status) higher in warmth.

The treatment of the data followed the procedure recommended by Waldzus et al. (2004). Euclidean distances[38] were calculated, thus measuring *dissimilarity* between superordinate category and target group. The reverse of the measure indicates the degree of *similarity* between the two. Here, then, the lower the score, the higher the perceived relative prototypicality.

**Allocation-based ingroup bias:* Three new ostensible projects were devised (e.g., 'to fund brownsite developments'), and participants allocated a grand total £15 million between the ingroup and outgroup for these (*-15 = low* to +15 = *high).* In the control condition, participants were told that the scheme was introduced by Parliament. **Evaluative ingroup bias* and *similarity-based relative prototypicality* were a replication of Study 2.

† Proximity-based relative prototypicality: Four Venn-like diagrams depicting variations of crossed or subsumed categorisation (see e.g. App. II, p. 308.) were presented. Diagrams A and B reflected resp. the double-ingroup and double-outgroup scenario, and thus represented no disparity between subgroups in their relationship to the superordinate category. Scenarios C (ingroup-in outgroup-out) and D (outgroup-in ingroup-out) showed disparity. Participants ranked the four diagrams on how these best reflected the relationship between the three groups (1 = *least best* to 4 = *best;*

[38] $d_{super-sub} = \sqrt{[\sum (x_{super1} - x_{sub1})^2 + (x_{super2} - x_{sub2})^2 \ldots (x_{super15} - x_{sub15})^2 / xn]}$, where d = profile dissimilarity, super = superordinate category, sub = subgroup, x*n* = trait *n*.

see Vescio, Hewstone, Crisp & Rubin, 1999, p. 117). Of interest were only those responses given as Scenario C or D. $M_{diagram\text{-}C} - M_{diagram\text{-}D}$ delivered *proximity-based relative prototypicality* (-3 = *low* to +3 = *high*).

**Relative power*[39] was a replication of Study 2 (here both αs $\geq$ = .73).

**†Relative fairness (legitimacy):* In two sub-items, participants were asked 'how fair do you personally find the amount of power that the ingroup [outgroup] has in <the superordinate category>?'. $M_{fairness\text{-}to\text{-}ingroup} - M_{fairness\text{-}to\text{-}outgroup}$ formed *relative fairness* (-6 = *very unfair* to +6 = *very fair*).

*† *Received respect:* The next six statements (three ingroup, three outgroup, four reverse scored) were alternated with the power statements described above (e.g., 'The EU does not take Wales seriously'). Two collapsed scores were computed (both αs $\geq$ .70) and $M_{ingroup\text{-}respect} - M_{outgroup\text{-}respect}$ delivered *respect-based ingroup bias* (-6 = *low* to +6 = *high*).

† Superordinate category identification: The Cameron (2004) scale was used to measure identification at the British or European level. Studies 1 and 2 had shown the factor *centrality* to play a minor role in national ingroup identification, and this factor was therefore omitted[40]. Sub-items and factors (all αs $\geq$ .75) were collapsed into *superordinate category identification* (1 = *low* to 7 = *high*).

[39] In the control condition, the frame of reference was 'other nations' on r*elative power, relative fairness* and *received respect.*

[40] Given the unanticipated and strong centrality score in the Welsh sample, the decision to exclude centrality was, in hindsight, unfortunate.

**Hierarchical levels of identity:* This multiple response item was a replication of Study 2.

Procedure

Ethics Approval was granted before running the study (see App. III-1). At CU, the study was advertised on the Departmental Study Pool web-site, and students signed up to take part in the study in return for course credits. Administration of the questionnaire took place in the designated laboratory. At SI, students were approached by the investigator during their lectures and questionnaires returned at a later point. At SU, participants were approached individually by the investigator at eating outlets on campus, and questionnaires were filled in on the spot. SI and SU participants received a raffle ticket with a prize of £25 as an incentive. All participants were told that the aim of the study was to investigate 'how we feel about our country and our neighbours'. Those who agreed to participate signed the Form of Consent and completed one of the twelve questionnaires (i.e. two national groups, three conditions, ingroup and outgroup items counterbalanced). All participants were thanked and fully de-briefed (see App. III-2 – III-4).

5.2 Results

The data were screened for outliers, all reverse scored items recoded and variables collapsed as described in the Method section. It was noted that the male:female ratio (38:144) was weighted towards females ($\chi^2 = 6.96$, $df = 2$, $p < .05$), a common effect when drawing heavily on psychology students. Therefore in the analyses reported below, analyses of covariance were performed in each instance in a first step, with

Gender as covariate. No gender effects were found. Therefore unless stated otherwise, all analyses of variance employed a 2 X 2 [3] design, where the factors national group (English/Welsh) and condition (EU/GB/[Control]) served as independent variables. The *a priori* assumptions were tested first.

A priori *assumptions*

Superordinate category evaluation: It had been assumed that all scores would be significantly above the midpoint, and this was the case. England ($M = 5.54$, $SD = .71$) held Great Britain in higher esteem than the Welsh ($M = 5.04$, $SD = 1.17$). did, though only marginally so (see Table 23). The Welsh ($M = 4.88$, $SD = 1.06$) rated The EU only marginally higher than the English ($M = 4.76$, $SD = 1.22$) did. All scores were significantly above the midpoint (all $ps < .001$). Therefore and as assumed, superordinate category evaluation was higher rather than lower, and the measure was not utilized further[41].

Table 23: Mean superordinate category evaluation scores

	English	Welsh
Great Britain	5.54***	5.04***
	(.71)	(1.17)
	$n = 29$	$n = 28$
The EU	4.76***	4.88***
	(1.22)	(1.06)
	$n = 26$	$n = 31$

Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above the midpoint (3) using one-sample *t*-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. ***$p<.001$.

41 For the interested reader: The English cohort rated Great Britain more highly than The EU ($F(1, 110) = 7.54$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$, $p < .01$; simple effect), whereas the Welsh cohort did not ($p = .58$). All other simple effects were non-significant.

Ingroup identification: As assumed (see Table 24), Welsh ingroup identification ($M = 5.17$, $SD = .88$) was significantly higher than English ingroup identification ($M = 4.61$, $SD = .70$), $t(180) = 4.70$, $p < .001$.

Table 24: Mean ingroup and superordinate category identification scores

	English	Welsh
Ingroup identification	4.61^{***} (.70) $n = 86$	5.17^{***} (.88) $n = 98$
British identification	5.16^{***} (.94) $n = 29$	4.97^{***} (1.02) $n = 26$
European identification	4.40^{***} (1.00) $n = 26$	4.26^{***} (.91) $n = 31$

Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above the midpoint (3) using one-sample *t*-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. $^{***}p < .001$.

Superordinate category identification: Only partly in line with *a priori* assumptions, a 2 X 2 ANOVA, where superordinate category identification served as a dependent variable, revealed that groups identified significantly more at the British (English: $M = 5.16$, $SD = .94$; Welsh: $M = 4.97$, $SD = 1.02$) than at the European level (English: $M = 4.40$, $SD = 1.00$; Welsh: $M = 4.26$, $SD = .91$), both $Fs \geq 7.46$, both $ps < .01$ (simple effects). There were no significant differences between the national groups in their degrees of British or European identification, both $Fs \leq .45$, both $ps \geq .49$.

Hierarchical levels of identification: As shown in Table 25, there was a significant relationship between nationality and the levels of identity ($\chi^2 = 29.58$, $df = 6$, $p < .001$), where nearly half of the Welsh sample (46.9%; English = 15.3%)

identified at subgroup level only. However, both groups identified at subgroup and British level almost in equal measure (Welsh: 34.4%; English: 35.3%).

Table 25: 2 X 7 contingency table – national group by hierarchical identity level combinations

	Count (% within nationality)						
Hierarchical combinations	Sub	Sub + Grp	Sub + Super	Grp	Grp + Super	Super	All levels
English $n = 85$	13 (15.3)	30 (35.3)	0 (0)	22 (25.9)	1 (1.2)	1 (1.2)	18 (21.2)
Welsh $n = 96$	45 (46.9)	33 (34.4)	1 (1.0)	10 (10.4)	0 (0)	0 (0)	7 (7.3)

Note: Sub = subgroup English or Welsh. Grp = British. Super = European.

Relative prototypicality

All English scores were higher than all Welsh scores across both conditions, that is, the English felt more prototypical of both superordinate categories than the Welsh did (for the sake of brevity, see Table 26 for mean scores and standard deviations). On all three measures, the English felt more prototypical of Great Britain than of The EU. Conversely on two of the three measures, the Welsh felt more prototypical of The EU than of Great Britain (the exception was trait-based relative prototypicality). A series of 2 X 2 ANOVAs, where one of the relative prototypicality measures served as a dependent variable, tested for between- and within-subjects differences.

Proximity-based and *similarity-based relative prototypicality:* The 2-way interaction National Group X Condition was significant on proximity-based relative

prototypicality, ($F(3, 105) = 6.57$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$, $p < .05$), and on similarity-based relative prototypicality, $F(3, 110) = 8.04$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$, $p < .01$.

Between-subjects, simple effects: On the dimension of *proximity-based relative prototypicality,* the English felt more prototypical of Great Britain ($F(1, 105) = 94.55$, partial $\eta^2 = .48$, $p < .001$) and of The EU ($F(1, 105) = 30.01$, partial $\eta^2 = .27$, $p < .001$) than the Welsh did. On the dimension of *similarity-based relative prototypicality*, the English felt more prototypical of Great Britain ($F(1, 110) = 36.78$, partial $\eta^2 = .25$, $p < .001$) and of The EU ($F(1, 110) = 3.07$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$, $p = .08$, n.s.) than the Welsh did.

Within-subjects, simple effects On the dimension of *proximity-based relative prototypicality,* the English felt more prototypical of Great Britain than of The EU, $F(1, 105) = 4.62$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$, $p < .01$. Although the Welsh sample scored higher in The EU condition than in the GB condition, differences were non-significant ($p = .14$). A similar pattern of simple effects emerged on the dimension of *similarity-based relative prototypicality*, (English: $F(1, 110) = 5.90$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$, $p < .05$; Welsh: $F(1, 110) = 3.46$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$, $p = .07$).

Table 26: Mean proximity-based, similarity-based and trait-based relative prototypicality scores

	English	Welsh
Proximity-based prototypicality		
GB	1.93***	-1.92†††
	(.90)	(1.47)
	$n = 28$	$n = 26$
EU	1.08*	-1.34†††
	(2.02)	(1.26)
	$n = 26$	$n = 29$
Similarity-based prototypicality		
GB	.86***	-1.25††
	(.95)	(1.84)
	$n = 29$	$n = 28$
EU	.00	-.61††
	(1.13)	(1.17)
	$n = 26$	$n = 31$
Trait-based prototypicality		
GB	-.42	.17
	(.43)	(.91)
	$n = 27$	$n = 22$
EU	-.23	.02
	(.45)	(1.27)
	$n = 24$	$n = 27$

Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above and daggers significantly below the midpoint (0) using one-sample *t*-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. †/*$p < .05$. ††$p < .01$. †††/***$p < .001$.

Trait-based relative prototypicality[42]*:* As shown in Table 26, English scores were *lower* than Welsh scores in both conditions, that is, English perceived relative prototypicality was *higher* in both conditions, significantly so in the GB condition, $F(1, 97) = 6.02$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$, $p < .05$ (simple effect). The third ANOVA, where

[42] Analysis of the trait dimensions warmth and competence is not part of the remit of this thesis. However, the reader may be interested to know that, as suspected, both groups concurred that the English are higher on competence and lower on warmth, and that the Welsh are higher on warmth and lower on competence (paired-sample *t*-tests, all *p*s $< .001$).

trait-based relative prototypicality was the dependent variable, showed a significant main effect of national group, $F(3, 97) = 6.07$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$, $p < .05$. The two-way interaction National Group X Condition was non-significant, $F = 1.06$, $p = .31$.

Relative power

Consistent with *a priori* assumptions. the English felt more relatively powerful than the Welsh across both conditions (see Table 27). The English felt less powerful in The EU ($M = .88$, $SD = 1.20$) than in Great Britain ($M = 1.68$, $SD = 1.16$). The Welsh felt less powerful in Great Britain ($M = -2.41$, $SD = 1.63$) than in The EU ($M = -1.63$, $SD = 1.37$).

Table 27: Mean relative power scores

	English	Welsh
Relative power		
GB condition	1.68^{***} (1.16) $n = 29$	$-2.41^{\dagger\dagger\dagger}$ (1.63) $n = 27$
EU condition	$.88^{**}$ (1.20) $n = 26$	$-1.63^{\dagger\dagger\dagger}$ (1.37) $n = 31$

Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above and daggers that measures are significantly below the midpoint (0) using one-sample *t*-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses$^{**}p < .01$. $\dagger\dagger\dagger/^{***}p < .001$.

The 2 X 2 ANOVA with relative power as a dependent variable showed the 2-way interaction National Group X Condition to be significant, $F(3, 109) = 9.55$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$, $p < .01$. Simple effects revealed that the English felt more powerful under Great Britain ($F(1, 109) = 127.41$, partial $\eta^2 = .54$, $p < .001$) and under The EU ($F(1, 109) = 45.57$, partial $\eta^2 = .31$, $p < .001$) than the Welsh did. They also felt

more powerful under Great Britain than under The EU, $F(1, 109) = 4.71$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$, $p < .01$. In contrast, the Welsh sample felt more powerful under The EU than under Great Britain, $F(1, 109) = 4.84$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$, $p < .01$.

Do we see higher evaluative ingroup bias in the lower-power Welsh sample, and higher allocation-based ingroup bias in the higher-power English sample? Can we identify any patterns of received respect? To what degree does the salient superordinate group affect ingroup bias scores?

The Welsh did indeed score higher on evaluative ingroup bias than the English. The English also scored higher on allocation-based ingroup bias than the Welsh. English received respect scores were higher than Welsh received respect scores, and the Welsh received less respect in Great Britain that they did within The EU (see Table 28).

Evaluative ingroup bias: A 2 X 3 ANOVA with evaluative ingroup bias as dependent variable, only revealed a main effect reflecting greater ingroup bias for the Welsh (overall $M = 26.64$, $SD = 31.77$) than for the English (overall $M = 8.63$, $SD = 19.12$), $F(5, 176) = 22.12$, partial $\eta^2 = .11, p < .001$.

Allocation-based ingroup bias: A 2 X 3 ANOVA with allocation-based ingroup bias as dependent variable, only revealed a main effect reflecting greater ingroup bias for the English (overall $M = .86$, $SD = 1.09$) than for the Welsh (overall $M = .07$, $SD = 1.09$), $F(1, 175) = 22.51$, partial $\eta^2 = .11, p < .001$.

Table 28: Mean evaluative ingroup bias, allocation-based ingroup bias and received respect scores

	English	Welsh
Evaluative ingroup bias		
GB condition	8.38 [a] (22.74) $n = 29$	33.21*** (30.91) $n = 28$
EU condition	2.65 (15.50) $n = 26$	21.90* (35.03) $n = 30$
Control condition	13.87*** (17.12) $n = 31$	25.53*** (29.68) $n = 38$
Overall	8.63*** (19.12) $n = 86$	26.64*** (31.77) $n = 96$
Allocation-based ingroup bias		
Great Britain	.70*** (.96) $n = 29$	.17 (1.19) $n = 27$
The EU	.72*** (.79) $n = 26$	.03 (1.06) $n = 31$
Control	1.14*** (1.39) $n = 30$	.03 (1.05) $n = 38$
Overall	.86*** (1.09) $n = 85$	.07 (1.09) $n = 96$
Received respect		
GB condition	1.33*** (1.23) $n = 29$	-2.01††† (1.58) $n = 27$
EU condition	.58** (.90) $n = 26$	-1.15††† (1.00) $n = 31$
Control condition	.99** (1.58) $n = 31$	-1.35††† (1.31) $n = 38$
Overall	.98** (1.30) $n = 86$	-1.47††† (1.34) $n = 96$

Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above the midpoint (0) using one-sample *t*-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. [a] $p = .06$. *$p < .05$. ***$p < .001$.

Received respect: A 2 X 3 ANOVA with received respect as dependent variable, revealed a main effect reflecting higher scores for the English (overall $M = .98$, $SD = 1.30$) than for the Welsh (overall $M = -1.47$, $SD = 1.34$), $F(3, 109) = 5.58$, partial $\eta^2 = .11$, $p = .001$. The National Group X Condition interaction was significant ($F(3, 109) = 5.58$, partial $\eta^2 = .11$, $p = .001$), where the English reported higher respect in Great Britain than in The EU ($M = 1.33$, $SD = 1.23$ and $M = .58$, $SD = .90$ resp.), $F(1, 109) = 5.42$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$, $p < .05$. Conversely, the Welsh reported higher respect in The EU than in Great Britain ($M = -1.15$, $SD = 1.00$ and $M = -2.01$, $SD = 1.58$ resp.), $F(1, 109) = 5.42$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$, $p < .05$.

What are the relationships between the possible predictor variables of ingroup bias (ingroup and superordinate category identification, relative prototypicality, relative power) and the three forms of ingroup bias? Is there any association between ingroup bias and relative fairness (legitimacy)?

To begin, relative fairness findings are reported in Table 29. A 2 X 2 ANOVA with relative fairness as dependent variable, only revealed a main effect reflecting higher perceived fairness in the English sample (GB: $M = .86$, $SD = .83$; EU: $M = .50$, $SD = 1.48$) than in the Welsh sample (GB: $M = -.85$, $SD = 1.63$; EU: $M = -1.06$, $SD = 1.24$), $F(3, 109) = 43.53$, partial $\eta^2 = .29$, $p < .001$.

Table 29: Mean relative fairness scores

	English	Welsh
Relative fairness		
GB condition	.86**	-.85†
	(.83)	(1.63)
	$n = 29$	$n = 27$
EU condition	.50	-1.06†††
	(1.48)	(1.24)
	$n = 26$	$n = 31$

Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above and daggers that measures are significantly below the midpoint (0) using one-sample *t*-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. †$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. †††$p < .001$.

Next a series of intercorrelations were examined for national group by condition. There were ten variables to consider. Evaluative ingroup bias, allocation-based ingroup bias and received respect were outcome variables. All other variables were considered possible predictor variables of ingroup bias. The EU condition is shown in Table 30, the GB condition in Table 31. In each table, English scores are given in the non-shaded and Welsh scores in the shaded areas. The variables examined were, in this order, 1. degree of ingroup identification (IGID), 2. degree of superordinate category identification (SCID), 3. proximity-based relative prototypicality (Prox), 4. similarity-based relative prototypicality (Sim), 5. trait-based relative prototypicality (Trait), 6. relative power (Power), 7. relative fairness (Fair), 8. received respect (Resp), 9. evaluative ingroup bias (Eval) and 10. allocation-based ingroup bias (Alloc). Findings are reported by national group and, given the complexity, these are additionally depicted schematically and without correlational values in Figure 16 (English sample) and Figure 17 (Welsh sample).

Table 30: EU condition: Intercorrelations between all variables by national group

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1.IGID	–	-.23 (*n*=26)	.03 (*n*=26)	.18 (*n*=26)	-.03 (*n*=24)	-.10 (n=26)	-.12 (n=26)	-.11 (n=26)	.30 (n=26)	-.05 (n=26)
2.SCID	-.48** (*n*=31)	-	.24 (*n*=26)	.05 (*n*=26)	.25 (*n*=24)	-.08 (*n*=26)	.10 (*n*=26)	-.05 (*n*=26)	.08 (*n*=26)	.18 (*n*=26)
3.Prox	.16 (*n*=29)	-.14 (*n*=29)	-	.49* (*n*=26)	-.42* (*n*=24)	.21 (*n*=26)	.01 (*n*=26)	.19 (*n*=26)	.44* (*n*=26)	.17 (*n*=26)
4.Sim	-.05 (*n*=31)	.13 (*n*=31)	.16 (*n*=29)	-	-.22 (*n*=24)	-.20 (*n*=26)	-.17 (*n*=26)	.03 (*n*=26)	.09 (*n*=26)	.20 (*n*=26)
5.Trait	-.06 (*n*=27)	-.04 (*n*=27)	-.36[a] (*n*=25)	-.38* (*n*=27)	-	-.27 (*n*=24)	.06 (*n*=24)	-.16 (*n*=24)	-.52* (*n*=24)	-.15 (*n*=24)
6.Power	-.27 (*n*=31)	-.04 (*n*=31)	.09 (*n*=29)	.38* (*n*=31)	-.22 (*n*=27)	-	.54* (*n*=26)	.56** (*n*=26)	.30 (*n*=26)	-.09 (*n*=26)
7.Fair	-.18 (*n*=31)	.33[a] (*n*=31)	-.20 (*n*=29)	.29 (*n*=31)	-.40* (*n*=27)	.19 (n=31)	-	.54** (*n*=26)	.07 (*n*=26)	-.47* (*n*=26)
8.Resp	-.33[a] (*n*=31)	.15 (*n*=31)	.01 (*n*=29)	.30 (*n*=31)	-.04 (*n*=27)	.75** (*n*=31)	.24 (*n*=31)	-	.26 (*n*=26)	.04 (*n*=26)
9.Eval	.78** (*n*=30)	-.67** (*n*=30)	.21 (*n*=28)	-.12 (*n*=30)	-.11 (*n*=26)	-.09 (*n*=30)	-.08 (*n*=30)	-.18 (*n*=30)	-	.30 (*n*=26)
10.Alloc	.31 (*n*=31)	-.44* (*n*=31)	-.16 (*n*=29)	.11 (*n*=31)	.02 (*n*=27)	.22 (*n*=31)	.11 (*n*=31)	.06 (*n*=31)	.49** (*n*=30)	-

Note: The shaded area shows intercorrelations in the Welsh sample. The non-shaded area shows intercorrelations in the English sample. [a] $p \leq .08$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 31: GB condition: Intercorrelations between all variables by national group

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1.IGID	–	.23 (*n*=29)	-.14 (*n*=28)	-.09 (*n*=29)	-.06 (*n*=27)	-.27 (n=29)	.11 (n=29)	-.07 (n=29)	.48** (n=29)	.47* (n=29)
2.SCID	.03 (*n*=26)	-	-.40* (*n*=28)	-.06 (*n*=29)	.24 (*n*=27)	-.15 (*n*=29)	.14 (*n*=29)	.04 (*n*=29)	-.05 (*n*=29)	-.01 (*n*=29)
3.Prox	-.35 (*n*=26)	.46* (*n*=25)	-	.46* (*n*=28)	.06 (*n*=26)	.38* (*n*=28)	-.06 (*n*=28)	.38* (*n*=28)	.16 (*n*=28)	-.06 (*n*=28)
4.Sim	.02 (*n*=28)	.36[a] (*n*=26)	.49* (*n*=26)	-	-.37[a] (*n*=27)	.58** (*n*=29)	.20 (*n*=29)	.58** (*n*=29)	.38* (*n*=29)	-.06 (*n*=29)
5.Trait	-.58** (*n*=23)	-.11 (*n*=22)	-.11 (*n*=22)	-.25 (*n*=23)	-	-.10 (*n*=27)	.04 (*n*=27)	.04 (*n*=27)	-.12 (*n*=27)	.18 (*n*=27)
6.Power	.06 (*n*=27)	.25 (*n*=26)	.47* (*n*=26)	.14 (*n*=27)	-.32 (*n*=23)	-	.46* (*n*=29)	.63** (*n*=29)	.09 (*n*=29)	-.27 (*n*=29)
7.Fair	.09 (*n*=27)	.39* (*n*=26)	-.05 (*n*=26)	.31 (*n*=27)	-.24 (*n*=23)	-.01 (n=27)	-	.28 (*n*=29)	-.07 (*n*=29)	-.15 (*n*=29)
8.Resp	.14 (*n*=27)	.23 (*n*=26)	.20 (*n*=26)	.32 (*n*=27)	-.20 (*n*=23)	.65** (*n*=27)	.30 (*n*=27)	-	.31 (*n*=29)	-.11 (*n*=29)
9.Eval	.65** (*n*=28)	-.30 (*n*=26)	-.45* (*n*=26)	-.09 (*n*=28)	-.12 (*n*=23)	-.19 (*n*=27)	-.14 (*n*=27)	.04 (*n*=27)	-	.25 (*n*=29)
10.Alloc	.22 (*n*=27)	-.31 (*n*=25)	-.01 (*n*=25)	.14 (*n*=27)	.09 (*n*=23)	-.18 (*n*=26)	.04 (*n*=26)	-.03 (*n*=26)	.29 (*n*=27)	-

Note: The shaded area shows intercorrelations in the Welsh sample. The non-shaded area shows intercorrelations in the English sample. [a] $p \leq .08$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

The English sample: As shown in Figure 16, evaluative ingroup bias increased with relative prototypicality (proximity-based: $r = .44$, trait-based: $r = -.52$, both $ps < .05$) in the EU condition, and with relative prototypicality (similarity-based: $r = .38$, $p < .05$) and ingroup identification ($r = .48$, $p < 01$) in the GB condition. Allocation–based ingroup bias increased with ingroup identification ($r = .47$, $p < .05$) in the GB condition. Allocation-based ingroup bias increased as relative fairness decreased (i.e. as perceived legitimacy decreased) in the EU condition, $r = -.47$, $p < .05$. Received

respect increased with relative power across both conditions, both $rs \leq .56$, both $ps < .01$. There were positive correlations between two of the three relative prototypicality measures and relative power (both $rs \geq .38$, both $ps \leq .05$), but in the GB condition only.

Figure 16: Significant intercorrelations in the English sample by condition



The Welsh sample: As shown in Figure 17, evaluative ingroup bias increased, as ingroup identification increased across both conditions, both $rs \geq .65$, both $ps < .01$. Evaluative ingroup bias ($r = -.67$, $p < .01$) and allocation-based ingroup bias ($r = -.44$, $p < .05$) decreased, as European identification increased (i.e. in the EU condition only). In contrast to the English sample, there were no correlations

between relative fairness and ingroup bias. Received respect increased with relative power across both conditions, both $rs \leq .65$, both $ps < .01$.

Figure 17: Significant intercorrelations in the Welsh sample by condition



In summary *in the English sample*, only perceived unfairness sees a reduction in ingroup bias (allocation-based, EU condition only). Ingroup identification is positively related to evaluative and allocation-based ingroup bias (GB condition only). Relative prototypicality increases with evaluative ingroup bias (both conditions). *In the Welsh sample*, only superordinate category identification sees a decrease in ingroup bias (evaluative and allocation-based, EU condition only). Ingroup identification sees an increase in evaluative ingroup bias (both conditions). Relative prototypicality and relative fairness are not related to any form of ingroup

bias. Bringing this into the theoretical framework of subgroup-superordinate group relations, ingroup identification was linked to bias, superordinate category identification less so (Welsh/EU), relative prototypicality only in the English sample (EU and GB), and, most interestingly, there were *no* direct relationships between ingroup bias and relative power.

Is any form of ingroup bias a function of national group and (directly or indirectly) relative prototypicality, relative power or relative fairness, or of the degree of ingroup or superordinate category identification?

Findings from Study 2 had shown ingroup bias to be mediated by relative prototypicality or relative power in some instances. The question was how generalizable were these findings when applied to England and Wales. Additionally and new to Study 3, could perceptions of (il-)legitimacy mediate ingroup bias? Finally and in contrast to Study 2, here we have a minority and a majority subgroup, and it was therefore likely that ingroup bias might be mediated by the degree of ingroup identification. To this end, a series of analyses of covariance were performed. Cases were selected by condition and in each ANCOVA with national group as independent variable, one specific predictor variable was entered as covariate, and one of the ingroup bias measures as dependent variable. Thus, if the effect of the covariate was significant and the effect of national group was non-significant, this would indicate possible mediation or partial mediation. For the sake of brevity, Table 32 summarises only those three instances where mediation was possible, that is, where the covariate had a significant or marginally significant value and where the effect of national group was *not* significant. For each of these,

mediation tests were performed following the steps recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986; Kenny, 2003). In each case, findings are reported by both conditions for comparison purposes.

Table 32: Significant or marginally significant main effects of covariates

	F	partial η^2	p
DV: Evaluative ingroup bias			
Proximity-based relative prototypicality (GB condition)	3.45	.06	.07
Ingroup identification (EU condition)	39.33	.43	<.001
DV: Allocation-based ingroup bias			
None			
DV: Received respect			
Relative power (GB condition)	37.25	.41	<.001

The Welsh were significantly higher in ingroup identification and in evaluative ingroup bias than the English across both experimental conditions, and the degree of ingroup identification mediated evaluative ingroup bias in the EU condition (see Figure 18 left), but not in the GB condition (see Figure 18 right). In the EU condition, path c was originally significant (B = .33, $p < .01$), and was reduced to non-significance (path c': B = .10, $p = .37$) after adding ingroup identification to the model, Sobel's $t = 2.62$, $p < .07$. In contrast in the GB condition path c' remained significant after adding ingroup identification to the model, $p = .03$.

Figure 18: Mediation effects of ingroup identification on evaluative ingroup bias



Note: National group context coded, where 1 = English, 2 = Welsh

The degree of proximity-based relative prototypicality mediated evaluative ingroup bias in the GB condition (see Figure 19 right), but not in the EU condition (see Figure 19 left). To remind the reader, the Welsh were higher on evaluative ingroup bias and the English on proximity-based relative prototypicality. Note that this prototypicality measure can also be interpreted as how much the subgroup feels relatively included in or excluded from the superordinate category. In the GB condition, the originally significant path *c* (B = .42, $p < .01$) was reduced to non-significance (path *c'*: B = .06, $p = .79$) after adding ingroup identification to the model, Sobel's $t = 1.83$, $p = .07$. Given the negative B-value for path *b* in the GB condition, the more excluded the group (the Welsh, national group context coded as 2), the higher the evaluative ingroup bias. The more included the group (the English, national group context coded as 1), the lower the evaluative ingroup bias.

Figure 19: Mediation effects of proximity-based relative prototypicality on evaluative ingroup bias



Note: National group context coded, where 1 = English, 2 = Welsh

The English scored higher than the Welsh on relative power and on received respect in both conditions. Analysis showed that the degree of relative power mediated received respect in the GB condition (see Figure 20 right), but not in the EU condition (see Figure 20 left). In the GB condition, path *c* (originally significant; B = -.77, $p < .001$) was reduced to non-significance (path *c'*: B = -.06, $p = .18$) after adding ingroup identification to the model, Sobel's $t = 5.30$, $p < .001$. England is a higher power group than Wales, and this power differential brings respect and not vice versa.

Figure 20: Mediation effects of relative power on received respect



Note: National group context coded, where 1 = English, 2 = Welsh

Do high dual identifiers demonstrate higher (IPM) or lower (CIIM, IMSR) ingroup bias?

To recap' the identification scores as the point of departure and as shown in Table 24, Welsh ingroup identification ($M = 5.17$, $SD = .88$) was significantly higher than English ingroup identification ($M = 4.61$, $SD = .70$). The English sample identified at the British ($M = 5.16$, $SD = .94$) and European ($M = 4.405.17$, $SD = 1.00$) levels more than the Welsh sample (British: $M = 4.97$, $SD = 1.02$; European: $M = 4.26$, $SD = .91$), but differences were non-significant.

As in Study 2, the final set of tests looked to identify interaction effects between Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification, and whether these moderated evaluative or allocation-based ingroup bias in line with predictions from IPM, or perceptions of being a target of negative bias (received respect). Firstly, a 2 X 2 X 2 omnibus MANOVA examined where interactions might be found. Secondly,

a series of MANOVAs examined scores by condition and by national group to see if these factors featured in the interactions. Thirdly, simple slope analysis tested 2-way interactions for significant moderation effects.

Firstly, the omnibus MANOVA was a 2 (National Group: categorical independent variable) X 2 (Condition: categorical independent variable) X (Ingroup Identification, i.e. English or Welsh) X (Superordinate Category Identification, i.e. British or European) design. The latter two measures were continuous independent variables (centred). The three ingroup bias measures were dependent variables. Of interest were interactions that included Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification. There were two marginally significant 3-way interactions Condition X Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification; on received respect ($F(1, 94) = 3.11$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$, $p = .08$) and on evaluative ingroup bias, $F(1, 94) = 2.75$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$, $p = .10$. The 2-way interactions Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification and the 3-way interactions National Group X Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification were non-significant, all Fs ≤ 2.19, all ps $\geq .14$.

To decompose the 3-way interactions into 2-way interactions, cases were selected by condition, and two 2 (National Group) X Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification MANOVAs, with received respect and evaluative ingroup bias as dependent variables, followed.

On the *evaluative ingroup bias* measure (that is, demonstrating ingroup bias), the 2-way interaction Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification was

non-significant in the EU condition, $F(1, 48) = 1.32$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$, $p = .26$. In the GB condition, the 2-way interaction Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification was non-significant, $F(1, 47) = 1.34$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$, $p = .25$. Although there were no significant interactions, the slopes were nonetheless plotted, because the marginally significant 3-way interaction reported above did indicate that that the two 2-way interactions might diverge from one another.

As shown in Figure 21, in both conditions, high dual identifiers showed the lowest evaluative ingroup bias amongst those with high ingroup identification. Conversely, low dual identifiers showed the highest ingroup bias amongst those with low ingroup identification. For high superordinate category identifiers, as ingroup identification increased, so did ingroup bias (EU: z high: $\beta = 21.36$, $p < .001$; GB: z high; $\beta = 21.97$, $p < .001$). The same relationship between the two levels of identification was observed for low superordinate category identifiers, that is, as ingroup identification increased, so did ingroup bias (EU: z low: $\beta = 17.60$, $p < .001$; GB: z low; $\beta = 27.54$, $p < .001$). However, comparing the two z low slopes between conditions, ingroup bias as a function of ingroup identification was stronger in the GB condition than in the EU condition ($\beta = 27.54$ and $\beta = 17.60$ resp.).

Figure 21: Moderation effects of ingroup identification (X) on mean evaluative ingroup bias scores (Y) for high and low superordinate category identifiers (Z)



On the *received respect measure* (that is, receiving negative bias), the 2-way interaction Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification was significant in the EU condition, $F(1, 48) = 4.37$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$, $p < .05$. In the GB condition, the 2-way interaction Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification was not significant, $F(1, 47) = .70$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$, $p = .41$.

As shown in Figure 22, top, in the EU condition, high dual identifiers scored low (but not lowest) on received respect. Low dual identifiers scored highest on received respect. In this condition, as ingroup identification increased and European

identification decreased, relative respect decreased significantly for low to medium European identifiers, *z* low: β = -.75, $p < .001$; *z* mid: β = -.39, $p < .01$. However, when European identification was high, as ingroup identification increased, relative respect decreased only marginally, *z* high: β = -.03, n.s.

By comparison in the GB condition (see Figure 22, bottom), high dual identifiers again scored low (but not lowest) on received respect. Low dual identifiers scored higher (but not highest) on received respect. Here there were no interactions between ingroup identification and British identification. Overall, as ingroup identification increased, received respect decreased, irrespective of the degree of British identification (z low: β = -.69; *z* med: β = -.67; *z* high: β = -.65; all slopes n.s.).

Figure 22: Moderation effects of ingroup identification (X) on mean received respect scores (Y) for high and low superordinate category identifiers (Z)



5.3 Discussion

As with the previous study, the purpose of this study was to examine subgroup-superordinate group relations, and specifically (a) to examine the relationship between relative prototypicality, relative power and ingroup bias, (b) to test IPM against CIIM/ICM/IMSR in predicting ingroup bias, and (c) to identify factors that mediate or moderate ingroup bias. Additionally, it was thought that the relative fairness (a proxy measure of legitimacy) of subgroup-superordinate group relations might help explain ingroup bias score patterns.

Evidence was found that proximity-based relative prototypicality mediated evaluative ingroup bias in the GB condition only. Relative power mediated received respect in the GB condition only. The degree of ingroup identification mediated evaluative ingroup bias in the EU condition only. Slope analysis showed no interactions between ingroup identification and superordinate category identification that might affect evaluative ingroup bias. Turning to received respect, simple slope analysis showed that, in the EU condition, low levels of ingroup and European identification (i.e. low dual identification) led to higher levels of received respect, and high dual identification led to lower levels (but not the lowest level) of received respect. In contrast in the GB condition, there was no interaction between the two levels of identification, and as ingroup identification increased, received respect decreased. Finally, there was little evidence linking relative fairness to ingroup bias. Only one inverse relationship between relative fairness and allocation-based ingroup bias was found (in the English/EU scenario).

Given the complexity of dependent variables and the inconsistent findings supporting the four models of intersubgroup relations, an overview is shown in Table 33.

Table 33: Summary of evidence supporting the four models of intersubgroup relations

	High SC ID	High dual ID	Trait-based proto.	Sim.-based proto.	Prox.-based proto.
CIIM/ICM					
Evaluative ingroup bias	W/EU (corr)	GB + EU[1] (mod)	-	-	E/GB (med)
Allocation-based ingroup bias	W/EU (corr)	-	-	-	-
Received respect	-	GB + EU[2] (mod)	-	-	-
IMSR					
Evaluative ingroup bias	-	-	-	-	-
Allocation-based ingroup bias	-	-	-	-	-
Received respect	-	-	-	-	-
IPM					
Evaluative ingroup bias	-	-	E/EU (corr)	E/GB (corr)	E/EU (corr)
Allocation-based ingroup bias	-	-	-	-	-
Received respect	-	-	-	-	-

Note: SC ID = superordinate category identification (based on evaluative component of identity). Dual ID = identification with ingroup and superordinate category. Proto. = prototypicality. corr = correlational. med = mediation. mod = moderation [1]: Of high ingroup identifiers, those with high superordinate category identification showed lowest levels of evaluative ingroup bias. [2]: Of high ingroup identifiers, those with high superordinate category identification showed highest levels of received respect.

Ingroup bias score patterns

As anticipated, irrespective of condition the Welsh sample overall showed higher evaluative ingroup bias, the English sample overall higher allocation-based ingroup bias. These patterns mirror those from Study 2, where the higher-power group (Germans) showed higher allocation-based ingroup bias, and the lower-power group (British) higher evaluative ingroup bias. This reflects the notion of usable power (Ng, 1980, 1982; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985, 1987, 1991). It is unlikely that the Welsh would succeed in claiming more resources than the English given the latter's size and power. Demonstrating favourable attitudes towards the outgroup costs the English nothing in terms of status or resources. Therefore both groups respect size- and power-relevant social reality constraints. Finally and as expected, relative respect and relative power were positively related for both national groups in both conditions.

Relative prototypicality and ingroup bias

As shown in Table 33, findings relating to the prototypicality measures were conflicting. On the one hand, correlational evidence supported IPM. Here, relationships were examined *within* national groups and within separate conditions. On the other hand, mediation analysis produced findings contradictory to IPM. Here, differences *between* national groups were tested. Below, the findings of correlational and mediation analyses are discussed separately.

Relative prototypicality and correlational evidence

From the English standpoint, there was correlational evidence to support IPM. Against the backdrop of The EU, both higher proximity and higher prototypicality based on trait-ratings increased evaluative ingroup bias. Against the backdrop of Great Britain, similarity-based relative prototypicality saw an increase in evaluative ingroup bias. There were no associations between any type of prototypicality and allocation-based ingroup bias. Against the backdrop of The EU and fully in line with IPM, if the English sample regards itself as more representative of the prototype such as it did on the trait-ratings, and if we consider the dimensions of warmth vs. competence that were tested, then the English sample may react to the perceived lack of competence in the Welsh sample with negative attitudes. Similarly, the English feel less included in The EU than in Great Britain, yet more included in The EU than they feel the Welsh to be (proximity-based relative prototypicality). Given the less secure position of England in The EU, making downward comparisons with a less powerful and more excluded group such as the Welsh could be a viable identity management strategy. Finally, it seems that when the Welsh deviate from British goals and values (that is, feelings of exclusion or not sharing the perceived degree of competency), then evaluative ingroup bias results.

From the Welsh standpoint, there were no associations between any form of ingroup bias and any measure of relative prototypicality in either condition. However, there was an inverse relationship between similarity-based relative prototypicality and relative fairness in the EU condition, that is, as prototypicality increased, the perceived legitimacy of Wales' treatment decreased. This is similar to the effect

found by Weber et al. (2002) when the superordinate category had been primed negatively. It would not be circumspect to conclude that this one piece of evidence offers reliable support for Weber and her colleagues' findings; nonetheless further investigation may tell us more.

Relative prototypicality and mediation analyses

On the surface, evidence was found that proximity-based relative prototypicality partially mediated evaluative ingroup bias in the GB condition (Sobel's $p = .07$), (see Table 33). Here the Welsh sample scored higher than the English sample on ingroup bias, and the English sample scored higher than the Welsh sample on prototypicality. National group (the independent variable) was coded such that the English national group had the value of 1, and the Welsh the value of 2, and it negatively predicted prototypicality in line with the higher prototypicality of the English. The pathway between prototypicality (the mediator) and evaluative ingroup bias (the dependent variable) was negative and marginally significant. Thus the closer relationship between England and Great Britain saw a reduction in ingroup bias (as proposed by IPM), but the more distant relation between Wales and Great Britain saw higher ingroup bias, mediated by the relatively *lower* prototypicality. This pattern is clearly contrary to IPM's predictions. Indeed, as we noted earlier, the correlational data for the English sample do suggest evidence of an ingroup projection pattern in evaluative bias in the British context. Therefore this deviation from IPM when comparing levels of ingroup bias *between* national groups is best accounted for by the Welsh. From the Welsh standpoint, being more excluded from the British prototype (whether desired or undesired) fosters more negative attitudes to the

English. This phenomenon was not found in the EU condition, where the Welsh sample was less distanced from the superordinate category, that is, higher in proximity-based relative prototypicality. It is suggested tentatively that the degree of inclusion or exclusion (desired or not desired) may exacerbate or mitigate evaluative ingroup bias for the Welsh.

The dimensions of relative prototypicality

These dimensional differences in the measures employed warrant brief discussion. Firstly, correlational evidence supporting IPM showed that all three dimensions of relative prototypicality are linked positively to ingroup bias for the English sample (higher in relative prototypicality). However, in the GB condition, higher proximity-based relative prototypicality saw a decrease and lower proximity-based prototypicality an increase in evaluative ingroup bias when treated as a mediator. Why? Administration of the measure (the Venn-type diagrams) may have induced in some participants a feeling of being (undesirably) excluded from the superordinate category for the Welsh in particular. This could therefore have triggered aversive affective responses from participants (exclusion threat; Branscombe et al., 1999) – and ingroup projection is, in the first instance, a cognitive process. Furthermore, IPM does not examine the responses of groups lower in relative prototypicality. It could be that adding an affect component to the IPM model, or more generally considering the relation between (lack of) prototypicality and the threat of exclusion, might bring forth more consistent findings in future research.

Relative power and ingroup bias

As assumed, the English were higher than the Welsh on relative power across both conditions. The English felt more powerful in Great Britain than in The EU, and although both scores were negative, the Welsh did feel more relatively powerful in The EU than in Great Britain. However, there was no correlational evidence or covariate effects to suggest that relative power was associated with or affected evaluative or allocation-based ingroup bias.

This lack of evidence regarding power differentials is a puzzle and almost flies in the face of past studies of subgroup-superordinate group relations and power differentials. One can only speculate why this might be. One explanation for the lack of evidence of power effects might be that the English feel so much more powerful than the Welsh, that, as a gesture of goodwill, they do not draw directly upon this (magnanimity and noblesse oblige). Similarly, the Welsh may feel so disempowered – and this over time – that the power differential may have become latent or defunct. However, there may well be some additional factor(s) that have not been taken into consideration in this study. In any event, due consideration must be given when designing follow-up studies.

The relationship between relative power and received respect

It is circumspect at this point to turn to the measure of received respect. As expected across both national groups and conditions, relative power correlated positively with received respect. Further tests showed that, in the GB condition, respect-based ingroup bias is driven by relative power, where English scores were higher than

Welsh scores. In other words, for the English, their power position earns them respect, and for the Welsh, the lack of power costs them respect. This mediation effect was absent in the EU condition. Presumably, as The EU is a larger international organisation, the English perceive themselves to be one player of many. In Great Britain, however, England may be perceived as *the* key player. English-Welsh power differentials are therefore more clearly majority-minority based in Great Britain.

As already mentioned, received respect was measured to provide a simple approximation of the degree to which a group might feel the target of negative bias or discrimination, and indeed, power mediates its effects. This is a line of evidence that should be pursued further in future studies. For example, measuring respect on different dimensions (e.g., warmth, competence, culture, etc.) as well as differentiating between the respect-giving agents (e.g., respect from within the ingroup, from the outgroup, from the superordinate category) could produce some interesting findings. This approach has been taken in several recent studies (e.g., Ellemers, Doosje & Spears, 2004; Huo & Molina, 2006; Jetten, Schmitt, Branscombe & McKimmie, 2005; Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2005).

The role of levels of identification in ingroup bias – correlational evidence

Examining correlational findings first, we see ingroup identification playing a significant role in ingroup bias, but superordinate category identification less so. This is perhaps not so surprising: by definition ingroup bias is related to the level at which the ingroup is experienced and expressed (i.e. experienced and expressed by the

ingroup towards an outgroup). For the English in the GB condition, higher ingroup identification saw increases in evaluative and allocation-based ingroup bias. Neither British nor European identification affected English ingroup bias levels. We see, therefore, the higher ingroup identifiers in the English sample, where the group is high in legitimate power and relative prototypicality, claim more resources than the outgroup and hold less favourable attitudes towards them. However, the EU relationship tells a different story. Here – though independent of ingroup identification – the less fair the treatment, the higher the allocation-based ingroup bias. It could be that the group seeks compensation for the perceived unfair treatment 'handed out' by The EU, at the cost of the outgroup if needs be. It is also possible that the English participants attempted to be fair in their treatment of the outgroup and allocated monies to reflect the respective group sizes.

From the Welsh standpoint, the story seems quite simple. Evaluative ingroup bias increased with ingroup identification across both conditions, independent of relative prototypicality or power. Thus the more salient Welsh ingroup identification is, the less positive the attitudes are towards the English. This finding is furthermore in line with evidence presented earlier (Mols et al., unpublished manuscript; Mols & Haslam, in press), where ingroup identity salience sees the peripheral group expressing pro-European sentiments.

Furthermore in the EU condition, we have the only evidence where superordinate category identification is related to ingroup bias scores. Here, the higher the Welsh identified at the European level, the lower their evaluative and allocation-based ingroup bias, and this supports CIIM (see Table 33). Given the growing trend

towards devolution in Wales and Gaertner and Dovidio's (2000) suggestion that the CIIM approach might reduce bias over time, it may be the case that European identification could become an increasing source of identity enhancement for the Welsh.

Taken at surface value, the reduction in both forms of ingroup bias speaks against the evidence presented by Mols and colleagues (Mols et al., unpublished manuscript; Mols & Haslam, in press), that is, here pro-European sentiment saw a decrease in ingroup bias. This is, however, not necessarily a contradiction. Firstly, one of the studies' main aims was to identify the *implicit* and *explicit meanings* that participants place on their three social groups and to explain these; as such, much of the evidence collected was qualitative. Secondly, qualitative data were collected from regional politicians, and as the authors point out, this sample was better informed of the economic, social and political impact of The EU than average citizens are likely to be. Thirdly, empirical data on Welsh, British and European identity were collected as a repeated measure, that is, the study did not involve any manipulations (Mols et al., unpublished manuscript). As stated above, from the Welsh standpoint, the story seems quite simple. But in the light of the findings from Mol and his colleagues, how sure can we be? It may be that including open-ended measures in Study 3 would have served well here to gain an understand of the *meanings* and *contents* that each of these social groups gives its group members. These in turn might have offered a different explanation for the decrease in ingroup bias in the EU condition.

The role of levels of identification in ingroup bias – Mediation analyses

Only in one instance did an identification measure fully mediate ingroup bias. The degree of ingroup identification mediated evaluative ingroup bias in the EU condition only, where Welsh scores were higher than English scores. In order to offer a tentative explanation for this, we revisit prototypicality: As reported above, evaluative ingroup bias was mediated ($p = .07$) by the perceived lower proximity-based prototypicality of the Welsh in the GB condition. This was interpreted as a question of perceived inclusion versus perceived exclusion.

Returning to the finding where Welsh ingroup identification mediated evaluative ingroup bias, the effect was found in the EU condition, but not in the GB condition. The EU is geographically and psychologically more distant to the Welsh than Great Britain is. Away from the influence of Great Britain and within the influence of a higher order group, it could be interpreted that the Welsh felt free to express anti-English attitudes. Closer to home in the GB condition, negative attitudes towards the English were observed irrespective of the degree of ingroup identification. Again interpreted with caution, if Englishness and Britishness are perceived to be two sides of the same coin for the Welsh, this would account for no mediation effects of ingroup identification on evaluative ingroup bias in the GB condition.

The role of dual identification in ingroup bias

Finally, the study tested whether high dual identifiers demonstrate higher (as per IPM) or lower (as per CIIM and IMSR) ingroup bias. There was no interaction between the levels of identification and allocation-based ingroup bias. Thus this form

of ingroup-bias in this study was not a function of identification. However, two interesting findings emerged, one with regards to evaluative ingroup bias, and one with regards to received respect (see Table 33).

Evaluative ingroup bias: Low dual identifiers showed lower levels of ingroup bias than high dual identifiers across both conditions. At face value, this observation initially lends support to IPM and not to CIIM and IMSR. However, it is the interaction between the two levels of identification that should be considered. Across both conditions, as ingroup identification increased, ingroup bias increased significantly irrespective of the increase in superordinate category identification. However, this increase was lowest when superordinate category identification was high. Thus we can conclude that an esteemed superordinate category can reduce ingroup bias, as postulated by CIIM and – indirectly – IMSR. Furthermore, comparing the *z* high slope between conditions, the bias shown in the GB condition was stronger than the bias shown in The EU condition. This is accounted for by differences in English-Welsh relations under each superordinate category. If the superordinate category *is not accepted* (i.e. *z* low), this may increase ingroup identification and ingroup bias, as it did more so with regards to British identification than to European identification ($\beta = 27.54$ and 17.60 resp.). This may be the case in Great Britain, where the groups carry more meaning, are located within a very confined superordinate category, and where they engage in more direct competition. Conversely, if the superordinate category *is accepted* (i.e. *z* high), there is virtually no difference in the relation between ingroup identification and ingroup bias (British: $\beta = 21.97$; European: $\beta =$ and 21.36). Therefore in support of CIIM, we do see high superordinate category identification *per se* bringing forth lower ingroup bias. Thus

if the superordinate category is held in high esteem, it can bring subgroups together. What we failed to find was direct evidence showing that high dual identification sees a reduction in ingroup bias, and thus no direct evidence in support of IMSR.

Received respect: Examining slope patterns over both conditions, received respect decreased as ingroup identification increased. High British identification saw higher received respect than high European identification did. Turning to the interactions between the two levels of identification, in the EU condition as ingroup identification increased and European identification decreased, relative respect decreased significantly – but not significantly so when European identification was high. This again reflects the CIIM premise that a valued shared superordinate category can affect intersubgroup relations positively. In this instance, received respect was admittedly in the negative domain, but the negative effect of ingroup identification was counteracted to some degree by high European identification. This interaction was not found in the GB condition. It appears that here that the increase in ingroup identification and its negative impact on received respect is only marginally affected by the degree of British identification.

In summary, we see higher evaluative ingroup bias in the Welsh sample overall. Furthermore, this bias is mediated by the degree of ingroup identification within The EU, and by lower proximity-based relative prototypicality within Great Britain. We see higher allocation-based ingroup bias in the English sample overall, which they can justify on the basis of their greater size and higher power. We see evidence that evaluative ingroup bias is a function of ingroup identification, more so in the GB context than in the EU context. Also, it appears that, the higher ingroup

identification, the lower the received respect. Additionally, we see that an esteemed superordinate category can improve intersubgroup relations (CIIM, IMSR). Finally, we have found evidence both supporting and conflicting with IPM.

There are many open questions remaining, of course, and four of the most pressing are presented here. Firstly, the three prototypicality measures were clearly interrelated, but can specifically the proximity-based relative prototypicality measure add a new, affective dimension to IPM? IPM is a cognition-driven model, but it is legitimate to question just how successfully can cognition alone account for intergroup relations without acknowledging the emotional dimension of identity. Secondly, there were strong associations between relative power and relative prototypicality in Study 2; why was this not the case in this study? Thirdly, why did relative power and relative fairness play no role in intersubgroup relations? Finally, why was there so little evidence of an association between perceived fairness and received respect?

Follow-up research is essential to look for answers to the above questions. Examining the three groups English, non-Welsh speaking Welsh and Welsh-speaking Welsh would likely enhance our understanding of these specific intersubgroup relations under Great Britain and The EU, firstly on the dimensions of prototypicality, power and status, as well as on identity management strategies, but also perhaps to consider the intergroup relations in a tripartite model. Furthermore, the open-ended items in Study 1 provided a good general understanding of the content of the superordinate categories for the British and German samples, which in turn aided the process of bringing empirical findings into a social reality context.

Contrasting the findings from Study 1 and 2 with the puzzling questions resulting from Study 3, it seems eminently sensible to include a qualitative component in a follow-up English-Welsh study. In this way, a better understanding of the content and meaning of each group's social identities would allow for clearer interpretation of findings, which would then serve to inform model and theory enhancement. Finally, given a large enough sample size, the statistical way forward would be to extend tests, for example by performing pathway analysis. Thus it would be possible to examine the richness of data in a more ordered fashion, where a more rigorous model of intersubgroup relations might emerge.

Chapter 6 General Discussion

The current studies provide evidence that specific types of group demonstrate specific types of ingroup bias, and specific groups draw on ingroup identification more than other groups. Certain types of superordinate category elicit more conflictual intersubgroup relations than others do. We also see relative prototypicality and relative power predicting ingroup bias in some cases, but not in others. These instances where we cannot generalize are understandable, not least when we consider that the social realities and the shared histories of the groups and their relationships to the superordinate groups have been acknowledged fully throughout. In short, patterns of ingroup bias seem to be determined by a diverse range of contextual factors and theoretical principles. We now attempt to extract some theoretical order from this complexity. In doing so, three summary tables are provided. Table 34 shows evidence supporting each of the four models of subgroup relations. Table 35 summarises the effects of power differentials on ingroup bias, and Table 36 the effects of the degree of ingroup and/or superordinate category identification on ingroup bias.

Table 34: Summary of evidence supporting the four models of intersubgroup relations

	High EU ID	High SC ID	High dual ID	Direct proto.	Trait. proto.	Sim. proto.	Prox. proto.
Study 1							
CIIM/ICM							
Evaluative IGB	✓			✓		✓	
IPM							
Evaluative IGB	-			-		-	
Study 2							
CIIM/ICM							
Evaluative IGB	✓	✓	✓[1]	-			
Alloc.-based IGB	-	✓	-	-			
IMSR							
Evaluative IGB	-	-	✓	-			
Alloc.-based IGB	-	-	-	-			
IPM							
Evaluative IGB	-	-	✓	-			
Alloc.-based IGB	-	✓	-	✓			
Study 3							
CIIM/ICM							
Evaluative IGB		✓	✓		-	-	✓
Alloc.-based IGB		✓	-		-	-	-
Received respect		-	✓		-	-	-
IMSR							
Evaluative IGB		-	-		-	-	-
Alloc.-based IGB		-	-		-	-	-
Received respect		-	-		-	-	-
IPM							
Evaluative IGB		-	-		✓	✓	✓
Alloc.-based IGB		-	-		-	-	-
Received respect		-	-		-	-	-

Note: EU ID = European identification. SC ID = superordinate category identification. Dual ID = identification with ingroup and superordinate category. Proto. = prototypicality. [1]: $p = .08$.

Relative prototypicality

From a theoretical standpoint, the main focus of the thesis was to compare IPM (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) and its predictions with other models of subgroup-superordinate group relations, that is, with CIIM, ICM and IMSR. Some limited evidence was found to support IPM, but clearly not in every instance, and indeed, one case was identified where the reverse effect was found. It is necessary at this point to distinguish between correlational evidence (i.e. relative prototypicality and ingroup bias *within* national groups) and evidence of differences in ingroup bias *between* national groups as a function of relative prototypicality.

Summarizing correlations (see Table 34), in the EU context in Study 1 there were no associations between the more relatively prototypical group (Germans) and ingroup bias levels, and the less relatively prototypical group (British) showed higher ingroup bias –and here IPM offers no explanation. In Study 2 and consistent with IPM, higher relative prototypicality saw higher allocation-based ingroup bias in the British/EU condition[43]. Finally in Study 3, higher proximity- and trait-based prototypicality saw higher evaluative ingroup bias in the English/EU condition, and higher similarity-based prototypicality in the English/GB condition. These findings have been addressed in the relevant Discussion sections, and suffice it to summarise as follows. In Study 1, the lack of evidence to support IPM may be due to important contextual factors. In Study 2 and 3, we have correlational evidence to support IPM.

[43] Here it should be noted that British scores on relative prototypicality and ingroup bias were below the midpoint (0), relative prototypicality significantly so. Nonetheless, the two measures did correlate positively at the .05 level, thus revealing the effect that higher relative prototypicality can have upon ingroup bias within the national group.

Consistent with IPM, in Study 2 mediation analysis revealed that higher relative prototypicality in the German sample mediated allocation-based ingroup bias in the EU condition. Here the more relatively prototypical group (and also the more relatively powerful group) claim higher resources than the less relatively prototypical (and less relatively powerful) group. This brings into question if and how relative power and relative prototypicality might relate to each other (see *Relative prototypicality and relative power* below). However and contrary to IPM, in Study 3 in the GB condition, English proximity-based relative prototypicality mediated evaluative ingroup bias such that higher relative prototypicality actually saw lower ingroup bias.

As discussed earlier, the proximity-measure may have induced feelings of inclusion or exclusion in participants. If a subgroup (here the Welsh) feels excluded from a superordinate category that is more inclusive of the other subgroup (here the English), then the response of increased evaluative ingroup bias is one way of responding to this threat to identity through social competition. Conversely, a subgroup (the English) that feels more included in the superordinate category may show more positive feelings to the less included group (the Welsh) in order to feel better about itself. Considering that IPM is cognition-driven and has focused to date on the higher relatively prototypical group, turning attention to more affective threats to identity deriving from lack of prototypicality may help develop the model further.

Furthermore in Study 1 and Study 2, ingroup projection was found in The EU context/condition, but not in the NATO context/condition. Here we turn to the nature of the superordinate categories and to IPM for a possible explanation. Firstly,

German identification at the European level is higher than identification at the ingroup level (Wenzel et al., 2003). The EU is associated with identity threat for the British (Cinnirella, 1997), and added to this, introducing specifically Germany as a subgroup decreases European identification in British participants significantly (Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000). Thus asking British and German participants to think in terms of European identity means different things to each. The EU is likely to be salient for both, albeit for different reasons relating to their more negative and positive attitudes respectively.

On the other hand, NATO is far removed from and impinges less upon everyday life; the category is therefore less salient. Secondly, ingroup projection is more likely to occur under a clearly defined and simple prototype (such as The EU), and less likely when the prototype is unclear and complex (such as NATO) (Wenzel et al., 2003). Qualitative findings from Study 1 revealed that the NATO prototype is indeed unclear, whereas The EU prototype is relatively clearly defined. These differences between the representations of the prototypes can account for the lack of ingroup projection in the NATO context/condition. Moreover, qualitative analysis also revealed that NATO poses no threat to its members, whereas The EU does. In their presentation of possible types of prototype representations (i.e., clear or unclear, large or small scope, narrow or broad, simple or complex), Wenzel and colleagues noted that this list was a starting point. It is suggested here that threatening or non-threatening might be a further possible dimension of the prototype.

Relative power

Power differentials were acknowledged by the subgroups. In each study, the lower-power group demonstrated higher evaluative ingroup bias, although correlational evidence to support this was not found in every case (see Table 35[44]). In Study 2 and 3, the higher-power group demonstrated higher allocation-based ingroup bias. (The higher-power group would possibly have shown allocation-based ingroup bias in Study 1 too, had the measure been included.) This pattern fully supports the notion of usable power (Ng, 1980, 1982). In other words, groups will show ingroup bias on a dimension that is (socially) realistically possible. Additionally, 'outgroup favouritism' was identified in the British sample in the EU condition (Study 2), where the group allocated more resources to Germany than to Great Britain. It was suggested that the outgroup favouritism encountered here cannot be accounted for by System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004). Indeed, rather than accepting its relatively lower-power position in The EU (as System Justification Theory would claim), the British reject the superordinate category. Accepting EU funding may create an undesirable sense of obligation to The EU; refusing funding is therefore a means of psychologically distancing itself from the (unwelcome) superordinate category.

[44] Since this is a general summary and for the sake of brevity, here the various measures of prototypicality are all subsumed under the single column *prototypicality*.

Table 35: Summary of relationships between relative power, relative prototypicality and ingroup bias

Relative Power	Eval. IGB	Alloc. IGB	Respect	Fairness	Prototypicality
Study 1					
German/EU	-				↑ (corr)
British/EU	↓[1] (corr) ↑ (med)				↑ (corr)
Study 2					
German/EU	-	↑ (corr) ↑[2] (med)			↑[2] (med)
British/EU	-	-			-
German/NATO	-	-			-
British/NATO	-	-			↑[2] (med)
Study 3					
English/EU	-	-	↑ (corr)	↑ (corr)	-
Welsh/EU	-	-	↑ (corr)	-	↑ (corr)
English/GB	-	-	↑ (corr)	↑ (corr)	↑ (corr)
Welsh/GB	-	-	↑[3] (corr)	-	↑ (corr)

Note: IGB = ingroup bias. corr. = correlations. med = mediation. ↑ = positive relationship/increase. ↓ = inverse relationship/decrease. [1]: $p = .08$. [2]: Sobel's test; $p \leq .11$. [3]: Sobel's test; $p = .08$.

There were no correlations between relative power and ingroup bias in the NATO context/condition – just as there were no correlations between relative prototypicality and ingroup bias. Turning to mediation analysis (see Table 35), relative power mediated evaluative ingroup bias in the EU context (Study 1). The higher evaluative ingroup bias shown by the British is explained by its lack of power. This is nicely contrasted in the EU condition in Study 2, where the higher allocation-based ingroup bias shown by the Germans is explained by its high power.

Based on mean scores, we also see evidence of the more relatively powerful group liking the less relatively powerful group (i.e. lower evaluative ingroup bias), especially when the superordinate category is salient, that is, in Study 2 in the EU condition and in Study 3 in the GB condition. This noblesse oblige effect has been identified in previous studies. Sachdev and Bourhis (1985) suggest that the more powerful group demonstrates this 'benevolent paternalism' because it can afford to. This is a likely explanation for the noblesse oblige demonstrated by the English towards the Welsh, where England clearly 'rules the Great British roost'. Spears et al. (2001) add that the more powerful group will show its generosity to the less powerful group when that generosity costs no loss of status. This could account for both Germans' positive attitudes to the British and English positive attitudes to the Welsh. Recent research (Vanbeslaere et al., 2006) has added a further dimension to this line of research; the noblesse oblige effect may not so much depend on the degree of power that the ingroup has over the outgroup, but the degree of power the ingroup has over itself. The more the ingroup is in control of its power position and its fate, the more secure it feels. Due to its secure position, the noblesse oblige effect may occur out of a sense of social responsibility. England's position in Great Britain is certainly very secure, Germany's position in The EU perhaps less so. In these studies, we can only speculate whether lower evaluative ingroup bias scores were compounded by a sense of social responsibility.

Relative prototypicality and relative power

The question arose regarding the relationship between relative prototypicality and relative power, where both mediated allocation-based ingroup bias *to some degree*

(Study 2, EU condition; see Table 35). Principal component analysis showed these to be two distinct constructs. It was found that relative prototypicality mediated relative power in the EU condition, and relative power mediated relative prototypicality in the NATO condition. To explain these asymmetrical scores, the nature of the two national groups and their relationships to the superordinate categories were considered.

In the EU condition, the Germans' claim to higher relative power was founded on (i.e. mediated to some degree by) their claim to higher relative prototypicality. Openly demonstrating power is a very sensitive issue in Germany. The EU embraces multicultural diversity and social inclusion, and these values mirror Germans' perceptions of what is 'right and fair'. Thus by being prototypical of such an organisation, the group may legitimately claim higher relative power, and remain politically correct when doing so. If this interpretation is correct, this would lend support to Turner's (2005) three-process theory of power, viz. the process of group formation (a social identification/self-categorization process) can lead to power, which informs the ability to control resources.

In contrast, the British associate the power-driven organisation of NATO with the USA, the dominating NATO member. The USA has the power to define NATO norms. Great Britain enjoys a 'special relationship' with the USA and, with it, 'power by proxy' – or at least proximity. It is this power that enables the British (i.e. mediates to some degree) to feel so relatively prototypical of NATO. If this interpretation is correct, this would contradict Turner's (2005) three-process theory

of power, viz. the ability to control resources can lead to feelings of power, which inform group processes and social identification.

It would require further research to test whether these interpretations of the power-prototypicality relationships *per se* can be extended to other subgroup-superordinate groups. Added to this, the conflicting findings in the causal relationship between prototypicality and power relations seem to both question and support Turner's (2005) theory. As he himself states, we must look to historical facts and social realities to explain relationships, and it may be that these two specific groups and these two superordinate categories have shown the necessity of doing so, at the same time providing a set of natural groups where the direction of causality might be investigated further.

Relative fairness (legitimacy)

Study 3 additionally investigated the role of the perceived (il-)legitimacy of relations. Both groups agreed that the Welsh are treated less fairly than the English both within Great Britain and within The EU. However, these perceptions had no effects on ingroup bias levels. Given that research from the start of social identity research until the present day shows that legitimacy can have a profound effect on intersubgroup relations, the lack of findings here seems odd. One can only speculate why this might be. It could be that the measures employed were inadequate. It could also be that English-Welsh relations and inequalities between the two sub-groups are so long-standing, that both groups do not question the legitimacy of the status quo. For example, it could be that the English sample are aware of the inequality between the

groups, but feel secure and unchallenged in their higher-power position; ingroup bias is therefore not necessary.

Identification and ingroup bias

Also central to these studies were the degrees of identification at ingroup and at superordinate category level. This line of questioning had, of course, served to examine the identity-driven models of subgroup-superordinate group relations CIIM (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), IMSR (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a) and, to a lesser degree, ICM (Brown & Hewstone, 20005, see also Hewstone & Brown, 1986). In a nutshell, the degree of ingroup identification and its effects on ingroup bias levels were apparent throughout. Effects of superordinate category identification on ingroup bias were also identified, but in a few instances only. Finally, interactions between the two levels of identification were considered. A general summary of findings are given in Table 36.

Table 36: Summary of findings on the roles of ingroup and superordinate group identification in ingroup bias

	Evaluative ingroup bias				*Allocation-based ingroup bias*			
Study 1	*British*		*German*					
Ingroup ID	↑		↑					
EU ID	↓		↓					
Study 2	*British*		*German*		*British*		*German*	
	EU	*NATO*	*EU*	*NATO*	*EU*	*NATO*	*EU*	*NATO*
Ingroup ID	↑	↑	-	-	-	-	-	-
EU ID	↓	-	-	↑	-	-	-	-
SC ID	↓	-	-	-	-	↓	-	-
Dual ID	↓		↑		-		-	
Study 3	*English*		*Welsh*		*English*		*Welsh*	
	GB	*EU*	*GB*	*EU*	*GB*	*EU*	*GB*	*EU*
Ingroup ID	↑	-	↑	↑	↑	-	-	-
SC ID	-	-	-	↓	-	-	-	↓

Note: ↑ shows increase in ingroup bias. ↓ shows decrease in ingroup bias. Shaded areas refer to national groups, irrespective of condition.

Based on correlations, generally, as ingroup identification increased, so did ingroup bias with few exceptions[45]. Generally, there were no associations between the degree of superordinate category identification and ingroup bias (indeed, these would not generally be expected, although this varies from one theory to another). In two of the three instances where there were associations (British/NATO evaluative ingroup bias: Wales/EU, evaluative and allocation-based ingroup bias), then as superordinate

[45] No correlations between the two were found in the German sample in Study 2. In Study 3 in the EU condition, the degree of ingroup identification was not associated with ingroup bias in the English sample.

category identification increased, ingroup bias decreased (with one exception[46]). This is consistent with the predictions of CIIM.

Mediation analyses revealed that the degree of ingroup identification indirectly affected ingroup bias scores[47] (Study 3, see Table 36). Here the Welsh sample demonstrated higher evaluative ingroup bias than the English did. These unfavourable attitudes to the outgroup were mediated by the degree of ingroup identification, but in the EU condition only. In other words, further away from home (the EU condition), attitudes to the English are not necessarily so unfavourable as they are at home (the GB condition); the decisive factor is the degree of Welsh ingroup identification.

Simple slope analyses examined ingroup bias as a function of the interaction between ingroup and superordinate category identification. The purpose of these analyses was to test three claims. On the one hand, IPM claims that high dual identifiers show highest ingroup bias. On the other hand, IMSR claims that high dual identification can improve intersubgroup relations, and CIIM claims that higher superordinate category identification can improve intersubgroup relations. No interactions were found with regards to allocation-based ingroup bias. Here it seems more likely that power differentials between groups and not differences in ingroup identification will impact upon this form of social competition.

[46] In Study 2 in the NATO condition, as superordinate category identification increased in the German sample, so did evaluative ingroup bias.

[47] Also, although the pathway between national group and ingroup bias was not significant in Study 1, the indirect effects of the degree of ingroup identification drove British ingroup bias considerably.

As expected, simple slope analyses revealed that the degree of identification (at one or both levels) can impact upon evaluative ingroup bias (see Table 36), which underlines Tajfel's (1978) proposal that the degree of ingroup identification involves a strong affective component. The emotional significance of the group revealed itself again, when it was seen that relative respect (an affective response) was also a function of (dual) identification.

It is necessary to distinguish between the findings from Study 2 (where superordinate category identification was based on the evaluative component of social identity only) and Study 3 (where superordinate category identification encompassed the factors *ingroup ties* and *ingroup affect* (Cameron, 2004)). In Study 2, support for IPM was found, where high German dual identifiers demonstrated the highest level of evaluative ingroup bias. In Study 3 however, support was found for CIIM. When British or European identification increased, this did help 'limit the damage' of increasing ingroup identification and its negative impact on evaluative ingroup bias.

This 'damage limitation' effect was also observed on relative respect. In the EU condition, where the subgroups share a broad and therefore less restrictive superordinate category, for high ingroup identifiers, high European identification saw only a minimal decrease in received respect. In contrast, low and medium European identification saw a significant decrease in received respect. In the GB condition, where the subgroups share a narrow and therefore more restrictive superordinate category, for high ingroup identifiers, the degree of British identification played no role in the degree of received respect.

In the broadest of terms, then, the degree of ingroup identification was central to handing out (evaluative ingroup bias) and receiving (received respect) affective bias. Simultaneously, it was seen that an esteemed shared superordinate category can help improve intersubgroup relations. But how? Respect (introduced in Study 3) might be a viable starting point. In contrast to the other two measures of ingroup bias, received respect examined the degree to which a sub-group might be the target of (negative) bias.

There were limitations to this measure, both planned and unplanned. No distinctions were made between the dimensions of respect, and the source of respect was the superordinate category only. Additionally and as well as the modest sample size within cell, it cannot be ruled out that the self-reported degree of received respect might be a means of enhancing self-presentation in the higher power group, and a reactive response in the lower power group. Given this host of limitations, caution is called for in the following interpretation and suggestion.

Received respect and relative power correlated positively across both national groups and conditions. In Study 2, relative power mediated allocation-based ingroup bias, but not evaluative ingroup bias. In Study 3, ingroup identification mediated evaluative ingroup bias, but not allocation-based ingroup bias. We see therefore a connection between (a) power and the behavioural form of social competition, (b) identification and the less tangible, attitudinal form of social competition and (c) between affect (respect) and behaviour (power). Might therefore respect provide a

link between power (and the ingroup bias it produces) and ingroup identification (and the ingroup bias it produces)?

The way(s) forward

Based on the findings from these studies, two ways forward are suggested. The first remains with ingroup projection research and *how* this might be developed further. The second concerns the contributions of CIIM, ICM and IMSR and, grounded in the data, weighs up how these models have faired with the samples in this study series. The three models are considered in terms of the naturally occurring large-scale groups. What are the implications of the findings here and how might they be applied profitably in real-life terms?

IPM

In these studies, support for IPM was inconsistent. Ingroup projection did occur (if only in a few instances) and there was evidence to suggest that high dual identifiers show the highest level of ingroup bias (if only in one case). Furthermore, the conditions that have been suggested as necessary for ingroup projection to occur are still too numerous, and these clearly need to be narrowed down. Indeed, one might sometimes question whether the predicted increase in ingroup bias is, in fact, attributable solely to ingroup projection, or whether ingroup projection is a 'by-product', that is, a latent variable. Nonetheless, IPM is still a relatively young model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), and given the support that was found here, dismissing IPM as a viable explanation for subgroup-superordinate group relations would be hasty. Four points come to mind.

Firstly, the proximity-based measure of relative prototypicality (that is, not the 'traditional' trait-based measure generally employed) might very well have induced an *affective* response. This may conflict somewhat with the cognitive-perceptual processes normally associated with SCT upon which IPM is based, but it may also be that IPM would be enhanced by integrating some of the affective processes relating to social identity. Indeed, just how well can a cognitive model explain ingroup bias in social groups, where, as we know, it is those ingroup members who attach higher emotional significance to their group that show higher levels of ingroup bias. If a model needs to bend as may be the case with IPM, it must.

This leads to the second point. The links found between relative prototypicality and relative power warrant further investigation. As documented by the asymmetrical partial mediation in the NATO and EU conditions (Study 2), prototypicality and power appear to co-operate; the nature of the superordinate category may determine which of the two is the driving force. As discussed earlier, Turner (2005) has recently questioned the direction of cause and effect between social identification (and, by implication, prototypicality) and power. By administering a measure of relative prototypicality, the study produced evidence for both the standard theory and the three-process theory of power. This in itself was a very interesting finding that should be investigated further.

Thirdly, attempts to examine legitimacy in this thesis bore little fruit. However, the research into the effects of legitimacy and relative prototypicality on ingroup bias (Weber et al., 2002) produced promising findings, and this line of evidence is worthy of further investigation. Given the weakness of the legitimacy measure employed in

Study 3, yet given Weber and colleagues' findings, possible interactions between legitimacy and prototypicality are worthy of further investigation.

Fourthly and importantly, qualitative evidence from Study 1 showed that the representation of the prototype may play a key role in ingroup projection, as suggested by Waldzus et al. (2003). A prototype that emerged was that of threatening or not threatening – but threatening to identity (again, an affective element). Similarly, the qualitative findings from Mols and colleagues (Mols et al., unpublished manuscript; Mols & Haslam, in press) demonstrated clearly the enrichment that, for example, in-depth interviews can add to our understanding of the beliefs and motivations underlying identity management from a multi-layered perspective. Against the backdrop of IPM, it is not unlikely that such techniques would reveal further, category-dependent prototypes. Admittedly, then operationalizing the representation of the superordinate category in an experimental setting is a difficult challenge, and this is even more so the case with real-life groups. However, this two-step methodological approach might serve to develop the Ingroup Projection Model further.

CIIM, ICM and IMSR

Evidence has been presented in support of CIIM (assimilation and recategorization), whereby CIIM integrates ICM (pluralism) '*en route*'. Additionally, according to IMSR, assimilation and pluralism are on a continuum and dual identification does not necessarily have to come at the cost of the degree of ingroup identification (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). None of these models, then, is mutually exclusive of the

others. Furthermore, all three acknowledge social reality constraints; natural groups bring with them their own perceptions of what is.

There is, therefore, no definitive model for successful intersubgroup relations. It may be that the ICM approach is a first step towards improving intersubgroup relations, and this 'solution' may be the most viable for some natural subgroups. In other settings, recategorization (CIIM) may work equally well or over time, and dual categorization (IMSR) is a further possibility. (It is also reasonable to assume that some subgroups, perhaps driven by overriding social or political agendas, would not want to get closer to the superordinate category or other subgroups – but that is a different story.)

Turning to the evidence that has emerged from these studies, we can make generalisations pertaining to (a) specific superordinate categories, (b) specific national groups, and (c) specific forms of ingroup bias. The essential task here is superimposing identification levels onto these patterns, and then to relate these back to the three models. One contextual factor, however, needs to be considered when doing so; power. The reader may, at this stage, like to refer back to Table 34 - Table 36.

(A): Underlining the notion that the nature of the superordinate group can mediate intersubgroup relations, relations were more favourable overall under NATO than under The EU or Great Britain. This is unsurprising, because NATO presence may go almost unnoticed by its subgroups. The following generalisations therefore exclude the NATO data. (B) and (C): Germans (higher in power) overall showed

higher allocation-based ingroup bias (see Table 35). The British (lower in power) overall showed higher evaluative ingroup bias. Power differentials did not impact upon ingroup bias in the Welsh or English cohorts. From this we can conclude that power differentials may play a role in some subgroup-superordinate group constellations, but not in others.

Focusing now on the general summary presented in Table 34, we see quite consistent evidence of the inverse relationship between identification at a higher level of inclusiveness and ingroup bias. There is less evidence to support IMSR directly, but the general trend speaks nonetheless for higher superordinate category bringing with it a more favourable intersubgroup relationship.

Table 36 offers a more detailed overview, and here we can consider additionally the influence of the degree of ingroup identification. In line with much past research, finding confirmed that ingroup bias is more prominent in higher ingroup identifiers than in lower ingroup identifiers. We also see that higher ingroup identification leads to higher evaluative ingroup bias, but generally not to higher allocation-based ingroup bias (which, as stated earlier, may be a reflection of perceived power and demonstrations of ingroup bias in a way that is realistic and viable). Table 36 also allows us to see at a glance the influence of the degree of superordinate group identification. With just one exception, identification at the superordinate level saw either a decrease in ingroup bias, or no increase in ingroup bias. Thus we can conclude that it is the degree of ingroup identification that is most likely to influence intersubgroup relations negatively, and as proposed by CIIM, ICM and IMSR,

identifying at a higher level of inclusiveness can improve these relations significantly.

Before considering these findings in real-life terms, two factors warrant discussion. These are legitimacy and respect. Each of these were measured in Study 3, and findings were disappointing. As far as the perceived (il)legitimacy of relations is concerned, it is inexplicable why no effect of legitimacy was found here. Given that a wealth of research has shown that illegitimate relations are more likely to promote conflict between subgroups, it can only be concluded here that the measure administered failed to tap into this adequately. Respect, on the other hand, has not yet received the amount of attention that il(legitimacy) has, and for this reason it is disappointing that Study 3 had nothing to contribute to this line of research. However, based on findings from others (e.g., Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers & Doosje, 2002; Eggins et al., 2002; Huo & Molina, 2006; Lipponen & Leskinen, 2006; O'Brien, Haslam, Jetten, Humphrey, O'Sullivan, Postmes, et al., 2004; Platow, Brewer & Eggins, 2007; Voltmer & Lalljee, 2003) and on common sense, respect is included in the proposal below as a further means to promoting intersubgroup harmony.

Most evidence, then, points to pluralism and/or assimilation or dual identification (i.e. this continuum) as a means of reducing intersubgroup conflict. In social reality terms, there will generally be differences in perceived power between subgroups. For example, the Welsh lack of power in Great Britain is likely founded on fact; the British lack of power in The EU is not. Also there may be a shared past between groups that is historically one of tension and dislike, as may be the case in British

attitudes to Germans and Germany, and Welsh attitudes to the English and England. Furthermore, a superordinate category may be perceived as a threat to ingroup distinctiveness, which is the case possibly in British-EU and Welsh-British relations. Grounded in the data and *irrespective of (national) subgroup*, the question is, then, *how* to promote identification at a higher level? The *way* of doing this depends on the social realities of the subgroups, that is, is *not irrespective of (national) subgroup*.

Especially considering that high ingroup identification *per se* is a great stumbling block to overcome ingroup bias, it seems clear that any attempts to exact of subgroup members that they relinquish some of their uniqueness is not viable in most cases – nor indeed should it be necessary. As we have also seen, the perceived nature of the superordinate group (its scope, its values and beliefs, its policies, the other subgroups it includes etc.) can mediate relations between its subgroup members, and it is therefore fair to place much onus on the higher level group to create and maintain an environment where subgroups (particularly lower-status groups) can feel valued and appreciated. It must be seen to show social responsibility and a sense of obligation, and not simply viewed as the 'grey eminence' exhibiting demonstrations of power. Nonetheless, if a superordinate category needs to intervene should a higher-status subgroup attempt to discriminate against a lower-status subgroup, it should and must be prepared do so, especially when this entails challenging a powerful subgroup. It should, then, lead by example.

There appear to be two scenarios, each of which brings its own set of dilemmas; emerging superordinate categories and established superordinate categories. The former case can be found regularly in an organisational setting. Here there is the

opportunity to set the rules and norms expected of subgroups, but it is unfortunate that the focus during merger processes is often more on profit (and possibly down-sizing) than on addressing the psychological needs of the workforce(s). As has been demonstrated (Eggins et al., 2002; O'Brien, Haslam, Jetten, Humphrey, O'Sullivan, Postmes, et al., 2004; Platow, Brewer & Eggins, 2007), much can be done to produce an environment conducive to staff welfare, which in turn can be translated into later financial gain. The keywords here are voice, involvement, and a consultative and democratic approach. Grounded in a bottom-up approach, intersubgroup contact should be encouraged before decision-making processes are announced; it is here that the strength of mutual inter(sub)group differentiation can bear fruit.

In the case where an existing superordinate category hosts subgroups in conflict, changing attitudes is naturally a difficult undertaking. Added to this, of course, is the question whether the superordinate category itself seeks to be democratic and fair (as is more likely the case with The EU), or whether it is dependent upon and influenced by a higher-status, main-stream subgroup (as is more likely the case with Great Britain). In line with the proposal for emerging superordinate categories presented above, if the institution is indeed attempting to treat subgroups fairly, then it should be seen to do so, but also seen to endorse inappropriate behaviour from deviant subgroups.

Finally we consider the nature of the subgroups involved. Despite the argumentation that the superordinate category carries the responsibility for promoting good intersubgroup relations, this is not absolute. A subgroup will and can seek to take ownership of the higher level group (e.g. England and Great Britain; relative

prototypicality), and this may be regarded by other subgroups as illegitimate and unfair. In contrast, if we consider here The EU, its policies of democracy and fairness have not necessarily been internalised by the British in general – hence the *Euroscepticism* encountered in many citizens. What we see here is a superordinate category not necessarily 'doing the right thing' (Great Britain) and a superordinate category attempting to 'do the right thing' (The EU), which in both cases lead to discontent amongst some subgroups. Here creativity is called for, and it is essential to give (lower-status) subgroups the support the support they need, and the only way to establish their needs is to ask them. A bottom-up approach and open communication channels are therefore essential. In this vein, it is interesting to note that, when articulating their attitudes to The EU, regional politicians (i.e. a group with a more informed opinion of The EU than average citizens) spoke more of the fact that The EU recognises Welsh regional identity and less that The EU funds Wales as an *Objective One* area (Mols et al., unpublished manuscript). Here we see that subgroup needs are best assessed by the subgroup itself.

In conclusion, it is hoped that these studies have contributed to social identity research in general, and more specifically to testing the mechanisms involved in intersubgroup relations. It is unfortunate that attempts to examine il(legitimacy) and respect were unsuccessful, but this failing is very likely due to inadequacies in the implementation of these measures. As well as findings on power and prototypicality, there seems to be clear evidence showing the negative impact that high ingroup identification can have on subgroup relations, and the positive impact that high superordinate group identification can have on (improving) intersubgroup relations. Translating these findings into real-life terms, we see here specifically a contribution

that may be integrated into research on national identity, which can in turn inform social and public policy making, multiculturalism, citizenship and multi-level governance. We further believe that these findings can be considered in the realm of organisational psychology, especially in view of the ever-increasing popularity of mergers, out-sourcing and restructuring/lean management.

Nonetheless, we must return to respect. Respect may not be the Holy Grail, but it is suggested here that it (alongside empowerment, voice, and engagement) can be a powerful tool to limit the damage to group self-esteem that lower-status groups may encounter, and simultaneously it can ensure that higher-status groups do not devalue (or even seek to dehumanise) lower-status groups. It is the function of the superordinate category to facilitate this.

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Appendix I to Study 1

I-1 Ethics Approval

PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT

ETHICS COMMITTEE

Memo

To: Christine Dobbs

From: Professor David Clark, Chair of Departmental Ethics Committee

Date: 28th September, 2004

Re: **European Perceptions** (Pilot Study leading up to Study 2 in Doctorate Thesis)

Members of the departmental Ethics Committee have now reviewed the above study and agree that it raises no substantive ethical issues, provided the information obtained from the questionnaires is kept absolutely confidential and that no personally identifiable information is entered on computer. You may therefore proceed with your study.

A copy of this memo together with a copy of your Ethics Application Form and Risk Assessment Form should be included in the final version of your thesis.

I-2 Form of Consent (English)

Dear Participant

I am a PhD student at the Department of Psychology at the University of Wales Swansea. My main area of interest looks at European perceptions; how we feel about country, our European neighbours, and what living in Europe means to us personally.

This is one of two documents you have received via e-mail. This document is a form of consent, and I would ask you to tick the box below stating that you kindly agree to take part in this study. It is only when I receive your consent that I may examine your responses within this study.

The second document is the actual questionnaire. You will read a series of questions, and I would ask you to answer them in the order that they appear and on-screen. You will be asked to write down some of your thoughts in two instances, and in most other cases you will be asked to place a cross in the appropriate box. Filling in the questionnaire should take no longer than 25 minutes.

If you agree to take part in this study, your questionnaire will remain entirely anonymous. Your consent form will be printed out and then deleted. In other words, there will be no link between yourself and your responses. All data collected are treated with confidentiality and used only within the framework of this thesis and any resulting publications.

Please remember:

- Participation is entirely voluntary
- There are no right or wrong answers
- You are free to break off your participation at any time

If you agree to participate, please give your informed consent by placing an "X" in the box below, typing in the date and then <SAVE> the file. Then please open the next document and fill in your answers on screen. When you have completed the study, please mail both documents back to me in one e-mail.

Thank you very much for your participation.

Christine Dobbs
Department of Psychology, University of Wales Swansea
Tel: ++44 – 1792 – 513140
E-mail: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com or 182177@swan.ac.uk

By placing an "X" in this box		**I agree to participate in this study.**
Please type the date:	**dd.mm.yy**	

I-3 Instruction Sheet and Questionnaire (English)

European Perceptions

We live in a European democracy, and our government makes decisions on our behalf. Some decisions which are in national interest concern our degree of involvement with other nations – for example trading agreements, common policies to protect the environment and issues of security and defence. Recently, psychologists have become very interested in how citizens feel about the various degrees of involvement with other nations, and we would like to explore this issue in this study. In the following questionnaire we will be asking you as a British person about your perceptions of living in Europe.

When you complete this questionnaire, it is very important that you answer the questions in the order they come. Also please remember **there are no right or wrong answers**. We are interested in your own feelings and personal opinions. Try to answer the questions without too much deliberation. Past studies suggest that our initial responses are likely the better responses. We would also appreciate it if you could be honest in your responses. We assure you again that your responses are **entirely anonymous**.

Instructions on how to fill out the questionnaire

The questionnaire can be filled out on your screen, i.e. printing this document is NOT required. Please make sure you have SAVED this document (e.g. to the desktop) and then fill in as required. For ease of reading, please make sure you have selected <Print Layout> from the <View> option, and that the formatting marks are not visible.

Please take time to read this sheet carefully.

You will be asked a series of questions. For all questions a box is provided for your answers. Just click on the box to type in your answer. Very often you will be given a range of numbers to choose from when you answer a question. To show you what we mean, below is an example in which the respondent has typed her answer into the box, and here she agrees (6) with the statement.

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Tend to disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Keeping fit is important to me. [6]

When you have completed the questionnaire, please <save> the file. Please <send> the questionnaire together with the form of consent to:
Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com
or
182177@swan.ac.uk

Again, many thanks for your cooperation! It is greatly appreciated.

We'd like to start by asking you about your opinions concerning NATO. When you answer the question below, please write down **briefly** and **clearly** what spontaneously comes to mind. We're certainly not interested in your writing style nor in the amount you write – just try to write clearly and briefly what comes to mind. Remember there are no right or wrong responses, as these are your own personal feelings and opinions.

When you think of NATO, what things spring to mind? For example, you might like to write down some things that you associate with NATO, or things that you personally find a good thing or a bad thing about NATO.

Please write your response here:

Please read the following statement and write in the box the number that best reflects your opinion.

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Tend to disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In general, NATO conjures up a positive image for me. [ ]

Next we'd like you to read a short text about NATO. When you've read it, please continue with the questionnaire.

In January 1948, the United Kingdom (that is, Great Britain and Northern Ireland) proposed a form of Western Union between five European countries, and this union – the Brussels Treaty Powers – was established later that year. At the same time, Canada and the United States began negotiations on the North Atlantic Treaty with the Brussels Treaty Powers. In 1949 the treaty was signed by twelve countries, including Great Britain. The former Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) became an official member in May, 1955.

At its foundation, then, NATO comprised twelve member states. Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe. The 26 member countries retain their full sovereignty. All NATO decisions are taken jointly by the member countries on the basis of consensus. Of these 26 members, both Great Britain and Germany are represented in the most important decision making bodies.

The fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. It safeguards the Allies common values of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Please answer the following questions by writing your response in the appropriate box. You may, of course, refer back to the text if you want.

Do NATO member states retain their full sovereignty? **Yes/No** [ ]

Has Great Britain or Germany been a NATO member longer? [ ]

How many countries are members of NATO today? [ ]

Next, please read the following statements and place the number which best reflects your opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Tend to disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Membership in NATO is a good thing for Great Britain.	
Taking everything into consideration, Great Britain has on balance benefited from being a member of NATO.	
In general, NATO conjures up a negative image for me.	
Great Britain has a lot in common with NATO.	
Germany has a lot in common with NATO.	
Great Britain is a strong member in NATO.	
Germany is a strong member in NATO.	
Great Britain is a very good example of a typical NATO member state.	
Germany is a very good example of a typical NATO member state.	
Great Britain has a powerful influence on NATO decisions.	
Germany has a powerful influence on NATO decisions.	
I regard Great Britain as a typical NATO member state.	
I regard Germany as a typical NATO member state.	
A strong NATO makes for a strong Great Britain.	
A strong NATO makes for a strong Germany.	

Moving on, we'd like to know a little more about your opinions concerning the European Union. Please answer the question below, writing down **briefly** and **clearly** what spontaneously comes to mind. Remember there are no right or wrong responses, as these are your own personal feelings and opinions.

When you think of the European Union, what things spring to mind? For example, you might like to write down some things that you associate with the European Union, or things that you personally find a good thing or a bad thing about the European Union.

Please write your response here:

Please read the following statement and write in the box the number that best reflects your opinion.

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Tend to disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In general, the European Union conjures up a positive image for me. [ ]

Next we'd like you to read a short text about the European Union. When you've read it, please continue with the questionnaire.

The European Union was born out of the European Coal and Steel Community formed in 1951 by six European countries including Germany. In 1957 two further Communities were created (EURATOM and EEC), and ten years later all three were merged. The United Kingdom (that is, Great Britain and Northern Ireland) joined in 1973. By 1992 there were 10 members, new forms of co-operation between the member state governments were introduced and the European Union (EU) was created.

Today, the European Union comprises 25 countries from Eastern and Western Europe. Member States have set up common institutions to which they delegate some of their sovereignty so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at a European level. Each country has a certain number of votes which roughly reflects its population. Holding 29 votes each, Great Britain and Germany are two of the four countries with the highest number of votes.

The EU deals with many subjects, including ensuring freedom and security. It is now increasingly involved in creating stability in neighbouring countries, and it is developing its common foreign and security policy, with plans for more co-operation between members on defence questions.

Please answer the following questions by writing your response in the appropriate box. You may, of course, refer back to the text if you want.

Do EU member states retain their full sovereignty? **Yes/No** ☐

Has Great Britain or Germany been a member of the EU longer? ☐

How many countries are members of the EU today? ☐

Next, please read the following statements and place the number which best reflects your opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Tend to disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Membership in the EU is a good thing for Great Britain.	
Taking everything into consideration, Great Britain has on balance benefited from being a member of the EU.	
In general, the EU conjures up a negative image for me.	
Great Britain has a lot in common with the EU.	
Germany has a lot in common with the EU.	
Great Britain is a strong member in the EU.	
Germany is a strong member in the EU.	
Great Britain is a very good example of a typical EU member state.	
Germany is a very good example of a typical EU member state.	
Great Britain has a powerful influence on EU decisions.	
Germany has a powerful influence on EU decisions.	
I regard Great Britain as a typical EU member state.	
I regard Germany as a typical EU member state.	
A strong EU makes for a strong Great Britain.	
A strong EU makes for a strong Germany.	

Now we're interested in learning more about your attitudes towards four groups. We'd like you to use the thermometer ratings listed on the right in order to indicate your attitudes towards these groups. For example, a rating of 50° C would indicate that your feelings towards that particular group are neither favourable nor unfavourable. You may give any number between 0 and 100. Please be honest. Remember that your answers are strictly confidential.

My attitude towards Great Britain is ☐ °C.

My attitude towards NATO is ☐ °C.

My attitude towards the European Union is ☐ °C.

My attitude towards Germany is ☐ °C.



Favourable	100°	Extremely favourable
	90°	Very favourable
	80°	Quite favourable
	70°	Fairly favourable
	60°	Slightly favourable
	50°	Neither favourable nor unfavourable
	40°	Slightly unfavourable
	30°	Fairly unfavourable
	20°	Quite unfavourable
	10°	Very unfavourable
Unfavourable	0°	Extremely unfavourable

Please look at the following pairs. For example, we'd like you to think about which goals and values you think are important for Great Britain and about the goals and values you think are important for NATO. If you compare these, how similar do you think they are? To answer, please place an "X" in one of the seven boxes ranging from very dissimilar to very similar. To show you what we mean, we've provided two examples below.

I think the goals and values of the following pairs are:

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
shop steward - managing director	very dissimilar		X						very similar
Green Party member – organic farmer	very dissimilar						X		very similar

Please now provide your ratings for the pairs listed below:

I think the goals and values of the following pairs are:

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Great Britain - NATO	very dissimilar								very similar
Great Britain – the European Union	very dissimilar								very similar
Great Britain – Germany	very dissimilar								very similar
Germany – NATO	very dissimilar								very similar
Germany – the European Union	very dissimilar								very similar

Please indicate in the box below which of these four pictures (A, B, C or D) in your opinion best reflects how Great Britain and Germany are linked to NATO.



Box ☐ best reflects how Great Britain and Germany are linked to NATO.

Please indicate in the box below which of these four pictures (A, B, C or D) in your opinion best reflects how Great Britain and Germany are linked to the EU.



Box ☐ best reflects how Great Britain and Germany are linked to the EU.

You have almost completed the questionnaire. We'd like you to give your answers to one final set of statements. Please read them and place the number which best reflects your opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Tend to disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In a group of British people, I really feel that I belong. ☐

The fact that I'm British rarely enters my mind. ☐

Just thinking about the fact that I'm British sometimes gives me bad feelings. ☐

I feel strong ties to other British people. ☐

Being British is an important reflection of who I am. ☐

In general, I'm glad to be British. ☐

I don't have a lot in common with other British people. ☐

In my everyday life, I often think about what it means to be British. ☐

I often regret that I'm British. ☐

Finally, we'd like to know a little about yourself.

1. Are you ... male ☐ female ☐

2. How old are you? ☐

3. How would you describe yourself? Please place an "X" next to the box or boxes you feel that apply to you.

British		Irish		Other (please specify)	
English		Scottish			
European		Welsh			

4. In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". **How would you place your views on this scale?** Please place an "X" in appropriate box. There are also boxes provided if you don't want to answer this question or if you don't know where to place your views on this scale.

	Left 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Right 10
My views are:										

I don't want to answer this question	
I don't know	

5. On a scale from 1 to 10, how strongly would you rate your interest in ... Please place an "X" in appropriate box.

	Low 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	High 10	Don't know 00
British politics?											
European politics?											

6. Finally, suppose someone were to ask you how much do you feel British and how much do you feel European, what would you reply? Please place an "X" in the appropriate box.

	Entirely British 1	2	3	4	5	6	Entirely European 7
I feel							

I-4 Debrief Sheet (English)

European Perceptions – Christine Dobbs – University of Wales Swansea

De-briefing

You have now completed the study. Thank you again for your participation, which is greatly appreciated. Perhaps you might be interested to read a little more about the nature of the study at this point.

We are interested in how people feel about their country's membership in international organizations, here in NATO and in the European Union. For example, does membership make us feel more secure in our daily lives, or would we be happier if our governments made their decisions with national interests only in mind? The second issue was to examine how we feel about other member states. Do we feel, perhaps, that they are over-advantaged, or does their membership make us feel stronger as a larger, common group?

If you have any further questions concerning this study or my area of research in general, . please feel free to contact me.

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Tel: ++44 – 1792 – 513140
Email: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com OR c.dobbs.182177@swan.ac.uk

I-5 Form of Consent (German)

Einwilligungsblatt

Sehr geehrte Teilnehmerin, sehr geehrter Teilnehmer!

Ich bin Doktorandin in der Fakultät der Psychologie an der *University of Wales Swansea* in Großbritannien. Mein Hauptinteresse liegt auf dem Gebiet von Europäischen Wahrnehmungen; wie wir über unsere Nation und über unsere europäischen Nachbarn denken, und was das Leben in Europa uns persönlich bedeutet.

Dies – das Einwilligungsblatt – ist das erste von zwei Dokumenten. Ich möchte Sie bitten, das unten stehende Kästchen anzukreuzen und das heutigte Datum einzugeben. So erklären Sie sich bereit, an diese Studie teilzunehmen. Erst nachdem ich Ihre Einwilligung erhalten habe, darf ich Ihren Beitrag zu dieser Studie miteinbeziehen.

Im zweiten Dokument werden Sie eine Reihe von Fragen beantworten und ich bitte Sie, die Fragen in der Reihenfolge zu beantworten wie sie erscheinen. Das Ausfüllen dürfte nicht länger als 20 Minuten dauern.

Falls Sie mit einer Teilnahme einverstanden sind, werden Ihre Daten völlig vertraulich erhoben. Das Einwilligungsblatt wird ausgedruckt und dann gelöscht. Mit anderen Worten werden es keine Verbindungen zwischen Ihrer Person und Ihren Anworten bestehen. Alle gesammelten Informationen werden streng vertraulich behandelt und nur im Rahmen dieser Dissertation und in eventuell daraus entstehenden Veröffentlichungen verwendet werden.

Denken Sie bitte stets daran:
- Ihre Teilnahme ist absolute freiwillig.
- Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.
- Es bleibt Ihnen jederzeit frei, sich von der Teilnahme zurückzuziehen.

Wenn Sie zur Teilnahme bereit sind, erteilen Sie mir nun Ihre informierte Einwilligung. Dann öffnen Sie das zweite Dokument und füllen Sie es am Bildschirm aus. Wenn Sie mit dem Ausfüllen fertig sind, versenden Sie bitte beide Dokumente per Email an mich zurück.

Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme.

Christine Dobbs
Department of Psychology – University of Wales Swansea
Tel: ++44 – 1792 – 513140
E-mail: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com oder c.dobbs.182177@swan.ac.uk

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Indem ich dieses Kästchen ankreuze: [ ] **bin ich mit derTeilnahme einverstanden.**

Datum: [TT.MM.JJ]

I-6 Instruction Sheet and Questionnaire (German)

Europäische Wahrnehmungen

Wir leben in einer europäischen Demokratie und unsere Regierung trifft Entscheidungen in unserem Namen. Einige Entscheidungen im Interesse der Nation beziehen sich darauf, inwieweit wir mit anderen Nationen zusammenarbeiten, z.B. bei Handelsabkommen, gemeinsamer Umweltschutzpolitik und Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsangelegenheiten. Seit kurzem zeigen Psycholog/innen ein verstärktes Interesse daran, wie die Bürgerinnen und Bürger zu der Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Nationen stehen, und auch wir möchten in der vorliegenden Studie mehr zu diesem Thema herausfinden. Im Folgenden werden wir Sie, als deutschen Staatsbürger oder -bürgerin, über Ihre Einstellungen und Meinungen zum Leben in Europa befragen.

Bitte beachten Sie, dass Sie die folgenden Fragen der Reihe nach beantworten. **Wichtig: es gibt weder richtige noch falsche Antworten.** Wir sind an Ihren Empfindungen und persönlichen Meinungen interessiert. Versuchen Sie, die Fragen möglichst *ehrlich*, *schnell* und *spontan* zu bearbeiten. Frühere Studien haben ergeben, dass zu langes Nachdenken die Antworten verzerren kann. Wir versichern Ihnen, dass Ihre Daten streng vertraulich behandelt werden.

Wie Sie den Fragebogen ausfüllen

Der Fragebogen kann direkt am Computer ausgefüllt werden, das heißt er braucht NICHT extra ausgedruckt zu werden. Bitte vergewissern Sie sich, dass Sie das Dokument GESPEICHERT (<speichern unter>) haben (zum Beispiel auf dem DESKTOP), und es dann wie angegeben ausfüllen. Um das Lesen zu erleichtern, vergewissern Sie sich, dass Sie im Menü <Ansicht> den Punkt <Seitenlayout> aktiviert haben und dass die Formatierungszeichen (z.B. ¶) ausgeblendet sind.

Bitte nehmen Sie sich einen Augenblick Zeit, um diese Einleitung zu lesen.

Ihnen werden ein Reihe von Fragen gestellt. Für alle Fragen steht jeweils ein Kästchen für Ihre Antwort zur Verfügung. Klicken Sie mit der linken Maustaste auf das Kästchen und tragen Sie Ihre Antwort ein. In den meisten Fällen, sollen Sie das Ausmaß Ihrer Zustimmung zu einer bestimmten Aussage angeben. Dies geschieht anhand einer Zahlenskala, dessen Zahlen von 1 bis 7 reichen und den Grad Ihrer Zustimmung von „Stimme entschieden nicht zu" bis „Stimme entschieden zu" veranschaulichen. Bitte beachten Sie das unten aufgeführte Beispiel zur Veranschaulichung. (Hier hat die Teilnehmerin ihre Antwort (6) bereits eingegeben und stimmt somit der Aussage zu.)

Stimme entschieden nicht zu	Stimme nicht zu	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme weder zu noch nicht zu	Stimme eher zu	Stimme zu	Stimme entschieden zu
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Mir ist es wichtig, fit zu bleiben. [6]

Wenn Sie den Fragebogen vollständig ausgefüllt haben, <speichern> Sie bitte das Dokument. Dann senden Sie es zusammen mit Ihrer Einwilligungserklärung zurück an
Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com
oder
c.dobbs.182177@swan.ac.uk

Nochmal herzlichen Dank für Ihre Kooperation! Wir sind Ihnen für Ihre Teilnahme sehr dankbar.

Wir möchten damit beginnen, dass wir Sie über Ihre Meinungen zur NATO befragen. Wenn Sie die unten stehende Frage beantworten, schreiben Sie bitte **deutlich** und **in Kürze,** was Ihnen spontan einfällt. Denken Sie daran, dass es keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten gibt. Dies sind Ihre persönlichen Einstellungen und Meinungen.

Wenn Sie an die NATO denken, was fällt Ihnen dazu ein? (Zum Beispiel Dinge, die Sie mit der NATO in Verbindung bringen, oder Merkmale der NATO, die Sie persönlich als gut oder schlecht bewerten)

Bitte schreiben Sie Ihre Antwort hier:

Bitte lesen Sie die folgende Aussage und geben Sie im vorgesehenen Kästchen die Zahl an, die Ihre persönliche Meinung am besten widerspiegelt.

Stimme entschieden nicht zu	Stimme nicht zu	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme weder zu noch nicht zu	Stimme eher zu	Stimme zu	Stimme entschieden zu
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Im Allgemeinen ruft die NATO bei mir ein positives Bild hervor. [ ]

Als Nächstes möchten wir, dass Sie einen kurzen Text über die NATO lesen. Wenn Sie ihn gelesen haben, fahren Sie mit dem Fragenbogen fort.

Im Januar 1948 schlug das Vereinigte Königreich (das heißt, Großbritannien und Nordirland) die Idee für einen Westlichen Bund zwischen fünf europäischen Ländern vor. Dieser Bund, eine so genannte Union, – *the Brussels Treaty Powers* – wurde dann später in diesem Jahre tatsächlich gegründet. Gleichzeitig begannen Kanada und die USA Gespräche mit den *BTP* , um die North Atlantic Treaty Organization zu verhandeln. Der Vertrag wurde 1949 von zwölf Ländern unterzeichnet, darunter Großbritannien. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland trat im Mai 1955 als offizielles Miglied der NATO bei.

Bei ihrer Gründung bestand die NATO also aus zwölf Mitgliedstaaten. Heute ist die NATO eine Allianz aus 26 europäischen und nordamerikanischen Ländern. Alle 26 Mitgliedstaaten behalten ihre volle Souveränität. Alle NATO-Entscheidungen werden auf Abstimmungsbasis von allen Mitgliedsländern gemeinsam getroffen. Von den 26 Mitgliedern sind sowohl Deutschland als auch Großbritannien in den wichtigsten Entscheidungsgremien vertreten.

Die grundsätzliche Rolle der NATO ist es, die Freiheit und die Sicherheit ihrer Mitgliedstaaten mit politischen und militärischen Mitteln zu schützen. Sie soll die gemeinsamen demokratischen Werte der Allierten, die Freiheit des Einzelnen, die Rechtsstaatlichkeit und die friedliche Beilegung von Auseinandersetzungen absichern.

Bitte beantworten Sie nun die folgenden Fragen, indem Sie Ihre Antwort in das jeweilige Kästchen eingeben. Selbstverständlich können Sie dabei nochmals auf den Text zurückgreifen.

Behalten NATO-Mitgliedstaaten ihre Souveränität in vollem Maße? **Ja/Nein** ☐

Welches Land ist länger NATO-Mitglied? Deutschland oder Großbritannien? ☐

Wie viele Länder hat die NATO heute? ☐

Als nächstes lesen Sie bitte die folgenden Aussagen durch und geben Sie jeweils in das vorgesehene Kästchen diejenige Zahl ein, die Ihre Meinung am besten widerspiegelt. Die Skala reicht von 1 (stimme entschieden nicht zu) bis 7 (stimme entschieden zu).

Stimme entschieden nicht zu	Stimme nicht zu	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme weder zu noch nicht zu	Stimme eher zu	Stimme zu	Stimme entschieden zu
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Die Mitgliedschaft in der NATO ist eine gute Sache für Deutschland.	
Wenn man alles berücksichtigt, hat Deutschland im Großen und Ganzen davon profitiert, ein Mitgleid der NATO zu sein.	
Im Allgemeinen ruft die NATO bei mir ein negatives Bild hervor.	
Deutschland hat viele Dinge mit der NATO gemeinsam.	
Großbritannien hat viele Dinge mit der NATO gemeinsam.	
Deutschland ist ein starkes NATO-Mitglied.	
Großbritannien ist ein starkes NATO-Mitglied.	
Deutschland ist ein gutes Beispiel für einen typischen NATO-Mitgliedstaat.	
Großbritannien ist ein gutes Beispiel für einen typischen NATO-Mitgliedstaat.	
Deutschland hat einen starken Einfluß auf NATO-Entscheidungen.	
Großbritannien hat einen starken Einfluß auf NATO-Entscheidungen.	
Ich betrachte Deuschland als einen typischen NATO-Mitgliedstaat.	
Ich betrachte Großbritannien als einen typischen NATO-Mitgliedstaat.	
Eine starke NATO bedeutet ein starkes Deutschland.	
Eine starke NATO bedeutet ein starkes Großbritannien.	

Im Folgenden möchten wir mehr über Ihre Meinungen zur Europäischen Union (EU) erfahren. Beantworten Sie bitte die unten stehende Frage beantworten, indem Sie **deutlich** und **in Kürze** schreiben, was Ihnen spontan einfällt. Denken Sie daran, dass es keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten gibt.

Wenn Sie an die Europäische Union (EU) denken, was fällt Ihnen dazu ein? (Zum Beispiel Dinge, die Sie mit der EU in Verbindung bringen, oder Merkmale der EU, die Sie persönlich als gut oder schlecht bewerten)

Bitte schreiben Sie Ihre Antwort hier:

Bitte lesen Sie die folgende Aussage und geben Sie im vorgesehenen Kästchen die Zahl an, die Ihre Meinung am besten widerspiegelt.

Stimme entschieden nicht zu	Stimme nicht zu	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme weder zu noch nicht zu	Stimme eher zu	Stimme zu	Stimme entschieden zu
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Im Allgemeinen ruft die EU bei mir ein positives Bild hervor. ☐

Als Nächstes möchten wir, dass Sie einen kurzen Text über die Europäische Union lesen. Wenn Sie ihn gelesen haben, fahren Sie bitte mit dem Fragenbogen fort.

Die EU wurde aus der Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl begründet, die seit 1951 aus sechs europäischen Ländern inklusive Deutschland bestand. 1957 wurden zunächst zwei weitere Gemeinschaften (EURATOM und EWG) gegründet, die sich zehn Jahre später mit der Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl vereinigten. Das Vereinigte Königreich (dass heißt, Großbritannien und Nordirland) trat 1973 bei. Bis 1992 gab es 10 Mitgliedstaaten, neue Formen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Mitgliedern wurden eingeführt und die Europäische Union (EU) war gegründet.

Heute besteht die Europäische Union aus 25 Ländern Ost- und Westeuropas. Mitgliedstaaten haben gemeinsame Institutionen eingerichtet. Teile ihrer einzelstaatlichen Souveränität hat jeder Mitgliedstaat diesen Institutionen übertragen, damit in bestimmten Angelegenheiten im gemeinsamen Interesse demokratische Entscheidungen auf europäischer Ebene getroffen werden können. Jedes Land hat eine bestimmte Anzahl von Stimmen, die sich ungefähr nach der Größe der einzelnen Länder richtet. Mit jeweils 29 Stimmen sind Deutschland und Großbritannien zwei der vier Länder mit der höchsten Stimmenzahl.

Die EU befasst sich mit vielen Fragen, wie zum Beispiel die Sicherung von Frieden und Sicherheit. Sie bemüht sich heute zunehmend darum, angrenzende Länder zu stabilisiern. Außerdem entwickelt sie eine gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, bei der eine engere Zusammenarbeit in Verteidigungsfragen geplant ist.

Bitte beantworten Sie nun die folgenden Fragen, indem Sie Ihre Antwort in das jeweilige Kästchen eingeben. Selbstverständlich können Sie dabei nochmals auf den Text zurückgreifen.

Behalten EU-Mitgliedstaaten ihre Souveränität in vollem Maße? **Ja/Nein** ☐

Welches Land ist länger EU-Mitglied? Deutschland oder Großbritannien? ☐

Wie viele Länder hat die EU heute? ☐

Als nächstes lesen Sie bitte die folgenden Aussagen durch und geben Sie jeweils in das vorgesehene Kästchen diejenige Zahl ein, die Ihre Meinung am besten widerspiegelt. Die Skala reicht von 1 (stimme entschieden nicht zu) bis 7 (stimme entschieden zu).

Stimme entschieden nicht zu	Stimme nicht zu	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme weder zu noch nicht zu	Stimme eher zu	Stimme zu	Stimme entschieden zu
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Die Mitgliedschaft in der EU ist eine gute Sache für Deutschland.	
Wenn man alles berücksichtigt, hat Deutschland im Großen und Ganzen davon profitiert, ein Mitgleid der EU zu sein.	
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Ich betrachte Großbritannien als einen typischen EU-Mitgliedstaat.	
Eine starke EU bedeutet ein starkes Deutschland.	
Eine starke EU bedeutet ein starkes Großbritannien.	

Nun sind wir daran interessiert, mehr über Ihre Einstellungen zu vier verschiedenen Gruppen zu erfahren. Wir möchten, dass Sie uns anhand der unten dargestellten Thermometerskala Ihre Einstellungen zu diesen Gruppen mitteilen. Zum Beispiel, eine Bewertung von 50°C würde bedeuten, dass Ihre Einstellung zu dieser bestimmten Gruppe weder positiv noch negativ ist. Sie können jede Zahl zwischen 0 und 100 vergeben. Bitte versuchen Sie möglichst ehrlich, schnell, und spontan zu antworten. Denken Sie daran: es gibt weder Richtig noch Falsch!

Meine Einstellung gegenüber Deutschland ist ☐ °C.

Meine Einstellung gegenüber der NATO ist ☐ °C.

Meine Einstellung gegenüber der Europäischen Union ist ☐ °C.

Meine Einstellung gegenüber Großbritannien ist ☐ °C.



Positiv	100°	Äußerst positiv
	90°	Sehr positiv
	80°	Positiv
	70°	Ziemlich positiv
	60°	Eher positiv
	50°	Weder positiv noch negativ
	40°	Eher negativ
	30°	Ziemlich negativ
	20°	Negativ
	10°	Sehr negativ
Negativ	0°	Äußerst negativ

Betrachten Sie bitte die folgenden Wortpaare. Wir möchten, dass Sie darüber nachdenken, welche Ziele und Werte Sie als wichtig beispielsweise für Deutschland erachten, und welche Ziele und Werte Sie als wichtig für die NATO erachten. Wenn Sie sie vergleichen, wie ähnlich finden Sie sie? Um die Frage zu beantworten, bitte geben Sie bitten ein „X" in eins von den sieben Kästchen ein. Die Skala reicht von sehr unähnlich (1) bis sehr ähnlich (7). Um die Aufgabe zu verdeutlichen, haben wir unten zwei Beispiele aufgeführt.

Ich glaube, dass die Ziele und Werte der folgenden Paare sind:

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Betriebsrat - Geschäftsführung	sehr unähnlich		X						sehr ähnlich
Miglied der Grünen – Biobauer	sehr unähnlich						X		sehr ähnlich

Bitte schreiben Sie nun Ihre Bewertungen für die unten aufgelisteten Paare:

Ich glaube, dass die Ziele und Werte der folgenden Paare sind:

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Deutschland - NATO	sehr unähnlich								sehr ähnlich
Deutschland –EU	sehr unähnlich								sehr ähnlich
Deutschland – Großbritannien	sehr unähnlich								sehr ähnlich
Großbritannien – NATO	sehr unähnlich								sehr ähnlich
Großbritannien – EU	sehr unähnlich								sehr ähnlich

Welches dieser vier Bilder (A, B, C oder D) spiegelt gibt Ihrer Meinung nach am besten wider wie Deutschland und Großbritannien mit der NATO verbunden sind?

A.



B.



C.



D.



Bild [ ] spiegelt am besten wider wie Deutschland und Großbritannien mit der NATO verbunden sind.

Welches dieser vier Bilder (A, B, C oder D) spiegelt gibt Ihrer Meinung nach am besten wider wie Deutschland und Großbritannien mit der EU verbunden sind?

A.



B.



C.



D.



Bild ☐ spiegelt am besten wider wie Deutschland und Großbritannien mit der EU verbunden sind.

Sie haben den Fragebogen fast vervollständigt. Wir möchten Sie bitten, eine lezte Reihe von Aussagen zu bewerten. Bitte lesen Sie jede Aussage sorgfältig durch und geben Sie in dem dafür vorgesehenen Kästchen die Zahl an, die Ihre Meinung am besten widerspiegelt. Die Skala reicht von 1 (stimme entschieden nicht zu) bis 7 (stimme entschieden zu).

Stimme entschieden nicht zu	Stimme nicht zu	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme weder zu noch nicht zu	Stimme eher zu	Stimme zu	Stimme entschieden zu
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In einer Gruppe von Deutschen habe ich das Gefühl, wirklich dazu zu gehören. ☐

Die Tatsache, dass ich Deutscher/Deutsche bin, ist mir selten wirklich bewußt. ☐

Der einfache Gedanke daran, dass ich Deutsche/r bin, bereitet mir manchmal ein schlechte Gefühl. ☐

Ich fühle mich mit anderen Deutschen stark verbunden. ☐

Deutsch zu sein ist ein wichtiger Bestandteil meines Selbstbildes. ☐

Im allgemeinen bin ich froh, Deutsche/r zu sein. ☐

Ich habe nicht sehr viele Dinge mit anderen Deutschen gemeinsam. ☐

In meinem täglichen Leben denke ich oft darüber nach, was es für mich bedeutet, Deutsch zu sein. ☐

Ich bedauere es oft, Deutsche/r zu sein. ☐

Zum Schluß möchten wir ein wenig über Sie erfahren.

1. Sind Sie ... männlich ☐ weiblich ☐

2. Wie alt sind Sie? ☐

3. Wie würden Sie sich beschreiben? Kreuzen Sie bitte das Kästchen oder die Kästchen an, das/die Sie als zutreffend empfinden.

Deutsch		Ostdeutsch		Andere (bitte dazuschreiben)	
Europäisch		Westdeutsch			

4. In politischen Zusammenhängen spricht man von „links" und „rechts". **Wo würden Sie Ihre Ansichten auf dieser Skala platzieren?** Hier sind auch Kästchen vorgesehen, falls Sie diese Frage nicht beantworten möchten oder falls Sie sich nicht sicher sind, wo Ihre Ansichten auf dieser Skala liegen.

	Links 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Rechts 10
Meine Ansichten sind										

Diese Frage möchte ich nicht beantworten.	
Weiß nicht	

5. Auf einer Skala von 1 bis 10, wie stark würden Sie Ihre Interesse in ... bewerten?

	Niedrig 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Hoch 10	Weiß nicht 00
Deutschlandpolitik											
Europapolitik											

6. Wenn Sie jemand fragen würde, ob Sie sich eher deutsch oder eher europäisch fühlen, wie würden Sie antworten?

	Ganz Deutsch 1	2	3	4	5	6	Ganz Europäisch 7
Ich fühle mich							

I-7 Debrief Sheet (German)

Europäische Wahrnehmungen – Christine Dobbs – University of Wales Swansea

Zum Schluß

Sie haben an dieser Studie teilgenommen. Haben Sie nochmal herzlichen Dank dafür! Vielleicht möchten Sie an dieser Stelle etwas mehr über die Hintergrundfragen der Studie erfahren.

Wir sind daran interessiert, mehr über die Meinungen von Bürgern und Bürgerinnen zum Thema Mitgliedschaft der eigenen Nation in internationalen Organisationen – hier in der NATO und in der Europäischen Union – zu erfahren. Zum Beispiel, fuehlen wir uns durch die Mitgliedschaft Deutschlands in einer internationalen Organisation sicherer oder sollte sich die Regierung ausschliesslich Entscheidungen im nationalen Interesse treffen?: Das zweite Ziel war es zu untersuchen, wie wir zu anderen Mitgliedstaaten stehen. Weiterhin haben wir untersucht, wie unsere Nation zu anderen Mitgliedstatten stehen. Meinen wir beispielsweise, dass sie bevorzugt werden, oder fühlen wir uns aufgrund ihrer Mitzugehörigkeit gemeinsam stärker?

Wenn Sie weitere Fragen zu dieser Studie oder zu meinem Forschungsgebiet im Allgemeinen haben, würde ich mich sehr freuen, von Ihnen zu hören.

Christine Dobbs
Department of Psychology
University of Wales Swansea
Tel: ++44 – 1792 – 513140
Email: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com ODER c.dobbs.182177@swan.ac.uk

I-8 Qualitative Responses

Sample responses supporting each identified connotation are reported in the tables below. Each statement is followed by participant number, where E = British participant and G = German participant. asdasd

Sample responses supporting positive NATO connotations

Connotation	Response
shared goals and values	Alliance, western values *(019E)* Commonality … one goal *(013G)*
together we are strong	We have allies in the other members of NATO which helps us in times of conflict. Having this alliance makes us stronger and more confident, knowing that we have support. *(014E)* Fusion of European states and the USA to secure peace *(009G)*

Sample responses supporting positive EU connotations

Connotation	Response
shared goals and values	Standard democratic law and order. *(001G)*
	A common understanding of certain basic values, the growing together and the cultural exchange between member states etc. *(021G)*
promotes diversity	Important to continue sharing experiences and developing shared culture *(010E)*
	A common understanding of certain basic values, the growing together and the cultural exchange between member states etc. *(021G)*
together we are strong	Good things: breaking down boundaries, euro, easing travel with the EU and extending the numbers of member states, coming into the Union – all leading to a stronger Europe. *(008E)*
	stronger economic power against the USA (+) *(015G)*
supportive of weaker members	Increasing prosperity for poorer European countries *(013E)*
	European integration *(019G)*
freedom of movement	Breaking down boundaries ... easing travel within the EU *(008E)*
	No border controls ... opportunity to work in all EU states *(020G)*

Sample responses supporting negative NATO connotations

Connotation	Response
too powerful	In the interim plays at being the World police *(020G)*
too bureaucratic, unwieldy	As an organisation too large and unwieldy to react quickly or decisively *(005G)*
	In my opinion, perhaps due to the large number of members, too unwieldy in its decisions, too long-winded, until it can take necessary action if required (e.g. war in Yugoslavia). (014G)
too much intersubgroup rivalry	[Members] fighting for competencies, conflicting interests *(010G)*
	needs a detailed concept about its ... internal power relationship *(020G)*
too little power	Largely unable to take action in conflict situations *(009G)*

Sample responses supporting negative EU connotations

Connotation	Response
too bureaucratic, unwieldy	It seems to be a remote bureaucracy which affects our lives and we don't really understand it. *(014E)*
	I get the strong feeling that the basic idea of a European Union has turned into a bureaucratic institution. *(007G)*
too expensive	A lot of very highly paid bureaucrats in Europe milking the system *(002E)*
	Too high in costs *(009G)*
too much intersubgroup rivalry	Lots of infighting amongst member states each with its own agenda. E.g. fishing quotas *(005E)*
	Too many conflicts of interests, many nation-specific interests which are supposed to be pushed through *(022G)*
irrelevant goals	Straight bananas – not very beneficial to us *(004E)*
	Furthermore when I see what the Europe-civil servants are producing for crap (norming bananas, developing standard sizes for apples) *(007G)*
too large *or* enlargement bad	The EU is currently getting too big *(014G)*
	Eastern enlargement (-) *(015G)*

Sample responses supporting threat connotations in NATO

Connotation	Response
Threat to peace	Aggression. *(007E)*
	Duty to participate in conflicts. A bad feeling when thinking of the American dominance. *(018G)*

Sample responses supporting threat connotations in the EU

Connotation	Response
Threat to sovereignty	Great Britain has become subservient to Europe and has forsaken her allies in the commonwealth. *(006E)*
	Los of sovereignty *(017E)*
Threat to ingroup identity	Through the EU several members states have merged, which in my opinion is supposed to boil down to some sort of uniformity at the end of the day. The cultures of the European member states are becoming increasingly similar. *(007G)*
	Too much globalisation and adjustment [assimilation] means the loss of one's own identity. *(017G)*
Threat to ingroup wealth & prosperity	I thing the Euro is an economic catastrophe for Germany and others. *(014G)*
	Loss of purchasing power through the introduction of the Euro. *(009G)*

Appendix II to Study 2

II-1 Ethics Approval

PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT

ETHICS COMMITTEE

Memo

To: Christine Dobbs

Copy: Professor Russell Spears and Dr. Gordon Hodson (Supervisors)

From: Professor David Clark, Chair of Departmental Ethics Committee

Date: 6th January, 2005

Re: **European Perceptions**

The above study has now been reviewed by the departmental Ethics Committee and it is agreed that no substantive ethical issues are raised, provided the information obtained from the questionnaires is kept absolutely confidential and that no personally identifiable information is entered on computer. You may therefore proceed with your study.

A copy of this memo together with a copy of your Ethics Application Form and Risk Assessment Form should be included in the final version of your thesis.

A copy of this memo has also been produced for your project supervisors.

II-2 Form of Consent (English)

Dear Participant

I am a PhD student at the Department of Psychology at the University of Wales Swansea. My main area of interest looks at European perceptions; how we feel about our country, our European neighbours, and what living in Europe means to us personally. The enclosed questionnaire should take around 25 minutes or less to complete.

If you agree to take part in this study, your questionnaire will remain entirely anonymous. All data collected are treated with confidentiality and used only within the framework of this thesis and any resulting publications.

Please remember:

- Participation is entirely voluntary
- There are no right or wrong answers
- You are free to break off your participation at any time

If you agree to participate, please give your informed consent by signing below. Then place this Form of Consent into the small envelope provided and seal it. When you have filled in the questionnaire, please make sure that this is returned together with the sealed envelope.

Thank you very much for your participation.

Christine Dobbs
Department of Psychology
University of Wales Swansea
Tel: ++44 – 1792 – 513140
E-mail: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com or 182177@swan.ac.uk

I agree to participate in this study.

Name: _____

Signed: _____ **Date:** _____

II-3 Instruction Sheet and Questionnaire (English, EU version)

NB: Only one English questionnaire is replicated here; the EU version. In the NATO version, The EU etc. was substituted for NATO throughout. The NATO priming text was an exact replication of the text employed in Study 1 (see App. i). Those measures administered in the control condition only are asterisked in the Method section.

European Perceptions

Instructions

Please take time to read this sheet carefully.

1. **Answer each question as it appears before moving on to the next item.** This is very important for us! The questionnaire is designed so that boxes are provided for all your answers. Simply write your answer in the appropriate box.

2. Also, remember that **there are no right or wrong answers**. Try to answer the questions without too much deliberation. Past studies suggest that our initial responses are likely the truest responses.

3. We would also appreciate it if you could be completely honest in your responses. We assure you again that your responses are **entirely anonymous**.

4. When you have completed the questionnaire, please make sure you return it **together** with the sealed envelope.

Again, many thanks for your cooperation! It is greatly appreciated.

Please read the following statements and write the number which best reflects your opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Tend to disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In a group of British people, I really feel that I belong. ☐

The fact that I'm British rarely enters my mind. ☐

Just thinking about the fact that I'm British sometimes gives me bad feelings. ☐

I feel strong ties to other British people. ☐

Being British is an important reflection of who I am. ☐

In general, I'm glad to be British. ☐

I don't have a lot in common with other British people. ☐

In my everyday life, I often think about what it means to be British. ☐

I often regret that I'm British. ☐

We'd like you to read a short text about the European Union.

The European Union was born out of the European Coal and Steel Community formed in 1951 by six European countries including Germany. The United Kingdom (that is, Great Britain and Northern Ireland) joined in 1973. By 1992 there were 10 members, new forms of co-operation between the member state governments were introduced and the European Union (EU) was created.

Today, the European Union comprises 25 countries from Eastern and Western Europe. Member States have set up common institutions to which they delegate some of their sovereignty so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at a European level. Each country has a certain number of votes which roughly reflects its population. Holding 29 votes each, Great Britain and Germany are two of the four countries with the highest number of votes.

The EU deals with many subjects, including ensuring freedom and security. It is now increasingly involved in creating stability in neighbouring countries, and it is developing its common foreign and security policy, with plans for more co-operation between members on defence questions.

Please answer the following questions by writing your response in the appropriate box. You may, of course, refer back to the text if you want.

Do EU member states retain their full sovereignty? ☐

Which state has been a member of the EU longer; Great Britain or Germany? ☐

How many countries are members of the EU today? ☐

Next, please read the following statements and write the number which best reflects your opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Tend to disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Membership in the EU is a good thing for Great Britain.	
Taking everything into consideration, Great Britain has on balance benefited from being a member of the EU.	
In general, the EU conjures up a negative image for me.	
Great Britain has a lot in common with the EU.	
Great Britain does not have a powerful influence on EU decisions.	
I regard Great Britain as a typical EU member state.	
A strong EU makes for a strong Great Britain.	
Great Britain is not a very good example of a typical EU member state.	
Great Britain is a strong member in the EU.	
Germany has a lot in common with the EU.	
Germany does not have a powerful influence on EU decisions.	
I regard Germany as a typical EU member state.	
A strong EU makes for a strong Germany.	
Germany is not a very good example of a typical EU member state.	
Germany is a strong member in the EU.	

Currently, discussions are underway to introduce a series of projects within the EU. Each of the projects shall be funded by two or three member states, and the projects will benefit all EU members. Great Britain has been paired with Germany and together they form one of the 12 planned Patron Scheme Teams. Each team will be expected to contribute an annual total of:

€ 10,000,000 (€ 10 million).

The Great Britain-Germany Patron Scheme Team will finance a project to increase safety awareness amongst member states. How much do you think Great Britain should contribute towards the € 10 million, and how much do you think Germany should contribute towards the € 10 million? In other words, what do you feel would be a fair distribution?

Great Britain should contribute towards the total of € 10 million: € _____

Germany should contribute towards the total of € 10 million: € _____

Below are three projects that other Patron Scheme Teams are funding. Tell us how much you think Great Britain and how much Germany should receive from these funds. **A reminder: the TOTAL SUM available for all three projects together is € 10 million.**

Project One: To fund six-monthly **Conferences** to discuss future policies on border controls. The Conferences are to be held in rural regions with low employment rates and will hopefully boost the local economies.

Great Britain should receive from the total € 10 million available: € _____

Germany should receive from the total € 10 million available: € _____

Project Two: To fund the introduction of local **Information Centres** where citizens may find out more about the EU. These centres are to be installed in urban regions with low employment rates and will hopefully boost the local economies.

Great Britain should receive from the total € 10 million available: € _____

Germany should receive from the total € 10 million available: € _____

Project Three: To boost social communication within member states, this scheme focuses on our children. Trained teams will go into schools and organise **Multi-Cultural-Schooldays**. This scheme will promote student exchange visits between member states.

Great Britain should receive from the total € 10 million available: € _____

Germany should receive from the total € 10 million available: € _____

We'd like to learn more about your attitudes towards certain groups, and we'd like you to use the thermometer scale on the right to do this. For example, a rating of 80° would be quite favourable, and 20° quite unfavourable. You may give **any number** between 0 and 100. Please be honest. Remember that your answers are strictly confidential.

My attitude towards Great Britain is ☐ °C.

My attitude towards Germany is ☐ °C.

My attitude towards the European Union is ☐ °C.



100°	Extremely favourable
90°	
80°	
70°	
60°	
50°	Neither favourable nor unfavourable
40°	
30°	
20°	
10°	
0°	Extremely unfavourable

Please look at the following pairs. For example, we'd like you to think about which goals and values you think are important for Great Britain and about the goals and values you think are important for the European Union. If you compare these, how similar do you think they are? Please tick or cross the appropriate box on the scale of 1 (very dissimilar) to 7 (very similar). To show you what we mean, we've provided two examples below.

I think the goals and values of the following pairs are:

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
shop steward ↔ managing director	very dissimilar		X						very simila
Green Party member ↔ organic farmer	very dissimilar						X		very simila

Please provide your ratings for the pairs listed below:

I think the goals and values of the following pairs are:

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Great Britain ↔ the European Union	very dissimilar								very simila
Great Britain ↔ Germany	very dissimilar								very simila
Germany ↔ the European Union	very dissimilar								very similar

Below are four pictures (A – D) which show how Great Britain and Germany might be linked to the EU. Please tell us in which order you think these boxes best reflect Great Britain and Germany's relationship to the European Union.



Box ☐ shows best how Great Britain and Germany are linked to the EU.

Box ☐ shows second best how Great Britain and Germany are linked to the EU.

Box ☐ shows third best how Great Britain and Germany are linked to the EU.

Box ☐ shows least well how Great Britain and Germany are linked to the EU.

The European Union means different things to different people. What does the European Union mean to you personally? The scale ranges from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so).

Not at all						Very much so
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Peace

Bureaucracy and/or waste of money

Helps protect Western values

Threat to our identity

Economic prosperity

Too much rivalry amongst member states

Makes us stronger in the world

Too many members from poorer countries

Next, please read the following statements and place the number which best reflects your opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Tend to disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

British success in sports makes me feel proud. ☐

Great Britain's democratic institutions make me feel proud. ☐

When I criticize Great Britain, I do that out of allegiance to my country. ☐

The fact that Britain is number one in Europe makes me feel proud. ☐

The possibilities for political participation in Great Britain make me feel proud. ☐

Due to Britain's economic superiority, we rightly dominate international decisions. ☐

For me, Great Britain is the best country in the world. ☐

I appreciate the British democratic system very much, but I am willing to criticize it in order to achieve further improvement. ☐

Please read through the following list of characteristics:

conventional	loud	loyal to family ties
courteous	domineering	honest
reserved	materialistic	extremely nationalistic
straightforward	sophisticated	generous
humorous	efficient	tradition-loving

Please write in
Column 1: the **five** characteristics from the above list that you feel are most typically **British**.
Column 2: your best estimation of what percent of **British** people you feel share this characteristic
Column 3: whether you think this is a positive, negative or neutral characteristic
Column 4: How well do you feel this characteristic describes you on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so).

Column 1 Characteristic	**Column 2 % of British**	**Column 3 Positive, negative or neutral?**	**Column 4 This describes me: (1 = not at all; 7 = very much so)**
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			

Please read through the list again and tell us:
Column 1: the **five** characteristics from the above list that you feel are most typically **German**.
Column 2: your best estimation of what percent of **German** people you feel share this characteristic
Column 3: whether you think this is a positive, negative or neutral characteristic
Column 4: How well do you feel this characteristic describes you on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so).

Column 1 Characteristic	**Column 2 % of Germans**	**Column 3 Positive, negative or neutral?**	**Column 4 This describes me: (1 = not at all; 7 = very much so)**
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			

You've nearly completed this questionnaire. We'd like you to imagine that you are the only British person working on a team with people from Germany. Also please assume that there are no language barriers. How would you feel working in this team compared to occasions when you were working with a group of British people? The scale ranges from 1 (not al all) to 7 (very much so).

Not at all						Very much so
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

I would feel:

Awkward

Happy

Suspicious

Confident

Defensive

Comfortable

Accepted

Self-conscious

Wary

Finally, we'd like to know a little about yourself.

1. Are you ... male ☐ female ☐

2. How old are you? ☐

3. Are you a student? yes/no ☐ Which Faculty or Department? ☐

4. How would you describe yourself? Please tick ALL OF THE BOXES you feel that apply to you.

British		Irish		Other (please specify)	
English		Scottish			
European		Welsh			

5. Have you ever lived abroad for a period of longer than six months?

yes/no ☐ If so, where? ☐

6. In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale?. (Boxes are provided if you don't want to answer this question or if you don't know where to place your views on this scale.)

	Left 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Right 10
My views are:										

I don't want to answer this question	
I don't know	

7. On a scale from 1 to 10, how strongly would you rate your interest in ... ?

	Low 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	High 10	Don't know
British politics											
European politics											

8. One final question: If someone were to ask you how much you feel British and how much you feel European, what would you reply? The scale ranges from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).

	Not at all 1	2	3	4	5	6	Very much 7
I feel **British**							
I feel **European**							

II-4 Debrief Sheet (English)

NB: Participants received one of two debrief sheets, dependent upon the condition they were allocated to. Below is an integrated version of both sheets.

European Perceptions – Christine Dobbs – University of Wales Swansea

You have now completed the study. Thank you again for your participation, which is greatly appreciated. Perhaps you might be interested to read a little more about the nature of the study at this point.

We are interested in how people feel about their country's membership in international organizations such as NATO and the European Union. For example, does membership make us feel more secure in our daily lives, or would we be happier if our governments made their decisions with national interests only in mind? Do we feel that these organisations are too large?

EU and control conditions:
The second issue was to examine how we feel about other member states. Do we feel, perhaps, that they are over-advantaged, or does their membership make us feel stronger as a larger, common group? In order to investigate this, we devised a task asking you to allocate monies within a Patron-Scheme. The Patron-Scheme was entirely of our own creation, and, to our knowledge, the EU is not planning to introduce a scheme such as this.

NATO condition:
The second issue was to examine how we feel about other member states. Do we feel, perhaps, that they are over-advantaged, or does their membership make us feel stronger as a larger, common group? In order to investigate this, we devised a task asking you to allocate monies within a Patron-Scheme. The Patron-Scheme was entirely of our own creation, and, to our knowledge, NATO is not planning to introduce a scheme such as this.

If you have any further questions concerning this study or my area of research in general, please feel free to contact me.

Christine Dobbs
Department of Psychology
University of Wales Swansea

Tel: ++44 – 1792 – 513140
Email: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com – OR – 182177@swan.ac.uk

II-5 Form of Consent (German)

Sehr geehrte Teilnehmerin, sehr geehrter Teilnehmer!

Ich bin Doktorandin in der Fakultät der Psychologie an der *University of Wales Swansea* in Großbritannien. Mein Hauptinteresse liegt auf dem Gebiet von Europäischen Wahrnehmungen; wie wir über unsere Nation und über unsere europäischen Nachbarn denken, und was das Leben in Europa uns persönlich bedeutet. Wenn Sie sich entscheiden sollten, an dieser Studie teilzunehmen, dürfte das Ausfüllen nicht länger als 25 Minuten dauern.

Falls Sie mit einer Teilnahme einverstanden sind, werden Ihre Daten völlig anonym erhoben. Alle gesammelten Informationen werden streng vertraulich behandelt und nur im Rahmen dieser Dissertation und in eventuell daraus entstehenden Veröffentlichungen verwendet werden.

Denken Sie bitte stets daran:

- Ihre Teilnahme ist absolute freiwillig.
- Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.
- Es bleibt Ihnen jederzeit frei, sich von der Teilnahme zurückzuziehen.

Wenn Sie zur Teilnahme bereit sind, erteilen Sie mir nun Ihre informierte Einwilligung, indem Sie unten unterschreiben. Dann verschließen Sie dieses Einwilligungsblatt in den kleinen, beigefügten Umschlag. Wenn Sie den Fragebogen ausgefüllt haben, vergewissern Sie sich, dass sowohl der Fragebogen als auch der verschlossene Umschlag abgegeben werden.

Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme.

Christine Dobbs
Department of Psychology – University of Wales Swansea
Tel: ++44 – 1792 – 513140
E-mail: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com oder 182177@swan.ac.uk

Ich bin mit der Teilnahme an dieser Studie einverstanden..

Name: _____

Unterschrift: _____ **Datum:** _____

II-6 Instruction Sheet and Questionnaire (German, EU version)

Europäische Wahrnehmungen

Anweisungen

Bitte nehmen Sie sich Zeit, diese Anweisungen sorgfältig durchzulesen.

1. Füllen Sie bitte den Fragebogen aus. **Für uns ist sehr wichtig, dass Sie alle Fragen in der Reihenfolge beantworten, in der sie erscheinen.** Der Fragebogen ist so konzipiert, dass Kästchen für alle Ihrer Antworte zur Verfügung stehen.

2. Denken Sie bitte daran, dass es **keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten** gibt. Versuchen Sie, die Fragen ohne großes Zögern zu beantworten. Frühere Studien deuten darauf hin, dass unsere ersten Reaktionen häufig auch die ehrlichsten Reaktionen sind.

3. Wir würden es sehr schätzen, wenn Sie uns Ihre Meinungen völlig offen mitteilen. Seien Sie bitte nochmal versichert, dass Ihre Daten **absolut anonym** gesamelt werden.

4. Wenn Sie den Fragebogen ausgefüllt haben, vergewissern Sie sich, dass er ZUSAMMEN mit dem Umschlag abgeben wird.

Nochmal herzlichen Dank für Ihre Kooperation!

Bitte lesen Sie die folgende Reihe von Aussagen und schreiben Sie in das jeweils dafür vorgesehene Kästchen die Zahl, die Ihre Meinung am besten widerspiegelt. Die Skala reicht von 1 (stimme entschieden nicht zu) bis 7 (stimme entschieden zu).

Stimme entschieden nicht zu	Stimme nicht zu	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme weder zu noch nicht zu	Stimme eher zu	Stimme zu	Stimme entschieden zu
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In einer Gruppe von Deutschen habe ich das Gefühl, wirklich dazu zu gehören. ☐

Die Tatsache, dass ich Deutscher/Deutsche bin, ist mir selten wirklich bewußt. ☐

Der einfache Gedanke daran, dass ich Deutsche/r bin, bereitet mir manchmal ein schlechtes Gefühl. ☐

Ich fühle mich mit anderen Deutschen stark verbunden. ☐

Deutsch zu sein ist ein wichtiger Bestandteil meines Selbstbildes. ☐

Im allgemeinen bin ich froh, Deutsche/r zu sein. ☐

Ich habe nicht sehr viele Dinge mit anderen Deutschen gemeinsam. ☐

In meinem täglichen Leben denke ich oft darüber nach, was es für mich bedeutet, Deutsch zu sein. ☐

Ich bedauere es oft, Deutsche/r zu sein. ☐

Wir möchten Sie bitten, einen kurzen Text über die Europäische Union zu lesen.

Die EU wurde aus der Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl begründet, die seit 1951 aus sechs europäischen Ländern inklusive Deutschland bestand. Das Vereinigte Königreich (dass heißt, Großbritannien und Nordirland) trat 1973 bei. Bis 1992 gab es 10 Mitgliedstaaten, neue Formen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Mitgliedern wurden eingeführt und die Europäische Union (EU) war gegründet.

Heute besteht die Europäische Union aus 25 Ländern Ost- und Westeuropas. Mitgliedstaaten haben gemeinsame Institutionen eingerichtet. Teile ihrer einzelstaatlichen Souveränität hat jeder Mitgliedstaat diesen Institutionen übertragen, damit in bestimmten Angelegenheiten im gemeinsamen Interesse demokratische Entscheidungen auf europäischer Ebene getroffen werden können. Jedes Land hat eine bestimmte Anzahl von Stimmen, die sich ungefähr nach der Größe der einzelnen Länder richtet. Mit jeweils 29 Stimmen sind Deutschland und Großbritannien zwei der vier Länder mit der höchsten Stimmenzahl.

Die EU befasst sich mit vielen Fragen, wie zum Beispiel die Sicherung von Frieden und Sicherheit. Sie bemüht sich heute zunehmend darum, angrenzende Länder zu stabilisiern. Außerdem entwickelt sie eine gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, bei der eine engere Zusammenarbeit in Verteidigungsfragen geplant ist.

Bitte beantworten Sie nun die folgenden Fragen, indem Sie Ihre Antwort in das jeweilige Kästchen schreiben. Selbstverständlich können Sie dabei nochmals auf den Text zurückgreifen.

Behalten EU-Mitgliedstaaten ihre Souveränität in vollem Maße? ☐

Welches Land ist länger EU-Mitglied? Deutschland oder Großbritannien? ☐

Wie viele Länder hat die EU heute? ☐

Als nächstes lesen Sie bitte die folgenden Aussagen durch und schreiben Sie jeweils in das vorgesehene Kästchen diejenige Zahl, die Ihre Meinung am besten widerspiegelt. Die Skala reicht von 1 (stimme entschieden nicht zu) bis 7 (stimme entschieden zu).

Stimme entschieden nicht zu	Stimme nicht zu	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme weder zu noch nicht zu	Stimme eher zu	Stimme zu	Stimme entschieden zu
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Die Mitgliedschaft in der EU ist eine gute Sache für Deutschland. ☐

Wenn man alles berücksichtigt, hat Deutschland im Großen und Ganzen davon profitiert, ein Mitgleid der EU zu sein. ☐

Im Allgemeinen ruft die EU bei mir ein negatives Bild hervor. ☐

Deutschland hat viele Dinge mit der EU gemeinsam. ☐

Deutschland hat keinen starken Einfluß auf EU-Entscheidungen. ☐

Ich betrachte Deuschland als einen typischen EU-Mitgliedstaat. ☐

Eine starke EU bedeutet ein starkes Deutschland. ☐

Deutschland ist kein gutes Beispiel für einen typischen EU-Mitgliedstaat. ☐

Deutschland ist ein starkes EU-Mitglied. ☐

Großbritannien hat viele Dinge mit der EU gemeinsam. ☐

Großbritannien hat keinen starken Einfluß auf EU-Entscheidungen. ☐

Ich betrachte Großbritannien als einen typischen EU-Mitgliedstaat. ☐

Eine starke EU bedeutet ein starkes Großbritannien. ☐

Großbritannien ist kein gutes Beispiel für einen typischen EU-Mitgliedstaat. ☐

Großbritannien ist ein starkes EU-Mitglied. ☐

Zur Zeit wird diskutiert, ob eine Reihe von Projekten innerhalb der EU eingeführt werden sollte. Jedes Projekt soll von jeweils zwei oder drei der Mitgliedsstaaten finanziert werden, und alle diese Projekte sollen allen Mitgliedsstaaten der EU zugute kommen. Deutschland kooperiert mit Großbritannien und zusammen bilden sie eins der zwölf geplanten Schirmherrschaftsprogramm-Teams (SPTs). Es wird erwartet, dass sich jedes Team jährlich mit einer Gesamtsumme in Höhe von

€ 10.000.000 (€ 10 Millionen) beteiligt.

Das SPT Deutschland-Großbritannien finanziert ein Projekt, das auf das Thema Sicherheit innerhalb der EU aufmerksam machen soll. Mit welchem Beitrag zur Gesamtsumme von € 10 Millionen sollte sich Deutschland daran beteiligen und mit welchem Beitrag zur Gesamtsumme von € 10 Millionen sollte sich Großbritannien daran beteiligen? Anders ausgedruckt; was wäre Ihrer Meinung nach eine faire Kostenverteilung?

Deutschland sollte zur Gesamtsumme von € 10 Mio. beitragen: € _____

Großbritannien sollte zur Gesamtsumme von € 10 Mio. beitragen: € _____

Im Folgenden sind drei Projekte beschrieben, die von anderen SPTs finanziert werden. Sagen Sie uns bitte, wie viel von den verfügbaren Geldern Deutschland und wie viel von den verfügbaren Geldern Großbritannien zugute kommen sollten**. Zur Erinnerung: Für alle drei Projekt zusammen stehen insgesamt € 10 Millionen zur Verfügung!**

Projekt Eins: Die Finanzierung von halbjährlichen **Konferenzen** über künftiges Vorgehen in Bezug auf Grenzkontrolle. Es ist geplant, diese Konferenzen in ländlichen Regionen mit hohen Arbeitslosigkeitsraten zu halten. Somit wird gehofft, zur hiesigen Volkswirtschaft positiv beizutragen.

Deutschland sollte von den insgesamt verfügbaren € 10 Mio. erhalten: € _____

Großbritannien sollte von den insgesamt verfügbaren € 10 Mio. erhalten: € _____

Projekt Zwei: Die Finanzierung von lokalen **Informationszentren**, wo Bürger und Bürgerinnen Auskünfte über die EU einholen können. Diese Zentren sollen in städtischen Regionen mit hohen Arbeitslosigkeitsraten eingerichtet werden. Somit wird gehofft, zur hiesigen Volkswirtschaft positiv beizutragen.

Deutschland sollte von den insgesamt verfügbaren € 10 Mio. erhalten: € _____

Großbritannien sollte von den insgesamt verfügbaren € 10 Mio. erhalten: € _____

Projekt Drei: Eine Finanzierung, um soziale Kommunikation zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten zu erhöhen. Dieses Projekt fokussiert auf unsere Kinder. Geschulte Teams werden jeweils vor Ort **‚Multi-Kulti-Schultage'** organisieren. Somit werden Schüleraustauschmöglichkeiten zwischen Mitgliedsstaaten gefördert.

Deutschland sollte von den insgesamt verfügbaren € 10 Mio. erhalten: € _____

Großbritannien sollte von den insgesamt verfügbaren € 10 Mio erhalten: € _____

Nun sind wir daran interessiert, mehr über Ihre Einstellungen zu verschiedenen Gruppen zu erfahren. Wir möchten, dass Sie uns anhand der unten dargestellten Thermometerskala Ihre Einstellungen zu diesen Gruppen mitteilen. Zum Beispiel, eine Bewertung von 80°C wäre ziemlich positiv und 20° ziemlich negativ. Sie können **jede Zahl zwischen 0 und 100** vergeben. Bitte versuchen Sie möglichst ehrlich zu antworten und denken Sie daran: Ihre Angaben werden streng vertraulich behandelt!

Meine Einstellung gegenüber Deutschland ist ☐ °C.

Meine Einstellung gegenüber Großbritannien ist ☐ °C.

Meine Einstellung gegenüber der Europäischen Union ist ☐ °C.



Positiv	100°	Äußerst positiv
	90°	Sehr positiv
	80°	Positiv
	70°	Ziemlich positiv
	60°	Eher positiv
	50°	Weder positiv noch negativ
	40°	Eher negativ
	30°	Ziemlich negativ
	20°	Negativ
	10°	Sehr negativ
Negativ	0°	Äußerst negativ

Betrachten Sie bitte die folgenden Wortpaare. Wir möchten, dass Sie darüber nachdenken, welche Ziele und Werte Sie als wichtig beispielsweise für Deutschland erachten, und welche Ziele und Werte Sie als wichtig für die EU erachten. Wenn Sie sie vergleichen, wie ähnlich finden Sie sie? Um die Frage zu beantworten, bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kästchen an. Die Skala reicht von sehr unähnlich (1) bis sehr ähnlich (7). Um die Aufgabe zu verdeutlichen, haben wir unten zwei Beispiele aufgeführt.

Ich glaube, dass die Ziele und Werte der folgenden Paare sind:

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Betriebsrat ↔ Geschäftsführung	sehr unähnlich		X						sehr ähnlicl
Mitglied der Grünen ↔ Biobauer	sehr unähnlich						X		sehr ähnlicl

Bitte teilen Sie nun Ihre Bewertungen für die unten aufgelisteten Paare mit:

Ich glaube, dass die Ziele und Werte der folgenden Paare sind:

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Deutschland ↔ die EU	sehr unähnlich								sehr ähnlich
Deutschland ↔ Großbritannien	sehr unähnlich								sehr ähnlich
Großbritannien ↔ die EU	sehr unähnlich								sehr ähnlich

Unten sehen Sie vier Bilder (A – D) aus denen hervorgeht, wie Deutschland und Großbritannien mit der EU verbunden sein könnten. In welcher Reihenfolge, Ihrer Meinung zufolge, repräsentieren diese Bilder Deutschlands und Großbritanniens Verhältnis mit der EU am besten?



Bild ☐ spiegelt am besten wider, wie Deutschland und Großbritannien mit der EU verbunden sind.

Bild ☐ spiegelt am zweitbesten wider, wie Deutschland und Großbritannien mit der EU verbunden sind.

Bild ☐ spiegelt am drittbesten wider, wie Deutschland und Großbritannien mit der EU verbunden sind.

Bild ☐ spiegelt am wenigsten wider, wie Deutschland und Großbritannien mit der EU verbunden sind.

Die EU hat unterschiedliche Bedeutungen für verschiedene Menschen. Was bedeutet die EU für Sie persönlich? Die Skala reicht von 1 (gar nicht) bis 7 (sehr sogar).

Gar nicht						Sehr sogar
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Frieden

Bürokratie und/oder Geldverschwendung

Hilft, westliche Werte zu schützen

Bedrohung unserer nationalen Identität

Wohlstand

Zu viel Konkurrenz zwischen Mitgliedsstaaten

Macht uns stärker in der Welt

Zu viele ärmere Mitgliedsstaaten

Bitte lesen Sie die folgende Reihe von Aussagen und schreiben Sie in das jeweils dafür vorgesehenen Kästchen die Zahl, die Ihre Meinung am besten widerspiegelt. Die Skala reicht von 1 (stimme entschieden nicht zu) bis 7 (stimme entschieden zu).

Stimme entschieden nicht zu	Stimme nicht zu	Stimme eher nicht zu	Stimme weder zu noch nicht zu	Stimme eher zu	Stimme zu	Stimme entschieden zu
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Ich bin auf die deutschen Erfolge im Sport stolz. ☐

Ich bin auf die demokratischen Institutionen Deutschlands stolz. ☐

Wenn ich die Bundesrepublik Detuschland kritisiere, tue ich dies aus Verbundenheit mit meinem Land. ☐

Ich bin stolz darauf, dass Deutschland in Europa die Nr. 1 ist. ☐

Ich bin auf die politischen Mitbestimmungsmöglichkeiten in Deutschland stolz. ☐

Angesichts der deutschen wirtschaftlichen Überlegenheit ist es nur recht und billig, dass wir in internationalen Entscheidungen das Sagen haben. ☐

Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist für mich das beste Land auf der Welt. ☐

Ich schätze das demokratische System in der Bundesrepublik sehr, aber ich bin auch bereit zur Kritik, wenn es um weitere Verbessserungen geht. ☐

Lesen Sie bitte die folgende Liste von Eigenschaften:

konventionell	laut	familientreu
höflich	dominant	ehrlich
zurückhaltend	materialistisch	extrem nationalistisch
direkt	anspruchsvoll	großzügig
humorvoll	effizient	traditionsliebend

Schreiben Sie in
Spalte 1. die **fünf** Eigenschaften aus der obigen Liste, die Ihrer Meinung nach am typischsten **deutsch** sind
Spalte 2. auf wieviel Prozent der **Deutschen** diese Eigenschaften Ihrer Schätzung nach zutreffen.
Spalte 3. ob Sie diese Eigenschaften als positiv, negativ oder neutral bewerten.
Spalte 4. inwiefern diese Eigenschaften auf Sie zutreffen. Die Skala reicht von 1 (gar nicht) bis 7 (sehr).

Spalte 1 Eigenschaft	**Spalte 2 % der Deutschen**	**Spalte 3 Positiv, negativ oder neutral?**	**Spalte 4 Trifft auf mich zu: (1 = gar nicht; 7 = sehr)**
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			

Nun lesen Sie bitte die Liste nochmal und schreiben Sie in
Spalte 1. die **fünf** Eigenschaften aus der obigen Liste, die Ihrer Meinung nach am typischsten **britisch** sind
Spalte 2. auf wieviel Prozent der **Briten** diese Eigenschaften Ihrer Schätzung nach zutreffen.
Spalte 3. ob Sie diese Eigenschaften als positiv, negativ oder neutral bewerten.
Spalte 4. inwiefern diese Eigenschaften auf Sie zutreffen. Die Skala reicht von 1 (gar nicht) bis 7 (sehr).

Spalte 1 Eigenschaft	**Spalte 2 % der Briten**	**Spalte 3 Positiv, negativ oder neutral?**	**Spalte 4 Trifft auf mich zu: (1 = gar nicht; 7 = sehr)**
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			

Sie haben den Fragebogen fast vervollständigt. Stellen Sie sich nun bitte vor, Sie arbeiten als einzige/r Deutsche/r in einem Team von Briten. Gehen Sie außerdem davon aus, dass es keinerlei sprachliche Probleme gibt. Geben Sie bitte auf der folgenden Skala an, wie Sie sich in einem solchen Team fühlen würden im Vergleich zu einem rein deutschen Team. Die Skala reicht von 1 (gar nicht) bis 7 (sehr).

Gar nicht						Sehr
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Ich würde mich fühlen:

Unbehaglich ☐

Glücklich ☐

Misstrauisch ☐

Vertraut ☐

Unterlegen ☐

Wohl ☐

Akzeptiert ☐

Verlegen ☐

Vorsichtig ☐

Zum Schluß möchten wir ein wenig über Sie erfahren.

1. Sind Sie ... männlich ☐ weiblich ☐

2. Wie alt sind Sie? ☐

3. Studieren Sie? ja/nein ☐ In welcher Fakultät? ☐

4. Wie würden Sie sich beschreiben? Kreuzen Sie bitte ALLE KÄSTCHEN an, die Sie als zutreffend empfinden.

Deutsch		Ostdeutsch		Andere (bitte dazuschreiben)	
Europäisch		Westdeutsch			

5. Haben Sie schon mal über einen Zeitraum von länger als sechs Monate im Ausland gelebt?

ja/nein ☐ Falls ja, wo bitte? ☐

6. In politischen Zusammenhängen spricht man von „links" und „rechts". Wo würden Sie Ihre Ansichten auf dieser Skala platzieren? Hier sind auch Kästchen vorgesehen, falls Sie diese Frage nicht beantworten möchten oder falls Sie sich nicht sicher sind, wo Ihre Ansichten auf dieser Skala liegen.

	Links 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Rechts 10
Meine Ansichten sind										

Diese Frage möchte ich nicht beantworten.	
Weiß nicht	

7. Auf einer Skala von 1 bis 10, wie stark würden Sie Ihre Interesse in ... bewerten?

	Niedrig 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Hoch 10	Weiß nicht
Deutschlandpolitik											
Europapolitik											

8. Zum Schluß: Wenn Sie jemand fragen würden, wie sehr Sie sich deutsch und wie sehr Sie sich europäisch fühlen, wie würden Sie antworten? Die Skala reicht von 1 (gar nicht) bis 7 (ganz).

	Gar nicht 1	2	3	4	5	6	Ganz 7
Ich fühle mich **deutsch**							
Ich fühle mich **europäisch**							

II-7 Debrief Sheet (German)

For German participants, there was one single Debrief Sheet handed out.

Europäische Wahrnehmungen – Christine Dobbs – University of Wales Swansea

Zum Schluss

Sie haben an dieser Studie teilgenommen. Haben Sie nochmal herzlichen Dank dafür! Vielleicht möchten Sie an dieser Stelle etwas mehr über die Hintergrundfragen der Studie erfahren.

Wir sind daran interessiert, mehr über die Meinungen von Bürgern und Bürgerinnen zum Thema Mitgliedschaft der eigenen Nation in internationale Organisationen – beispielsweise in der NATO oder in der Europäischen Union – zu erfahren. Zum Beispiel bereitet unsere Mitgliedschaft ein Gefühl von größerer Sicherheit im täglichen Leben, oder wären wir zufriedener, wenn unsere Regierungen Ihre Entscheidungen im Sinne von ausschließlich nationalem Interesse treffen würden?

Unsere Haltung gegenüber anderen Mitgliedstaaten ist der zweite Untersuchungsschwerpunkt dieser Studie. Meinen wir beispielsweise, daß andere Mitgliedsstaaten bevorzugt werden oder überwiegt das Gefühl, aufgrund der Mitgliedschaft gemeinsam stärker zu sein? Um dies zu untersuchen, entwickelten wir eine Aufgabe, wobei Sie gebeten wurden, im Rahmen von Schirmherrschaftsprojekten Gelder zu verteilen. Diese Projektreihe haben wir frei erfunden, und unseres Wissens nach beabsichtige die EU nicht, Projekte wie diese einzuführen.

Wenn Sie weitere Fragen zu dieser Studie oder zu meinem Forschungsgebiet im Allgemeinen haben, würde ich mich sehr freuen, von Ihnen zu hören.

Christine Dobbs
Department of Psychology
University of Wales Swansea
Tel: ++44 – 1792 – 513140
E-Mail: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com ODER 182177@swan.ac.uk

II-8 High and low identifiers based on median splits

A preliminary analysis using median splits determined high and low ingroup, and high and low superordinate category identifiers. The split was defined as 4.33 for ingroup identification (thus 48.6% of participants were low ingroup identifiers) and at 2.00 for superordinate category identification (thus 51.3% of participants were low superordinate category identifiers). As shown in the table below, 56 of the 116 participants were *not* double-high or double-low identifiers. Also, there was a significant association between national groups and high identification with the ingroup ($\chi^2 = 7.25$, $df = 1$, $p < .01$) and with the superordinate category ($\chi^2 = 8.57$, $df = 1$, $p < .01$), where high ingroup identification was weighted towards the British sample, and high superordinate category identification towards the German sample.

Distribution of high, mixed and low dual identifiers based on median splits

	Identification with ingroup-superordinate category				
	LO-LO	LO-HI	HI-LO	HI-HI	Total
British	8	6	28	18	60
German	11	15	7	22	55
Total	19	21	35	40	115

Note: In the above abbreviations, the first term of reference refers to the ingroup, the second to the superordinate category. Thus LO-HI, for example, indicates low ingroup and high superordinate category identification.

Appendix III to Study 3

III-1 Ethics Approval

NB: Approval signature bottom right

ETHICAL COMMITTEE APPLICATION

Title of investigation: European Perceptions

Names and statuses of investigators[1]: Christine Dobbs (PG), Russell Spears (UWC), Gordon Hodson (Brock, CA)

Category of application[2]:

practical class - program of study - single experiment - grant application - other (please-specify)

routine - non-routine

Brief description of purposes: Study 4 in doctorate thesis. Measures: social identity, attitudes to and evaluation of ingroup, outgroup and European Union, perceived power and legitimacy, resource allocation measures, stereotypes, intergroup anxiety PLUS POSSIBLY subtle prejudice

Methods[3]: Subjects: Welsh and English students at UWS (poss. English sample from UWC)

Design: Welsh/English * Eu pos/ Eu neg / Control

Questionnaire: Enclosed is q. for Welsh sample, EU primed positively

See enclosed sheet for further details

Ethical considerations[4]: Does the study involve any of the potentially controversial procedures listed below?

administration of drugs - collection of body fluids or tissue - unpleasant stimulation or procedures - collection of confidential information - deprivation - active deception– withholding information - payment → see enclosed sheet

Are any other potentially controversial procedures involved? Please specify:

/

Indicate on a separate sheet how it is intended to minimise any risk of harm or distress which could arise from each indentified procedure.

Informed consent: Please state how informed consent will be obtained. Attach copies of the consent form to be used plus any participant information sheets.

enclosed

[signature] 20/09/05

III-2 Form of Consent

NB: There are two versions of paragraph one; one for CU students, one for SU and SI students.

Form of Consent

Dear Participant

CU version:
I am a PhD student at the Department of Psychology at the University of Wales Swansea studying under the supervision of Prof. Russell Spears at Cardiff University. My main area of interest looks at European perceptions; how we feel about our country and our neighbours. The enclosed questionnaire should take around 20 minutes or less to complete.

SU and SI version:
I am a PhD student at the Department of Psychology at the University of Wales Swansea. My main area of interest looks at European perceptions; how we feel about our country and our neighbours. The enclosed questionnaire should take around 20 minutes or less to complete.

If you agree to take part in this study, your answers will remain entirely anonymous. All data collected are treated with confidentiality and used only within the framework of this thesis and any resulting publications.

Please remember:
- Participation is entirely voluntary
- There are no right or wrong answers
- You are free to break off your participation at any time

If you agree to participate, please give your informed consent by signing below. Then place this Form of Consent into the small envelope provided and seal it. When you have filled in the questionnaire, please make sure that this is returned together with the sealed envelope.

Thank you very much for your participation.

Christine Dobbs
Department of Psychology
University of Wales Swansea
E-mail: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com or 182177@swansea.ac.uk

I agree to participate in this study.

Name: _____

Signed: _____ **Date:** _____

III-3 Instruction Sheet and Questionnaire (English/EU version)

NB: Only one questionnaire is replicated here; the EU version for English participants where ingroup items were administered before outgroup items. In the GB version, 'The EU, 'Europeans' etc. were substituted for 'Great Britain' 'British' etc. throughout. The control condition contained those items asterisked in the Method section. In the Welsh versions (in the English language), 'England', 'English' etc. and 'Wales', 'Welsh' etc. were transposed. The framing texts in both conditions were identical, except where 'Elections are held as laid out in the Constitution' (EU-version) was replaced with 'Elections are held as laid out in the statutes' (GB-version)

European Perceptions

Instructions

Please take time to read this sheet carefully.

5. **Answer each question as it appears before moving on to the next item.** This is very important for us! The questionnaire is designed so that boxes are provided for all your answers. Simply write your answer in the appropriate box.

6. Also, remember that **there are no right or wrong answers**. Try to answer the questions without too much deliberation. Past studies suggest that our initial responses are likely the truest responses.

7. We would also appreciate it if you could be completely honest in your responses. We assure you again that your responses are **entirely anonymous**.

8. When you have completed the questionnaire, please make sure you return it **together** with the sealed envelope.

Again, many thanks for your cooperation! It is greatly appreciated.

Please read the following statements and write the number which best reflects your opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Tend to disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In a group of English people, I really feel that I belong. ☐

The fact that I'm English rarely enters my mind. ☐

Just thinking about the fact that I'm English sometimes gives me bad feelings. ☐

I feel strong ties to other English people. ☐

Being English is an important reflection of who I am. ☐

In general, I'm glad to be English. ☐

I don't have a lot in common with other English people. ☐

In my everyday life, I often think about what it means to be English. ☐

I often regret that I'm English. ☐

Next, please read the following statements. Again and on the same scale, place the number which best reflects your opinion in the box next to each statement.

England's success in sports makes me feel proud.	
If I criticize England, I do that out of allegiance to my country.	
There is no better place to live in Europe than in England.	
The broad scope for political participation in England make me feel proud.	
For me, England is the best country in the world.	
I appreciate the democratic system in England very much, but I am willing to criticize it in order to achieve further improvement.	

We'd like you to read a short text about the European Union.

The European Union was born out of the European Coal and Steel Community formed in 1951. The United Kingdom (that is, Great Britain and Northern Ireland) joined in 1973. Member states share their borders with other member states.

The people: Life expectancy is 78.38 years and the infant mortality rate extremely low (0.005%). Furthermore, it is estimated that 99% of the population is literate.

The economy: From an economic standpoint, the EU is a leading trading power and financial centre world-wide. Agriculture is intensive and highly mechanized. Services, particularly banking, insurance and business services, account by far for the largest proportion of GDP. By world standards, the economy is strong.

The political system: Democratic decision making lies at the heart of the system. Elections are held as laid out in the Constitution. All citizens aged 18 and over are entitled to vote in parliamentary elections and are eligible to stand for election themselves.

Please answer the following questions by writing your response in the appropriate box.

True or false? The European Union is a strong trading partner. [ ]

What is the minimum legal voting age? [ ]

What percentage of the population is estimated as being illiterate? [ ]

Next, please read the following statements and write the number which best reflects your opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Tend to disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Membership in the EU is a good thing for England. [ ]

Taking everything into consideration, England on balance benefits from being a member of the EU. [ ]

In general, the EU conjures up a negative image for me. [ ]

Please read through the following list of characteristics. For each characteristic, please tick the appropriate box to tell us how much you think it is **typical for English people** in general. The scale ranges from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so).

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
advantaged							
broadminded							
generous							
competitive							
genuine							
rude							
driven							
community-spirited							
honest							
high achieving							
caring							
nationalistic							
powerful							
warm							
intelligent							

And how much do you think each characteristic is **typical for Welsh people** in general?

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
advantaged							
broadminded							
generous							
competitive							
genuine							
rude							
driven							
community-spirited							
honest							
high achieving							
caring							
nationalistic							
powerful							
warm							
intelligent							

And how much do you think each characteristic is **typical for Europeans** in general? Here, please also indicate in the shaded right column whether you think this characteristic is positive (+), negative (-) or neutral (0).

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	+, - or 0?
advantaged								
broadminded								
generous								
competitive								
genuine								
rude								
driven								
community-spirited								

honest							
high achieving							
caring							
nationalistic							
powerful							
warm							
intelligent							



[In the original questionnaire, all three tables were on the same page]

The EU would like to see smaller regions working together to promote regional development. Currently, discussions are underway to introduce a series of projects to do this. The projects are known collectively as the Patron Scheme, and each project will be funded entirely by two EU regions. The regions England and Wales have been paired as a team to fund one of these projects. At the same time, England and Wales will receive monies for ***three*** projects funded by other Patron Scheme teams. In other words, all regions both contribute to the scheme and benefit from the scheme.

The total amount each Patron Scheme team will receive is:

€ 15,000,000 (€ 15 million).

How much do you think England should receive for these three projects, and how much do you think Wales should receive for these three projects? What do you feel would be a fair distribution?

Project One – € 8 million available in total
To fund **brownsite developments** across each region.

England should receive from the total € 8 million available: € _____

Wales should receive from the total € 8 million available: € _____

Project Two – € 4 million available in total
To **promote tourism** within each region.

England should receive from the total € 4 million available: € _____

Wales should receive from the total € 4 million available: € _____

Project Three – € 3 million available in total
To introduce **First-Stop-Free-Lance Centres** offering advice and financial assistance to local people wishing to start up a business. The Centres are to be distributed across each region.

England should receive from the total € 3 million available: € _____

Wales should receive from the total € 3 million available: € _____

GRAND TOTAL: € 15.000.000

We'd like to learn more about your attitudes towards certain groups, and we'd like you to use the thermometer scale on the right to do this. For example, a rating of 80° would be quite favourable, and 20° quite unfavourable. You may give **any number** between 0 and 100. Please be honest. Remember that your answers are strictly confidential.

My attitude towards the English is [ ] °C.

My attitude towards the Welsh is [ ] °C

My attitude towards Europeans is [ ] °C



100°	Extremely favourable
90°	
80°	
70°	
60°	
50°	Neither favourable nor unfavourable
40°	
30°	
20°	
10°	
0°	Extremely unfavourable

Please look at the following pairs. For example, we'd like you to think about which goals and values you think are important for England and about the goals and values you think are important for Wales. If you compare these, how similar do you think they are? Please tick or cross the appropriate box on the scale of 1 (very dissimilar) to 7 (very similar). To show you what we mean, we've provided two examples below.

I think the goals and values of the following pairs are:

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
shop steward ↔ managing director	very dissimilar		X						very similar
police officer ↔ judge	very dissimilar						X		very similar

Please provide your ratings for the pairs listed below:

I think the goals and values of the following pairs are:

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
England ↔ Wales	very dissimilar								very similar
England ↔ the European Union	very dissimilar								very similar
Wales ↔ the European Union	very dissimilar								very similar

Below are four pictures (A – D) which show how England and Wales might be linked to the EU. Please tell us in which order you think these boxes best reflect England's and Wales' relationship to the European Union.



Box ☐ shows best how England and Wales are linked to the EU.

Box ☐ shows second best how England and Wales are linked to the EU.

Box ☐ shows third best how England and Wales are linked to the EU.

Box ☐ shows least well how England and Wales are linked to the EU.

Please think again about England and Wales, and answer the following questions.

On a scale from 1 (very little) to 7 (very much):

how much power do you think England has in the EU? | |

how much power do you think Wales has in the EU? | |

On a scale from 1 (very unfair) to 7 (very fair):

how fair do you personally find the amount of power that England has in the EU? | |

how fair do you personally find the amount of power that Wales has in the EU? | |

And how much you agree with the following statements? The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Tend to disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Overall, English people generally enjoy higher prestige than Welsh people, irrespective of whether it is justified or not.

Within the EU, English people generally enjoy higher prestige than Welsh people, irrespective of whether it is justified or not.

When it comes to matters directly important for England, we have too little power in the EU.

In the EU, English culture is treated with respect.

England's interests are underrepresented in the EU.

The EU does not take England seriously.

England has too little impact on matters in the EU.

The English are treated fairly within the EU.

When it comes to matters directly important for Wales, they have too little power in the EU.

In the EU, Welsh culture is treated with respect.

Wales' interests are underrepresented in the EU.

The EU does not take Wales seriously.

Wales has too little impact on matters in the EU.

The Welsh are treated fairly within the EU.

The European Union means different things to different people. What does the European Union mean to you personally **as an English person**? The scale ranges from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so).

Not at all						Very much so
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Helps protect our values	
Too much rivalry amongst member states	
Economic prosperity	
Threat to our identity	
Makes us stronger in the world	
If wealthier regions subsidise poorer regions, this is a bad thing.	

Are there any other things that come to mind when you think of the EU? Please use the space below to tell us in a few words what else comes to mind.

You've nearly completed the questionnaire. Next, we'd like to know what being European means to you personally. Again, please read the following statements and write the number which best reflects your opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Tend to disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree	Agree	Strongly agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In a group of Europeans, I really feel that I belong. ☐

Just thinking about the fact that I'm European sometimes gives me bad feelings. ☐

I feel strong ties to other Europeans. ☐

In general, I'm glad to be European. ☐

I don't have a lot in common with other Europeans. ☐

I often regret that I'm European. ☐

Finally, we'd like to know a little about yourself.

1. Are you ... male ☐ female ☐

2. How old are you? ☐

3. Are you a student? yes/no ☐ Which Faculty or Department? ☐

4. How do you think of yourself? Please tick ALL OF THE BOXES you feel that apply to you.

British	☐	Irish	☐	Other (please specify)	☐
English	☐	Scottish	☐		☐
European	☐	Welsh	☐		☐

5. In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale?. (Boxes are provided if you'd prefer not to answer this question or if you don't know where to place your views on this scale.)

	Left 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Right 10
My views are:										

I would prefer not to answer this question ☐ I don't know ☐

6. If a general election were to be held tomorrow, which party would get your vote?

I would vote for: ☐

I would prefer not to answer this question ☐ I don't know ☐

7. On a scale from 1 to 10, how strongly would you rate your interest in ... ?

	Low 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	High 10	Don't know
English politics											
British politics											
European politics											

8. One final question: If someone were to ask you how much you feel English, how much you feel British and how much you feel European, what would you reply? The scale ranges from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).

	Not at all 1	2	3	4	5	6	Very much 7
I feel **English**							
I feel **British**							
I feel **European**							

III-4 Debrief Sheet

European Perceptions
Christine Dobbs
University of Wales Swansea

De-briefing

You have now completed the study. Thank you again for your participation, which is greatly appreciated. Perhaps you might be interested to read a little more about the nature of the study at this point.

We are interested in a) how people feel about being English or being Welsh, b) how the Welsh and the English might view each other, and c) how well placed each group feels within Great Britain and within the European Union. For example, do both groups feel that they are being well-represented in Great Britain/in the EU? Does either group feel disadvantaged or feel they have too little say in British/European matters?

To look at these issues, we handed out several versions of our questionnaire. For example, some participants were asked to read a text regarding Great Britain, some a text regarding the EU, and some read neither text.

As is sometimes the case in psychological studies, **we fabricated information in some parts of the study** in order to obtain the measures that we required. Here, we would like to draw your attention to two issues. **Firstly**, the figures quoted in the text on the European Union (e.g. GDP, life expectancy) were, in fact, the figures for Great Britain. Also, the description of Great Britain's democratic system was highly simplified. **Secondly**, one section that was completed by all participants required that you divide monies between England and Wales within a 'Patron Scheme'. The Patron Scheme was entirely of our own creation, and, to our knowledge, neither the EU nor the British government are planning to introduce a scheme such as this.

If you have any further questions concerning this study or my area of research in general, please feel free to contact me. **And good luck in the prize draw! [included where data collection was at SU or SI]**

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